

# SOCIAL FORCES

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# SOCIAL FORCES

May, 1944

## SECURITY AND ADJUSTMENT: THE RETURN TO THE LARGER COMMUNITY\*

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**A**DJUSTMENT rather than security, we are occasionally told, should be the keynote of public policy. Social security is a static concept, one that encounters the risk of failure whenever it attempts to use the social surplus to underwrite inefficient economic arrangements. Thus the Beveridge Plan will mean little for England if England fails to regain her industrial markets after the war.

On the other hand, adjustment, however drastic, is regarded as more dynamic in that it impels men to seek the remedy for their own undesirable situations. Thus, an overall program of social security might use the insuring capacity of the economy to hold people in stranded communities and overcrowded occupations. Social adjustment forces upon each individual the necessity of a decision as to whether he shall change his occupation or migrate to an area in command of greater resources.

It is not the intention of this paper to defend social security by a frontal attack on the theory of social adjustment. The concept of adjustment has too large and respectable a place in the history of economic and social theory for such summary treatment. In mechanics, adjustment means realignment of parts to promote better functioning of the whole. In biology the term in its wider usage has come to denote that adaptation of organisms to the environment and each other that comprises the subject matter of ecology—a usage

that has been accepted by sociology and extended to social and psychological relationships. In economics the wider meaning is mechanistic, corresponding to the analysis of economic equilibrium. In this discussion, however, we are not concerned with specific questions of the market, of supply and demand and price relationships, but simply with the adjustment of individuals to a changing institutional order. It is, of course, in the institutional phases of economics that we should expect the discipline to develop a doctrine closely related to the theory of social adjustment.

Adjustment is a process; security is a status—the goal, whether attained or not, of the process of adjustment. It is the thesis of this paper, however, that social security, instead of representing a new goal made possible by the economic surplus afforded by modern industrialism, represents the return to an accepted value developed in the local community. In the feudal manor and the guild system, society was regarded as a human community, not as an impersonal mechanism, continually adjusting and readjusting. This earlier concept of security, all the more remarkable in that it was attained at the low level of customary status in a niggardly domestic economy, conforms to what we know of security in primitive society.

*England's Road to Social Security*<sup>1</sup> in her experience with the break up of the manor and the guilds, the development of the Poor Law System, the emergence of the Industrial Revolution, and the final enactment of social insurance well shows the nature of this transition. To trace the running fight between the values of security and adjustment in this transition from the community of status to impersonal society would no doubt demand that we telescope a half century of history.

<sup>1</sup> By Karl de Schweinitz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943).

\* Read before the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Southern Sociological Society in Atlanta, Georgia, March 31, 1944. The first draft of this paper, a memorandum to the Social Security Board to which the author was then consultant, was written at the suggestion of Walton Hale Hamilton, then Director of the Bureau of Research and Statistics for the Board. It has since been revised.

## BREAK UP OF THE MANOR

The opening of the sixteenth century found England on the verge of the agrarian revolution, the break up of the manor. Perfected under feudalism and introduced into England by William the Conqueror, this system of landholding had developed two main classes: the landholders and the servile laborers. The feudal manor was a unit of government as well as of tillage, having as responsible head the lord of the manor. Theoretically the lord had the disposal of the land and its tenants; actually the manor was, as the Hammonds have pointed out, essentially a cooperative agricultural community in which custom and tradition regulated even the methods of agriculture. As a social system the manor provided security; but as an economic organization its usages and customs restricted efficiency, for they hindered adjustments to change.<sup>2</sup>

Men belonged to the land and in a measure land belonged by tradition to the serfs who tilled it. The servile laborers also belonged to a community and the community belonged to them in the sense that it functioned in their behalf. Under the system of feudal land tenure the obligation of the serf to work on the manor implied his right to maintenance. The worker did not merely receive a day's pay for a day's work; he was reasonably sure of a lifetime of economic support in return for the services of his working life on the manor. Mass poverty was great, but there was no wandering poor; the hazards of war, pestilence, and re-occurring scarcity were present, but in this community it remained true that, as long as there was security for one, there was a measure of economic security for all. There was no unemployment and the helpless aged were not thrown out to starve.

This social order was broken down by the transition to pecuniary standards. Commerce in agricultural products replaced subsistence agriculture. The prestige of the lord, as it came to pass, was no longer determined by the numbers of his retainers but by the amount of his income. Lords with armies of retainers were already "land poor" when the profit from sheep farming came to outweigh the returns that might be secured from working

the servile population under the self-sufficing non-pecuniary economy of the manor.

The wool trade, the introduction of large scale sheep farming, and the enclosure movement displaced thousands. It resulted, write the Webbs, "in the rise in England of the Tudor Kings of a new class of men, the 'poor' who had no claim on the manor or on any feudal superior for subsistence."<sup>3</sup> The classic statement of this case has been made by the Hammonds: "The enclosures created a new organization of classes. The peasant with rights and a status, with a share in the fortunes and government of his village, standing in rags but standing on his feet, makes way for the laborer with no corporate rights to defend, no property to cherish, no ambition to pursue, bent beneath the fear of his masters and the weight of a future without hope."<sup>4</sup> The transition from a community of status to adjustment in an impersonal society was under way.

The movement was more than a transition from a subsistence to a commercial agriculture; it was aided and abetted by other factors. Men were detached from their anchorage to place and custom by the demands of kings and nobles for recruits for their armies. When the armies were disbanded many of these recruits became wandering vagrants. The recurring epidemics of plagues, culminating in the Black Death, limited the supply of laborers and soldiers and created demands that tore men from their accustomed place and occupation. Needs existed in the growth of towns for manual workers in trade and manufactures. With the expansion of commerce and industry the rulers of England, write the Webbs, connived at the escape of people out of serfdom, since the hired man proved the superior in efficiency to the bondsman in agriculture, in war and in industry.<sup>5</sup>

Sir F. M. Eden in 1797 pointed out that the uprooting of a great body of people continually in a state of destitution coincided with the creation of a numerous class dependent for livelihood entirely on being hired for day labor at wages. In a passage that deserves quoting at length he wrote:

When the nation consisted principally of the two classes of landholders and servile cultivators, the

<sup>2</sup> J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry*, pp. 81-84. See also the excellent summary of this work in Floyd N. House, *Range of Social Theory* (New York: Henry Holt, 1929), pp. 422-34.

<sup>3</sup> Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *English Poor Law History*, Part I, pp. 44-46.

<sup>4</sup> J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Village Laborer*, p. 103.

<sup>5</sup> The Webbs, *op. cit.*

latter had, at least in ordinary times, a fund to which they could resort for maintenance; and although they could not acquire property, they were, in general, certain of food because it was the obvious interest of those who could command their services to provide for their support. A West Indian island, perhaps, is a picture of the condition of the agricultural class in this country soon after the conquest. The proprietor of a sugar plantation . . . is bound to feed the Negroes belonging to his establishment, whether they are disabled by sickness, accident, or old age. . . . The capital stock of Yorkshire is perhaps ten times as great as that of the Island of Jamaica; and the number of those who, in that part of England, have no visible means of support and subsist entirely on charity, I doubt not exceeds those in Jamaica of a similar description, in as great a proportion. Rousseau justly inquires, "Why is it that in a thriving city the poor are so miserable, whilst such extreme distress is hardly ever experienced in those countries where there are no instances of extreme wealth?"<sup>6</sup>

The loss of security for the working class was not regretted on every side. The Webbs feel that the multiplication of poverty was not regarded with entire disfavor by the rulers of England. "Every-one but an idiot" wrote Arthur Young,<sup>7</sup> "knows that the lower classes must be kept poor or they will never be industrious." The author of the *Fable of the Bees* drew a moral to the same effect. "The poor," he wrote, "have nothing to stir them to labor, but their wants, which it is wisdom to relieve but folly to cure." Wrote the inventor of the modern police system, "Without a large proportion of poverty, there could be no riches, since riches are the offsprings of labor while labor can only result from a state of poverty."<sup>8</sup>

#### THE POOR LAWS

With free laborers accordingly came the destitute and with the destitute came that remarkable development of the English Poor Laws, directed against the displaced farmers which the law came to call "sturdy beggars." In the history of the Poor Laws, say the Webbs, we have a history of the relations between what Disraeli termed, "The two nations over which the kings and queens of

England ruled, namely, the rich and the poor."<sup>9</sup> For our purposes it is not necessary to trace this history in detail. The earliest group of laws relating to the poor, the Statute of Laborers, were methods of thrusting the free laborer back into the social status (at least) of the serfdom from which he had escaped. The earliest law for relief of the poor, found in the statutes of Henry VIII in 1531 was significantly entitled: "How Aged Poor and Impotent Persons Compelled to Live by Alms Shall Be Ordered." It did no more than direct that the justices shall give the impotent poor licenses to beg and see that each is assigned a defined district.<sup>10</sup>

In the main, however, the penal statutes threatened dire punishment to sturdy beggars, sought to make labor compulsory, and disciplined those who were without work. The point can well be made in the early period that, instead of moving into the free play of social adjustment, the displaced laborer escaped one level of social control only to fall into another. "As his plight grew worse," write the Hammonds, "game laws, vagrancy laws, and settlement laws were drawn more tightly around the laborer's life and liberty. He became a kind of public serf at the disposal of the parish overseer, maintaining himself by poaching and stealing when his allowance no longer kept him."<sup>11</sup> With thousands of unemployed roaming the country the various penalties proved impossible to enforce. Repression was attended with attempted generosity, and laws for the ordering of the poor came to be subjected to abuses from both sides.

It is interesting to note that even the much abused Law of Settlement and Removal (13 and 14 Charles II, 1662) with its succeeding legislation grew out of the accepted doctrine that every person, serf or freedman, was a member of some local community to which he owed obligation, and from which he was entitled to expect some measure of protection and, when in need, some undefined support. Out of such a wholesome basis in the local community's responsibility for the security of its members, grew the whole system whereby officials shunted the poor from parish to parish in the effort to escape responsibility.

The case for a national instead of a local interest in the dependent is shown by the social effect of

<sup>6</sup> Sir F. M. Eden, *State of the Poor*, 1797, I, pp. 58-59.

<sup>7</sup> Arthur Young, *Tour Through the East of England*, 1771, IV, p. 361.

<sup>8</sup> Patrick Colquhoun, *A Treatise on Indigence*, 1806, pp. 7-9.

<sup>9</sup> The Webbs, *op. cit.*, I, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> The Webbs, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 44-45.

<sup>11</sup> The Hammonds, *Rise of Modern Industry*, p. 96.



giving parishes the legal right to remove certain classes who were likely to become public charges. One device of the overseers to prevent the increase of their chargeable poor was to hinder the marriage of poor persons by encouraging the destruction of cottages. The result of this action to restrict the marriage of the poor was to encourage the growth of bastardy. Bastardy, as such it may be remarked in passing, was not an offense against the laws of England, but for the poor to have illegitimate children was an offense against the Poor Law since it was likely to raise the parish rates. Illegitimate children become burdens on the parish and a succession of laws were passed with the view of forcing parents to provide for support of their illegitimate offspring.

The procedure, after 1733, was to take the oath of the woman before a Justice as to the father of her child and to arrest the man, who was then forced to give security for its support. Many opportunities for abuse existed. Pregnant women were sent back to place of settlement in time for delivery, for bastards took the settlement of the parish where they were born. If possible, her own parish likewise turned the unfortunate mother adrift and every other parish hounded her out. If parishes failed to rid themselves of such women before delivery, an affiliation order was served on the putative father. There followed the imprisonment of the reputed fathers, the forced marrying between parents, or the punishment of women. The whole attitude toward the question was absolutely non-moral, yet the stringency failed to suppress bastardy. The whole procedure serves to show the effect of leaving the administration of poor laws to small local units.<sup>12</sup>

The effect of confining responsibility to the local community was to prevent the free play of adjustment within the larger society. Thus the Act of Settlement penalized the development of the country by depriving the laborer of any incentive to look for work outside his parish and by terrifying him with the harsh provisions of the vagrancy laws. It also brutalized the administration of the act. Dorothy Marshall concludes: "To have bullied the helpless, corrupted the children, and polluted the moral life of the countryside—such were the consequences of leaving to the parishes

a problem which it had neither the wit nor the will to solve."<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, the point can be made that however crudely the poor laws were administered, they admitted a social responsibility for insecurity. In their ineffectual way, they functioned and were intended to function as a cushion for poverty and a safety valve for a sorely tried social order. They erred greatly on the side of local responsibility, but they looked back to a time when the local community had functioned under such responsibility. While they served as a poor substitute for any approach to security, it can be pointed out that their replacement by modern social insurance was the completion of a logical evolution.

#### THE COMMUNITY OF CUSTOM IN INDUSTRY

So far we have neglected a most important aspect of this transition, the medieval organization of industry and trade. In the merchant guilds and the craft guilds a community of status and security had grown up. The guilds represented a system of customary regulation by small producers' associations based on the relative economic independence of local areas. Merchant guilds developed first, but by the middle of the twelfth century the organization of artisans into publically regulated occupational associations was normal and universal throughout the towns and cities of Western Europe.

"In England the early boroughs were communities that had secured their exemption from the obligations of the manor; within their walls the guilds helped to control industry and commerce, just as outside their walls the manor court helped to control agriculture."<sup>14</sup> These associations of producers, as the Hammonds point out, differed in power, character, history, and length of life, "for the guilds did not cover all industrial life, just as the common field communities did not cover the whole field of agriculture."<sup>15</sup>

The development of the craft guild to the height of its power in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is explained, says Henri Pirenne, as the result of two principles acting simultaneously: voluntary association and legal authority. "These two original contradictory tendencies merge at the moment when the authorities recognized the work-

<sup>12</sup> Dorothy Marshall, *The English Poor in the 18th Century: A Study in Social and Administrative History* (London, 1926), pp. 206-224.

<sup>13</sup> Dorothy Marshall, *ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>14</sup> The Hammonds, *Rise of Modern Industry*, p. 103.

<sup>15</sup> The Hammonds, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

ers' associations as compulsory in reserving to their members the right to devote themselves to a particular branch of industry."<sup>16</sup> The establishment of just prices, the expulsion of those who dealt in short weights and shoddy materials, the establishment of group monopoly over local trade and production—in short, the whole system of customary regulation in the interest of group security came out of this combination of voluntary association and legal power.

Throughout its history the system was an evolving institution. It changed and finally disintegrated because of internal struggle for power within the guilds and the transition from domestic to world markets without. Internally the guilds moved from their original arrangement for the joint control of handicraft industry by a large number of small masters to a hierarchal structure with the principal power concentrated in the hands of a few.

This came about partly because of a great differentiation in function. The craft guilds represented interests and functions that were combined in the fourteenth century but quite separate by the seventeenth. The medieval craftsman as Unwin showed in his *Industrial Organization in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* was at once a workman, a foreman supervising his journeymen and apprentices, an employer undertaking responsibilities and supplying capital for materials, food, and wages, a merchant buying something and a shopkeeper selling something. By the end of the seventeenth century he had split up into no less than six different persons: the large merchant, the shopkeeper, the merchant employer, the large master, the small master, and the journeyman.

By the fifteenth century it had become more and more difficult for the small master to keep a status in the guild or for the apprentice to attain it. Devices of all kinds were adopted to limit influence and effective membership to the richer craftsmen. Thus the Guild Merchant of Newcastle excluded anyone with "blue nails" since this indicated that he worked with his own hands at dyeing.<sup>17</sup> Although they still retained their monopoly in the seventeenth and well into the eighteenth century, the craft guilds were in a process of dissolution throughout this period because of the extension of

domestic manufactures and the introduction of new industries organized on a more modern basis.

Because their surviving practices impeded the process of adjustment the early contribution of the guilds to the security of craftsmen was not highly regarded by the leaders of the Enlightenment in England. It is the conclusion of Henri Pirenne, however, that the guild system must be recognized as the only source of protection to the worker before the development of social legislation in the nineteenth century. "At the height of its development," he writes, "the institution assured the craftsman an existence as satisfactory from the economic as from the social point of view."<sup>18</sup> It is true that attempts to trace the origin of the labor union movement to the guilds have failed, but the similarity of function is striking. Like the guilds, modern union organization depends on the combination of voluntary association with legal authority and, like the guilds, these organizations are accused of developing policies of restriction and monopoly in the attempt to preserve the security of their members.

At first the transition from the local community was in the direction of social control on a wider basis. The place of the guilds as they lost their efficiency and power was taken in part by the national government. The first impulse of the government was to reform the guilds and adapt them to new needs. Thus the acts of 1531 and 1536 tried to protect apprentices from the disqualifying practices that had been introduced and forbade guild officers to require an oath from journeymen that they would not set up for themselves.<sup>19</sup>

By the time of Elizabeth the State was trying to do for industry what the guilds had done when they were effective organs. Thus wherever industry had formerly been regulated by guilds of producers receiving their authority from the city, it was now regulated by the Crown and Parliament which bestowed patents and privileges on bodies or companies that represented particular interests in a trade. Thus these companies turned into privileged bodies bent on monopoly, and, as the Industrial Revolution gathered strength, the experiment in regulation was followed by that strong reaction against State authority over industry which finally culminated in the victory

<sup>16</sup> Henri Pirenne, "Guilds," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, VII, p. 211.

<sup>17</sup> R. H. Gretten, *The English Middle Class*, p. 65.

<sup>18</sup> Henri Pirenne, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>19</sup> The Hammonds, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

of the classic plea for liberalism and laissez-faire in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776).

Even as the Industrial Revolution loomed, earlier trends survived in laws protecting the security of the craftsman in his craft. Many of these regulations supported minimum wages, others attempted to restrict the trend toward mechanization. Among the many laws regulating the ancient woolen industry was one prohibiting use of a machine known as the "gig mill" for raising the nap on fibers in the cloth. The difficulties facing the attempt to underwrite security by outlawing technological change can be indicated by the fact that this law tended to become a dead letter because of the doubt that the gig mill used in the eighteenth century was the machine that Parliament had forbidden in the sixteenth. In the long struggle over the transition, the men were constantly prosecuting or threatening to prosecute masters for the infringement of these and similar acts. For several years in succession Parliament suspended these laws but finally the masters gained the day and in 1809 Parliament repealed them.

Throughout this whole period of social change, the workmen and the peasants, write the Hammonds, would have refused to admit that they were merely defending obstructive survivals from the past. "They saw leaders of the State defending property in land and capital with great zeal and they felt that their own property was equally entitled to the protection of the law."<sup>20</sup> Thus, the cotton weavers wrote in a petition manifesto in 1823:

The weavers' qualifications may be considered as his property and support. It is a real property to him as buildings and lands are to others. Like them his qualifications cost time, application, and money. There is no point of view (except visible and tangible) wherein they differ.<sup>21</sup>

"Parliament may be tender of property," said the peasant in a case put to Arthur Young, "all I know is that I had a cow and an act of Parliament has taken it from me."<sup>22</sup>

#### THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

In the background was the emerging Industrial Revolution. The old industrial order, wrote Arnold Toynbee, was suddenly "broken in pieces

by the mighty blows of the steam engine and the power loom." Actually it is doubtful that we should apply the term "Revolution" to a movement which as Herbert Henton<sup>23</sup> writes had been 150 years in the making and 150 years in the completion. Toynbee saw 1760 as the eve of the Industrial Revolution, but Unwin felt that in 1760 "the Revolution had been in preparation for two centuries."

In terms that apply equally well to earlier conditions, Arnold Toynbee wrote of conditions preceding the Industrial Revolution in England: "Though there were periods of keen distress, there was no such thing as long-continued widespread depression of trade. Over-production was impossible when the producer lived next door to the consumer and knew his wants as well as the country shoemaker of today knows the number of pairs of boots that are wanted in his village." The market was almost as narrow as the local community. Toynbee writes: "The majority of employers were small masters, in ideas and habits but little removed from the workmen out of whose rank they had risen, and to whose rank they might return once more. Few there were that did not work with own hands and many taught trade to their apprentices."

"Between men living in such close and continuous relations the bonds were naturally very intimate." His master knew his affairs, his particular wants, his resources, the number of his children. If the weaver were sick the master lent him money; if trade were slack, he kept him on at a loss. "Masters and men," said an employer, "were in general so joined together in sentiment, and if I may be permitted to use the term, in love with each other that they did not wish to be separated if they could help it." It was not uncommon for workers to be employed by some master for 40 years. "It seldom happens," said a weaver, "that the small clothiers change their men except in case of sickness and death." A workman would live and die on the spot where he was born, and the same family would remain for generations working for the same employer's family in the village. The master busied himself with the welfare of the workmen.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> "Industrial Revolution," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, VIII, p. 5. An article critical of Toynbee's interpretation.

<sup>24</sup> Arnold Toynbee, *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution* (new ed., London, 1908), pp. 179-88.

<sup>20</sup> The Hammonds, *Rise of Modern Industry*, p. 108.

<sup>21</sup> The Hammonds, *Town Laborer*, p. 300.

<sup>22</sup> The Hammonds, *Village Laborer*, p. 59.



The rights granted laborers, however, were not enforceable. They were customary and personal, the outcome of a primary group relationship that was often granted but could not be demanded. Along with this relationship went laws against combination and conspiracy on the part of laborers. "We have," wrote Adam Smith, "no acts of Parliament against combining to lower the price of work but many against combining to raise it." Thus, points out Toynbee, a breach of contract on the part of the employer was a civil offense; on the part of the laborer, a crime. Organizations of employers were encouraged, but the organization of workers could be, and was, dealt with under the law of conspiracy. "The workman," he concludes, "half way between a serf and a citizen, was treated with kindness by those who injured him; he was protected, depressed and dependent."

In the pages of the Hammonds, Toynbee, and others the transition to insecurity was no less marked. Population "was torn up by the roots," like industry, the population "was dragged from cottages in distant villages into factories and cities," to become a collection of hands, "the living tools of whom the employer knew less than he did of his steam engine."<sup>26</sup>

As specialization increased, so the thesis runs, the laborer's claim on his community for security and his power to create work for himself decreased. When with simple tools he could still create goods, to find someone to buy those goods was not easy. The specialization of the market was already creating the wholesale and the retail merchant in their more modern form. The introduction of machinery means specialization of function in production, and now the worker could no longer create goods with the tools of the master craftsman. The new tools were in a factory and his access to that factory depended on whether the owner needed him. The owner needed him only when the state of trade was such that his labor would return a profit.

The particular system of industrial relationships which grew up in England during this long transition came to be rationalized in a system of politico-economic and legal individualism dignified under the term of "economic law." The "dismal science" of economics rationalized the mobility, the poverty, and the insecurity of the worker in terms of a laissez-faire order perfectly adjusted to

the maximization of production. Even the liberalism of the day "regarded society as existing to enforce respect for rights that man brought with him into society; not as a community whose members and classes served different purposes and stood in some organic relation to one another."<sup>26</sup> This type of reasoning culminated in a theory of wages of which the Hammonds write: "The first discovery, following Adam Smith that the state could not really protect the workman, was followed by another, even more interesting, that the employer could not really injure him." The recompense of labor was fixed by natural laws, and no human effort could really alter it.

The ultimate beneficence of this system attained classical statement in that passage in which Adam Smith compared competition to the invisible hand of Providence. "As every individual," wrote Smith, "... endeavors as much as he can to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry and so direct that industry that its product may be of the greatest value, every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He is led as by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention."<sup>27</sup>

In a particular period in the evolution of institutions the prevailing arrangements were seen in terms of universal economic laws, as cosmic as the physicist's law of matter. This law determined that men everywhere should gain their subsistence in a certain way and under certain conditions. To oppose the working of economic law was worse than futile, to use the economic surplus to underwrite a minimum of social security would not only cancel the gains of technology; it would tear asunder the very mechanism by which the social and economic order functioned. And Herbert Spencer, having developed an analysis of human society as a functioning organism of inter-related members, threw the whole weight of his authority behind this dogma without realizing the contradiction involved.

#### CONCLUSION

In so far as we can draw inferences about social values and theories from a survey of this type, it is not our contention that the doctrine of social adjustment has no future; it is rather the conclusion that

<sup>26</sup> Arnold Toynbee, *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution*, passim.

<sup>26</sup> The Hammonds, *Rise of Industry*, p. 214.

<sup>27</sup> *The Wealth of Nations* (London, 1904 edition), p. 421.

the doctrine of security has a past—a past which to sociological analysis appears quite respectable. The crux of the argument with which economists may be concerned—and doubtless rightly so—is whether the underwriting of a minimum degree of security against the risks of unemployment and old age tends to break down the whole process of adjustment. Obviously modern nations in their enactment of social insurance—from the first legislation of 1870 in the Germany of Bismarck to our Social Security Act of 1935—have made the political decision that it does not.

Our tradition of security had its origins in the organization of the local community—communities that in agriculture and industry were synonymous with the arrangements of feudalism and the guilds. In the transition to modern industrialism the worker initially moved from a reasonable expectation of security from unemployment and a dependent old age to a not unreasonable expectation of insecurity.

This transition from the community of custom to impersonal society in the Tönnies' sense involved the change from a doctrine of security and status to one of adjustment to an impersonal economic and social order. The risks facing the workers were thus the consequences of an industrial transition from which the state and society as a whole have benefited. Their insecurity, moreover, was rationalized in a doctrine of adjustment which by the very nature of the transition included the values of individualism and liberalism. Actually, society, before the process of industrialization got under way, existed under one form of social control; it floundered for a time in the trough of adjustment; and it is now returning to another system of control. Today it is recognized that in the attempt to mitigate these risks only the great power of the modern state can succeed to the place once held by the local community.

Security, most historians would conclude, is not one of the historic rights of Englishmen. The rights of Englishmen owed much to the historic achievements of liberalism but neither the men of the Enlightenment nor the leaders in the movement for individual freedom were predisposed to see either formal or informal values in the older communities. It was the claim of liberal leaders that they overthrew the survivals of serfdom as well as the monopolies and restrictions inherited from the guilds. We rightly honor the triumph of liberalism, but in seeking to give men an abstract

freedom these movements ignored earlier community values.

In America we had no comparable background, and for a long time our unappropriated resources made the problem of security seem so remote that there was no established right of the poor to relief such as had come to prevail in England. Thus it was a moot question whether our national constitution, written at the height of the struggle for personal and political freedom, embodied the dogma of a perfectly adjusting laissez-faire order. Witness the oft-quoted protest of Mr. Justice Holmes to the effect that it was not the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics* as the basic law of the land.

For a long time it seemed that under this philosophy our responsible and propertied classes, unlike those of England, would continue to hold the attitude that virtually all regulatory and protective legislation could be nullified on constitutional grounds. This essentially false dilemma of freedom and security operated to delay America's achievement of social security behind that of most countries in Western civilization.

Actually the passing of the old individualism was assured as soon as those below the middle classes were granted sufficient public education to realize that for the vast majority, wage labor was not a temporary stage on the road to place and power.<sup>28</sup> The laborer's next lesson was to learn the relative inability of wage labor under successive depressions to furnish him steady employment, security, and comfort for old age at the status to which he had perforce resigned himself. The change in our society may be marked as the precise date at which the American Federation of Labor officially decided that the term social insurance was not synonymous with the "dole."

The demand for social security in our day is the resultant of a relatively high degree of personal and political freedom, on the one hand, and a growing consciousness of dependence on the social and economic order as a going concern on the other. The legal rationalization by which this change was incorporated in the American constitutional system is emblazoned in the luminous prose of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the historic decision which validated the Social Security Act under the terms of the general welfare clause. It is hardly to be imagined that we shall ever reverse this step.

<sup>28</sup> See W. B. Catlin, *Labor Problems*, p. 17.

## SOME BASIC QUERIES RESPECTING WORLD REGIONALISM

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IN THE opinion of many, the globe, and not merely the nation or even the continent or oceanic area, has become the areal unit within which a host of planning and functional activities relating to administration and well-being must be carried on. Regionalism on a world scale has been actively and widely advocated recently, especially in the United States, as an aid—in fact, an indispensability—in conducting these tasks. It is mentioned especially as an aid in world unity as well as administration.

Certain assumptions, which are sometimes lost sight of, underlie the whole matter of post-war world organization. The more basic of these will be stated as a background for the critical examination of world regionalism to follow.

### BASIC ASSUMPTIONS POSITED

1. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ALL WORLD ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS IS WORLD PEACE. A durable and endurable peace is what we are fighting for now, and what we are hoping can be effectively and permanently instrumentalized in the post-war world. Whatever seems to foster or guarantee it, whether regionalism or universalism, or some variation or combination of them, or any other "ism" merits critical attention.

2. PEACE IN AN AREA, WHATEVER ITS SIZE, IS A MATTER OF ORDER AND SECURITY. Order implies (1) freedom from internal disorder and external aggression, and (2) such an arranging and systematizing of the relationships of individuals and groups within the community that there is a high degree of regularity and predictability of socially satisfactory conduct. The experience of the millennia indicates that peace is an achievement. It consists of recurrent relationships and tasks which have been "ordered" by convention or design, that is, they have been standardized, regularized, and functionalized.<sup>1</sup>

When you have order a considerable degree of security exists; the security, in turn, is a matter of

<sup>1</sup> J. O. Hertzler, "Some Basic Sociological Postulates Underlying World Organization and Peace," *Social Forces*, 22 (Dec., 1943), 125-130.

safety of the person and the group, economic sufficiency and well-being, and political justice.

3. ORDER AND SECURITY ARE ACHIEVED BY MEANS OF AN EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTING MACHINERY. It is axiomatic that peaceful and prosperous human community life, regardless of the size of the area in which it is carried on, must be effectively organized or instrumentalized into cooperative effort patterns if the basic objectives are to be met. This organization consists primarily of a minimal but sufficient array of institutions capable of meeting the ever-changing functional needs. These institutions must be efficiently and authoritatively administered.

4. THE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES NEED NOT AFFECT EVERY PHASE OF THE LIFE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD. Among a given people or society an all-inclusive institutional organization is essential. But in inter-state relations they can be limited, at the present time, to a few well-defined purposes, if war is to be prevented. Brecht presents three; (1) the maintenance of certain minimum standards of freedom and equality within states; (2) the maintenance of a certain minimum of political institutions to secure popular representation and free elections; and (3) the maintenance of certain minimum conditions of free communication, free traffic, and free commerce with the world at large.<sup>2</sup>

In order to get at the basic contentions, essentials, and difficulties of world regionalism as one person sees it, a series of basic queries are stated which are then critically examined.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Arnold Brecht, "Distribution of Powers between the International Government and the Governments of National States," *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 37 (Oct., 1943), 862-872.

<sup>3</sup> Some other recent critical treatments of general or specific significance are: Brecht, *ibid.*; Cheng Ch'eng-k'un, "Regionalism in China's Postwar Reconstruction," *Social Forces*, 22 (Oct., 1943), 1-20; James T. Watkins, IV, "Regionalism and Plans for Post-War Reconstruction: The First Three Years," *Social Forces*, 21 (May, 1943), 379-389; Nicholas Doman, "World Reconstruction and European Regionalism," *Social Forces*, 21 (March, 1943), 265-272;



## BASIC QUERIES FOR CRITICAL EXAMINATION

1. WHAT IS THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF GLOBAL REGIONALISM? The general proposition seems to be that some sort of subglobal division of nations and peoples is necessary for successful administration of those affairs affected with a world interest. The underlying theoretical contentions run about as follows: It has been necessary to break up the larger nations into regions as administrative units in order, (a) to avoid the "splintering" multiplicity, for example, of forty-eight separate states of unequal size and population; (b) on the other hand, to effect the decentralization; and (c) the more efficient over-all cooperation and integration which has come with increasing national federal planning and control.

For similar reasons, it is argued, a world regional organization is desirable as we face the need and the likelihood of some kind of world organization with its attendant administration. It is maintained that it is even more important for the world than a nation that the weaknesses, wastes, and hazards, both of excessive separatism, particularism, and isolationism, and of highly centralized and thinly diffused regulation, remote-control regimentation, and "giantism" generally be avoided. The oft-uttered principle to the effect that the larger the group and area affected the greater the need for "organization" and coordination, is presented as a collateral argument. At the same time the grouping, areal or otherwise, should not be along the lines of the extension of empires, or in the form of "balance of power" blocs, but on the basis of cer-

tain pertinent uniformities, compatibilities, or complementary relations, which will make for political peace and economic and cultural prosperity.

While this regionalist contention seems to have a high degree of validity, it does not necessarily follow that world regionalism can be established or imposed simply because it is rationally indicated. So much that has been written recently about world regionalism is glaringly oblivious or careless of certain very important factors and principles which the scientific analysis of regions has set forth. In the writings one frequently finds partial, superficial, and arbitrary treatments, blithe assumptions, wishful thinking, glib, unsubstantiated generalizations, even emotion-charged panacea-ism. Basic essentials of regions are ignored or glossed over. This may be due to ignorance; more likely it results from the fact that even the most superficial examination of the task of establishing workable world regions according to accepted scientific principles presents difficulties of an almost insuperable nature. The proponents, due to their enthusiastic evangelism, are tempted to ignore the difficulties. One sometimes has the feeling that a hope rather than an immediately realizable possibility is being argued. Similarly, there is often a cavalier disregard of stubborn facts relating to divisive political and cultural conditions, often deeply grounded in time and social organization, which prevail among the peoples of some of the areas which the proposals would regionalize.

These sanguine treatments may be comforting to the optimist in the field of world organization, but they are very disturbing to the scientific student of regions who sees the importance of looking unpleasant facts straight in the eye. Certainly the task of developing world regions, like that of settling world minority problems, is not simply one of drawing lines on a map according to some pat, logical scheme. The possible importance and desirability of combining nations and peoples into less than global combinations requires that the difficulties and perplexities be frankly faced.<sup>4</sup>

2. CAN THE BASIC REASONING REGARDING INTRANATIONAL REGIONS BE PROJECTED INTO THE TASK OF ESTABLISHING GLOBAL REGIONS? In the opinion

A. C. Millsaugh, *Peace Plans and American Choices* (Washington: Brookings Institutions, 1942); P. B. Potter, "Universalism versus Regionalism in International Organization," *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 37 (Oct., 1943), 850-862; Charles E. Martin, "Regionalism as Illustrated by the Western Hemisphere: Solidarity of the Americas," *Social Forces*, 21 (March, 1943), 272-275; George A. Lundberg, "Regionalism, Science, and the Peace Settlement," *Social Forces*, 21 (December, 1942) 131-137; Svend Riemer, "Theoretical Aspects of Regionalism," *Social Forces*, 21 (March, 1943), 275-280; Rudolf Heberle, "Regionalism: Some Critical Observations," *Social Forces*, 21 (March, 1943), 280-287; J. S. Roucek, "The Sociological Weaknesses of Federation Plans for Eastern Europe," *J. of Legal and Pol. Soc.*, 2 (Oct., 1943), 94-116; Max M. Laserson, "On Universal and Regional Federalism," *J. of Legal and Pol. Soc.*, 2 (Oct., 1943), 82-93; J. C. Campbell, "Nationalism and Regionalism in South America," *Foreign Affairs*, 21 (Oct., 1942), 132-148.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. J. T. Watkins IV, "Regionalism and Plans for Post-War Reconstruction: The First Three Years," *Social Forces*, 21 (May, 1943), 379-389, especially pp. 381-382.

of some, at least, of the students of world regionalism the task seems to be a sort of projection of the principles of intra-national regionalism, especially as it has developed in the United States, into the world field. It is granted that in the case of American regionalism we have a well developed and widely accepted body of principles. But do they apply to other nations, and can they be accepted as the pattern for world regionalism?

The very essence of a region within a nation is an area in which is found, to use Wirth's apt phrase, "a high degree of conformity between the geographic, economic, and cultural contour lines."<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, in the region there is a "clustering" of environmental, economic, historical, social, cultural, social-psychological and governmental factors.<sup>6</sup> Physically it is a "natural" region or a "distinctive landscape," geologically and physiographically, with unique characteristics of soil, topography, and climate. Along economic lines, the region has a similar organization in utilizing the natural resources and in adjusting the population to the physical setting; its parts have relative uniformity as to "resource patterns" and "production patterns" or these are notably complementary with each other; the whole region differs from other regions in various pertinent economic respects though without the thought of excluding inter-regional dependence. Demographically a region has special similarities and homogeneities as well as contrasts and heterogeneities; it has peculiarities as to rate of increase or decrease, age group structure, urban and rural distribution, nationality or racial composition and in other respects. Culturally, it has typical institutional forms, folkways and mores, folklore, language forms, standards of living, and special social psychological characteristics in the form of typical beliefs, attitudes, sentiments, loyalties, and thought and opinion patterns. Usually you have a regional collectivity of interests and behavior, and a regional level of consciousness. All of these features of an intra-national region are in a state of approximate equilibrium and harmony, and give it a relative homogeneity of features based on a variety of indices and an obvious external uniqueness. Lewis Mumford points out also that such a region consists of an area large enough to

embrace a sufficient range of interests, and small enough to keep these interests in focus and to make them a subject of direct collective concern.<sup>7</sup> The six regions of the United States, for example, as set up by Odum and associates, conform quite closely to these various related requirements.

Obviously, however, these requirements, in toto, or in any considerable combination of essentials, cannot apply to global regions in any of the schemes of division of the earth proposed. The large compact and ready-formed nations sometimes mentioned as separate world regions—United States, U. S. S. R., China, Brazil—do not have these uniformities, compatibilities, or complementary conditions in all or even many respects, even though there may be a satisfactory cooperation between the parts for functional purposes. When one examines any of the proposed continental regions, group-of-nations regions, or those which might be groups-of-nations-and-dependencies, one notes only infinite differences and antagonisms. There are the variations within the proposed regions of geographic factors, industrial and agricultural techniques and levels, consumption habits and standards, racial and nationality differences, often aggravated by long historical antagonisms, variant but tenaciously adhered to cultural features such as language, religion, customs, traditions, and other institutions and values, uneven cultural levels, variously satisfied aspirations for national status, long-existing intra- and inter-national superiority-inferiority situations, varying degrees of political independence and experience. The very fact that there are everywhere separate nations and peoples implies a long-standing conditioning under the sway of rivalry and antagonism in order to achieve unique identity and self-preservation.

3. WHAT CAN BE DONE REGARDING THE GEOGRAPHIC AND SPATIAL FEATURES OF WORLD REGIONS? In most national regions one finds a certain geographical compactness plus either the uniformity or complementary nature of physiographic features. It will be a great plains area, a river valley, an area given to certain types of agriculture or other extractive industry, or to mechanized secondary industry because of suitability or combination of climate, resources, and location. If world regions are to serve their purpose in world organization they must be rather

<sup>5</sup> L. Wirth, "The Prospects of Regional Research in Relation to Social Planning," *Publ. American Sociological Society*, 29 (1935), 107-114.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Regional Factors in National Planning* (Washington: National Resources Committee, 1935), p. 138.

<sup>7</sup> *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1938), p. 314.

extensive spatially else the existent "splintering" will not be avoided. Of course, they must not be so large as to be unwieldy. But any area of the world which is to serve as a region, whether continental, sub-continental or oceanic,<sup>8</sup> (i.e., areas bordering on a sea or ocean), must unavoidably be made up of diverse physiographic and climatic features, unless it is so small as to be insignificant and useless as a world region.

If we think of continents or combinations of continents we run into a variety of obstacles to ready contact and cooperation. South America, for example, is only a "natural" area in the sense that it is separated from the other land parts of the earth by oceans. Mountain ranges, impenetrable tropical jungles, and vast sparsely settled savannahs and semi-desert areas break it up into parts inaccessible to each other. Linkage by land is non-existent in some parts, difficult almost everywhere. Resort must be had to roundabout water routes plus transfer to often primitive forms of land transportation, which is time consuming and expensive, or to air which has been prohibitively expensive for the transportation of most articles. Asia with the highest mountains in the world, its vast deserts and tundras, offers similar obstacles. Millsbaugh points out that Asia is so vast that actually there are four areas of continental proportions—West Asia (Near and Middle East), Siberia, India, and China; one might add South East Asia as a fifth.<sup>9</sup> The mountains, jungles, and deserts of Africa break it up into highly diverse and remote areas.

Europe, the area most frequently mentioned for regionalization, is not a continent, not even a separate land-mass; it is a sub-continent, a part of Eurasia. Even within its own mapped boundaries, seas, bays, and mountain ranges create a dozen or more minor regions, and suggest geographical disunity.

If we are to think of some regions as oceanic we must give up the idea of contact by land, though the problem of accessibility may be simplified.

Obviously, we are sure to get all kinds of "geography" in any world region that could be set up. We will have to be satisfied with spatial contiguity or propinquity on land or within or around oceanic bodies. It may be granted that territorial pro-

pinquity or contiguity counts for much in interstate and inter-peoples relations, interstate cooperation and interstate organization. States and peoples living at great distances from each other are "foreign" to each other and often distrusted. But territorial propinquity may have quite the opposite effect; this fact is copiously demonstrated in Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, and northern South America. Strangers at a distance may be liked or tolerated; neighbors may be disliked and opposed. Furthermore, territorially contiguous nations are not always logical or actual cooperators while distant nations often are. Of course, it might be highly desirable to have great geographic diversity in a region, as the difficulties of communication and transportation are conquered, if this implies a rich array of natural resources and other economic gains. Though here too, stubborn political, cultural or other preventive situations may exist to nullify geography as a sole or important determinant of region. Often the factor of mutual accessibility will be difficult of achievement. The uniform or complementary geographic factors which make for national regions will have to be ignored in large part. In the main, it is most likely that for some time to come the world regions will be geographical "expressions"—aggregations of territories—and little more.

4. WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING THE ECONOMIC FEATURES OF PROPOSED WORLD REGIONS? Lewis Mumford points out that, ideally, regionalism does not aim at economic self-sufficiency of any region. Such an objective would be absurd in a world that is dependent upon such localized resources as rubber, coal, iron, copper, tin, and petroleum. But it does aim at a state of economic balance; a state in which population is effectively distributed with respect to the fundamental resources; one in which agriculture, the other extractive industries, manufactures and trade are coordinated; one in which the size of cities will be proportional to open spaces and recreation areas, and placed in sound working relation with the physical terrain as a whole.<sup>10</sup>

No economic uniformity or even any high degree of complementariness can be discerned in any of the proposed world regions. In most of them the economic organization ranges from feudalism to industrialism; primary and secondary production are not equilibrated; neither adequate nor suffi-

<sup>8</sup> See Eugene Staley, "The Myth of the Continents," *Foreign Affairs*, 19 (April, 1941), 481-494.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>10</sup> Lewis Mumford, "Regionalism and Irregionalism," *Sociological Review*, 19 (Oct., 1927), 277-288.



ciently coordinated transportation facilities exist; trade is complicated, even blocked, by innumerable political-economic factors such as tariffs, varying currencies, taxes, foreign ownership of land, and industries; the chief sources of essential production and consumption goods as well as markets for products may be on the other side of the globe; almost none are unitary or economically balanced areas; different areas or countries may have similar resources and production and be jealous competitors for world markets; highly divergent, even antagonistic, economic ideologies exist.

In some of the oft-mentioned world regions such as Europe, or especially Central and East Europe, the biggest immediate problem is economic co-ordination within the area; in others, such as South-eastern Asia or most of Asia and the islands of the Pacific, and Africa, it is coordination of the economic activity of the region with the rest of the world. In the Western Hemisphere the task is one both of coordination and greater specialization. But among *all* regions, world coordination is the first-rank economic problem from the point of view of world peace. Rarely are all or even many of the logical, actual, or potential economic cooperators contiguous. No area anywhere is completely self-sufficient or independent; nor should any effort be made to make it so, since it would mean serious limitations upon economic well-being intra-nationally and inter-nationally.

The great potential markets for almost all varieties of products of both primary and secondary industry, such as China, India, and parts of Africa and some of the islands of the South Pacific, are undeveloped, and cannot be developed adequately by regional efforts alone. In some instances the promotion and in many instances the capital and techniques must come from outside the region.

While the developmental possibilities in practically every area of the earth are almost illimitable and while great contributions along these lines can be made within, in this present shrunken and interlocking world, most of these activities must be universal and reciprocal, else all—those now favored as well as those less favored—are the losers.

5. CAN ANY HIGH DEGREE OF SOCIO-CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL UNITY OR COMPATIBILITY BE ANTICIPATED IN THE PROPOSED MULTI-NATIONAL WORLD REGIONS? If world regions are to be successful agencies for implementing long run world peace they will have to be based on a sufficient number, or, if based on a smaller number, on sufficiently powerful, common unifying socio-cultural

elements among the inhabitants of the designated area. The following are generally conceded to be essentials of this type: commonly shared historical experiences, common institutions and customs, common folkways and mores, common political and economic objectives, common attitudes and thought patterns, common sentiments, loyalties, interests, and wishes: in general, a collectivity of behavior and a regional level of consciousness.

Among the types of potential factors of this sort which, singly or in combination, might give this homogenizing effect in the proposed regions, those below come to mind.

a. Former historical unities, as, for example, the states formerly constituting the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire or possibly even the old Holy Roman Empire.

b. A physiographic-economic interlocking area, such as the Danube Valley.

c. Religion, plus a common historical experience over a period of centuries, such as the Mohammedan world of North-east Africa, the Near East and the Middle East.

d. An efficient, established and extensive federal area, such as the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., possibly also China.

e. A partial cooperating area with at least skeletal institutions, as the countries compassing the Pan-American Union.

f. An area inhabited by a common racial-cultural stock, such as Slav Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece), Latin Europe (France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal) or Germanic Europe (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Austria), Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway, Denmark), or the Turanian stocks (China, Japan, Korea, Formosa, Tibet, Mongolia), or Malaysian (Philippines, Thailand, East Indies, Indo-China, Micronesia, Melanesia), or all of Latin America.

g. Several plans even refer to the British Commonwealth of Nations, a "going concern," which, however, is widely dispersed geographically and rests on a common empire-national experience. The very fact that the component elements are not contiguous raises the questions as to whether this union could, strictly speaking, be considered as one of the world regions, however unified it might be culturally and politically, and however useful it might be for certain administrative purposes.

In spite of the above, however, certain stern realities must be faced which raise doubts as to

whether sufficient support now exists in some of the proposed world regions. At best, any possible world region must combine diverse peoples and cultures, peoples with uneven political and economic experience, peoples and nations with great psychological gaps between them, and almost without exception, peoples with a heritage of latent or active antagonisms.

One of the immediate tasks in various world areas would be to eliminate or reduce cultural friction and racial, nationality, and religious antagonisms and rivalries. National, racial, cultural and religious struggles in Central Europe, as one example, prevented both the Ottoman and Austrian Empires from consolidating themselves.<sup>11</sup> The succession states created in this "Cockpit of Europe" by the Treaty of Versailles, already lacking national and cultural homogeneity, organized themselves in the form of strongly centralized communities with master nations and subjected nationalities. The result was the aggravation of hostilities, rivalries, tensions, and sensitiveness between the nations and peoples of the area, the formation of antagonistic *blocs*, the rise of power politics, and even further disintegration. The array of racial, linguistic, and religious minorities in this area, the intensity of the nationalisms, the economic divisiveness due to numerous customs barriers, and the great unevenness or absence in some cases of experience in self-government would seem to indicate that *only* some form of regional organization would be sufficiently far-reaching and uniform in its control to override the disintegrative tendencies. That this is realized by some of the inhabitants of the area is evidenced in the proposed Czechoslovak-Polish (Jan. 23, 1942) and Yugoslav-Grecian (Jan. 15, 1942) federations thought of by the participants as a "general foundation for the organization of the Balkan Union."<sup>12</sup> But the execution of such a desirable plan is quite another matter.

Asia shows more cultural differences than does Europe. The racial diversities are greater and religion is a strong divisive factor. Unlike Europe, Asia has never had the ideal of union. In Southeast Asia—the Asiatic counterpart of the Balkans—deepseated differences based on race, religion, and history are the dominating influences, and

overshadow the similarities in economic weakness and lack of political experience. The growing nationalism promises to increase the disunion.<sup>13</sup> While the Malays, Indonesians, and Filipinos come from the same racial stock, centuries of divergent development have made the differences more trenchant than the similarities. The religious cleavages reinforce the disunity based on race. The Malays and most of the Indonesians are Moslems; the Thais and Burmese are Buddhists; most of the Chinese in the area are Buddhists, but there are some Confucianists among them; most of the Indians embrace Hinduism; the Filipinos are nominally Christian. The various groups are intolerant and suspicious of each other; assimilation, even peaceful social contact, are difficult. The situation is aggravated by the different economic positions of these racial and religious groups wherever they come in contact. Among these countries of South Eastern Asia, all except Thailand, were dependencies of American or European powers, and the degree of self-government varied widely. India offers all of these types of cultural disunities plus several additional ones.

Africa presents populations 90% of which are still at or below the tribal level of social organization. The variety of races, sub-races, and racial blends, in the whole continent, south and north, is almost as great as that of Asia. The culture ranges from that of the paleolithic jungle Pygmies to that of the European stocks in the Union of South Africa and the Mediterranean coast. The diversity of languages, religions, customs, and institutions generally is breathtaking. The last four centuries have seen innumerable and almost continuous subjections and exploitations of the peoples by European stocks, by Arabs and other Asiatics, and by the various indigenous African peoples of each other. While some of them have demonstrated considerable capacity for local self-government on a tribal basis, the great proportion have been, are, and probably for some time to come will have to be under the political supervision of more advanced peoples for internal as well as external protective purposes. A bewildering disunity prevails.

In Latin America the Catholic Church creates a common unity among the more politically and

<sup>11</sup> Dinko Tomic, "Reconstruction in Central Europe," *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 37 (Oct., 1943), 897.

<sup>12</sup> P. E. Corbett, *Post-War Worlds* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942), p. 203.

<sup>13</sup> For a more complete treatment see Lennox A. Mills, "The Future of Western Dependencies in South Eastern Asia and the Pacific," *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 37 (Oct., 1943), 909-919.

economically authoritative portions of the populations, and common Spanish or Portuguese cultural traditions prevail. Nevertheless, we note vast racial diversities and hierarchies both within and between countries—European stocks, Indians of many tribes and degrees of development, mestizos, Negroes, mulattoes; there are also historical political antagonisms, sharply cleaved social classes, and more than a century of revolutions and dictatorial governments.<sup>14</sup>

The indispensable prerequisite of a cultural region, namely, a body of annealing common interests, at the present time are weak or entirely absent in most of the various proposed regions. China has vastly more common interests with the United States than she has with her likely regional neighbor, Japan; Siberia with European Russia than with China or Japan; the British Dominions with each other rather than with areal countries or peoples; the predominantly Mohammedan countries and peoples with each other rather than with contiguous peoples; many of the Latin American nations with Europe rather than with North America north of the Rio Grande.

6. SHOULD THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE REGIONAL AREAS OF THE EARTH BE ORGANIZED AS POLITICAL FEDERATIONS (OR CONFEDERATIONS)? Most of the world regional schemes assume that it is both desirable and possible that all or most of the peoples and countries of the earth be organized into regional federations or confederations. The federations in most instances would be autonomous or semi-sovereign political mechanisms intermediate between the states and the world organization. Some schemes go so far as to set up these organizations with constitutions, and a full complement of executive, legislative and judicial institutions to carry on the functions of government, plus a variety of administrative agencies, all, of course, integrated in some sort of world system.

A few examples of such schemes might be mentioned. Ely Culbertson would divide the earth into eleven federated regions: the American (the United States and twenty Latin American republics), the British (the United Kingdom, the British Dominions, and Eire), the European Latin (France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Portugal),

the European Germanic (Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland), the Middle European (Poland, Lithuania, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece), the Middle Eastern (Turkey, Persia, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, United Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt), the Russian (most of the U. S. S. R.), the Chinese (China, including Manchuria, Formosa, and Tibet), the Japanese (including Japan proper and Korea), the Malaysian (Philippines, Thailand, Netherlands East Indies, Indo-China, etc.), and the Indian (India).<sup>15</sup> Colby refers most of the time to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Eastern Asia, the East Indies, India, South America, and the United States as world regions.<sup>16</sup> Quincy Wright discusses seven regions: the European, the Danubian, the Near Eastern, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the American, and the Far Eastern.<sup>17</sup>

These and others on the face of them are neat schemes, and at first glance seem to be ideal solutions. They provide a simplification of a bewilderingly complex problem that is most appealing to harassed well-wishers. One sees some point to Vera M. Dean's reference to regional schemes as a form of "escapism."<sup>18</sup> Certain questions immediately come to mind. Do all the areas need this degree of political organization? Would such a major division of the earth contribute more, in all cases, to world peace and well-being than some other form of world organization? Are all the peoples sufficiently developed in political experience and aptitude to participate in such organizations? If some are not, must they not be supervised from without the area anyhow, at least for some time to come? In view of the fact that the British Commonwealth of Nations is almost universally presented as a world political federation, must we not grant that other than purely regional considerations are involved? Is it possible

<sup>15</sup> Ely Culbertson, *The World Federation Plan* (New York: The World Federation, Inc., 1942).

<sup>16</sup> C. C. Colby, "Regional Aspects of World Recovery," *Annals Am. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, 218 (Nov., 1941), 141-152.

<sup>17</sup> Quincy Wright, "Peace and Political International Organization," *Preliminary Report and Monographs* (New York: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1942), pp. 240-275, especially pp. 248-252, 257-261.

<sup>18</sup> "Toward a New World Order," *Foreign Policy Reports*, 17 (May 15, 1941).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. C. E. Martin, "Regionalism as Illustrated by the Western Hemisphere: Solidarity of the Americas," *Social Forces*, 21 (Mar., 1943), 272-275; J. C. Campbell, "Nationalism and Regionalism in South America," *Foreign Affairs*, 21 (Oct., 1942), 132-148.



that the major objective should be efficient administration of activities affected with world interest and significance rather than world political sub-division?

There are undoubtedly areas where such federation is desirable. In the broad areas composing the United States and the U. S. S. R. we already find efficient federal organization; China is on the way to becoming such an one. In the sub-continent of Europe one or several federations would seem to be solutions, difficult of achievement but necessary in view of the contiguity and close interdependence of nations and peoples. Here too there is sufficient political maturity to give some assurance of success. An independent federation seems to be the only eventual solution for the hundreds of millions of dissident peoples of the sub-continent of India. Good arguments can be presented pro and con for a Pan-American Federation and one made up of the peoples and countries of the Near and Middle East.

But most of the peoples of Africa, Southeast Asia, and the islands of the Pacific do not fit into a picture of more or less sovereign peoples participating in a regional political federation. Due to their economic and political backwardness and their long colonial status they are too immature at the moment. It would be hazardous and unkind to put them fully "on their own." They might be victimized, both by the stronger nations in their federation and by aggressive and somewhat unscrupulous minorities within the respective countries. Such areas and peoples will have to be supervised in varying degrees, depending upon the level of political competence which they have achieved, either under some sort of mandate system or by some international agency.<sup>19</sup>

It might be surmised that the desire for regional political autonomy does not exist in many international areas, though these same nations and peoples might at the same time admit that many of the exigencies of the situation demand some sort of wider, more uniform administrative cooperation. In one of the recent articles on foreign policy in *Life* it was pointed out that most of the "small nations," which include nearly half of humanity, would prefer to be interrelated in a truly international organization rather than by means of "regional agreements." In such an organization they see much greater assurances of

peace, security, and justice, and of fair consideration of their problems.<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, in the world regional federations, as envisaged in various proposals now available, there would very likely be a disequilibrium between what Odum calls folk-society and state-society. Almost all conceivable world regions would involve an almost impossible extension of folk-society to a highly heterogeneous, economically diverse, multiple-nationality, state-society. Could the state-society successfully dominate chaotic folk-society?

In the last analysis the objective is not to hold a brief for regional federations or any other form of international organizations as such, nor should it rest upon purely sentimental, logical or philosophical considerations. The criterion should be whether or not any or all procedures offer practical results in producing world peace. All costs and gains, not only locally, nationally, or regionally but also for the entire world, for the near future, should be reckoned in terms of this primary objective. This points to the next two closely related queries.

7. IS THERE A POSSIBILITY THAT WORLD REGIONALISM MIGHT LEAD TO SECTIONALISM AND SEPARATIVENESS? There are some very respectable students of international affairs who are of the opinion that world regional federations may make for another kind of world isolationism and separatism.<sup>21</sup>

Even if regional federations start out with the best intentions of being subsidiary to the world organization or of cooperating with it and each other, they are likely, if at all successful to develop federation aspirations, superiorities, spheres of influence, aggressive control, even expansionist tendencies. This regionalism might conceivably produce a kind of political competition between eight or ten or thirteen self-conscious regional political bodies instead of between seventy-plus nations.

<sup>20</sup> For an excellent critical study of these points see Max M. Laserson, "On Universal and Regional Federalism," *Jour. of Legal and Political Sociology*, 2 (Oct., 1943), 82-93.

<sup>21</sup> P. B. Potter, "Universalism versus Regionalism in International Organization," *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 37 (Oct., 1943), 850-862; A. C. Millspaugh, *Peace Plans and American Choices* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1942), p. 51; Nicholas Doman, *The Coming Age of World Control* (New York: Harpers, 1942), pp. 170-175, 256.

<sup>19</sup> The situation respecting colonial peoples is discussed in greater detail under Query 10 below.

There is a possibility that one region might become a crystallization and institutionalization of selfishness, and of opposition to other regions. Potter states, "A strong European regional union would be dangerous to all the rest of the world if only because of the powers of such an aggregate and the obviously competitive interests of European against non-European countries." Similarly it is conceivable that an Asiatic region (or regions), on the basis of long historic discrimination and exploitation, might set itself against the United States and Europe. Areas in which a militant world religion predominates (like Mohammedanism in the belt stretching across North Africa and all of Asia into Indonesia) might ally themselves against other areas where other religions prevail, especially if divisive historic factors of an economic and political nature are also involved. A West and Central European region might array itself against the U. S. S. R. There is the possibility that any strong development of regionalism would be setting up large blocks of nations, or even of continents or hemispheres one against the other. The possible competition arising between regions might lead to exaggeration of differences, and efforts at regional particularism, isolationism, and self-sufficiency. "Monroe doctrines" of one kind or another might come into existence.<sup>22</sup> The likelihood of continental isolationism or continental competition, aiming at world hegemony is not to be taken lightly. Regional police could become regional armies to be used against other regions. Regional economic activity might lead to some new kind of economic imperialism or isolationism. There is also the possibility that given regions might become "spheres of influence" for the strongest national power in the region, or even that such a power use the region as an instrument in achieving designs of world domination, notably the German "geopolitik." The fact that geopolitics is a sort of perverted regionalism is not to be taken lightly; here is a trap that nations, especially the smaller or more immature ones, might fall into. As Millsbaugh puts it, "The world does have areas of relative separateness, but is it desirable to emphasize their separateness?"

8. SHOULD CONSIDERATIONS OF SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATIVE SUCCESS IN CARRYING ON THE VARIED GLOBALLY PERTINENT TASKS BE THE

<sup>22</sup> Note the phrase: "The Monroe Doctrine, once unilateral, has been continentalized, multilateralized, and streamlined." Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

DETERMINING FACTOR IN THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF WORLD REGIONS, EVEN IF IT MEANS THE IGNORING OF SOCIO-CULTURAL REGIONS AND REGIONAL FEDERATIONS? Our analysis to this point has produced, among others, two conclusions; namely, (1) that, strictly conceived, there are no "natural" world regions; and (2) that the subdivision of all the world into regional political federations is not universally desirable, appropriate or possible.

By way of recapitulation of the material on the first point, it may be said that it appears that we will have to cut loose from the social scientific conception of a world region as an existing "natural" areal unit with coextensive geographic, economic, and cultural contour lines—an area characterized by a considerable number of indices of unity and homogeneity. "Natural" world regions cannot be "made on order." At the same time we must accept the possibility that in the present shrunken world there is some need of administrative subdivisions in order that various tasks of world operation and cooperation essential to peace and well-being can be carried on. However, if we did try to establish subdivisions in which a consistent natural-cultural "landscape" existed they might not be appropriate for most administrative purposes. It would seem that if we extend the size of the area and increase the combination of peoples and cultures beyond a certain point we dilute the strength of the common elements or diversify the interests and the total ways of life so much that a sufficient degree of homogeneity and internal cohesiveness does not exist. If strictly applied to the world this principle of homogeneity and cohesiveness would mean that there would have to be a large number of regions. But there must be some limit to the multiplicity of regions.

If we did have a world region with significance as a socio-cultural unity with established ideological and racial affinities, and functioning as an effective economic zone, Scandinavia, for example, it would include too small a portion of the world area and world population to give the administrative advantages of world regionalism; we would have so many world regions as to have almost the same "splintered" situation as with the separate nations as world units. Therefore, is it possible to divide the earth into regions which are large enough to meet administrative requirements, and which at the same time have a sufficient degree

of cultural homogeneity and a well established "common denominator of interest?"

Similarly, with respect to the second conclusion, fixed federated regions, while offering incontestable advantages in carrying on both certain local administrative tasks and others of world significance, would offer both obstacles and limitations along other lines. Furthermore, it is questionable whether all regional federations in a scheme of universal subdivision into regional federations would have enough to do to justify their existence in view of the fact that so many problems of local significance are also world problems which only world-wide treatment can solve.

It may be that world regions, if we are to have them, will have to be a matter of several or many different schemes of combinations of peoples and areas. These will be more or less arbitrarily and experimentally established to include areas of the earth in which specific, basic, international administrative tasks should be met. Such criteria of selection and delineation should be used as are pertinent to the crucial problem at hand. Function, feasibility, and flexibility should condition form.<sup>23</sup> If existing community-of-interest ties of various kinds can be utilized so much the better, but in most instances we cannot expect to find any great degree of widespread cultural or other unity or compatibility. The need of operation rather than operation as an effect of unity will have to be the determining factor. It will at first be a sort of imperative dictated by the need of peace rather than a natural or spontaneous desire to cooperate, accompanied by a hope that later on common unity of spirit and interest may develop. We have to wait until modern communication, transportation, interdependence, division of labor, and other world uniformizing processes produce a sufficient number of natural regions. There is no thought of denying that a few actual and some nascent ones exist now.

To be sure, most of the schemes of world regionalism seem to operate on the idea that the whole array of diverse administrative tasks and purposes can be combined in single all-purpose administrative regions—that a single set of boundary lines of regions on the map of the world will and should take care of *all* the administrative tasks. The proponents argue that there cannot

be an infinite number of combinations of overlapping world regions on the basis of innumerable though highly variant tasks.

In this connection, however, it must be recalled that in the United States, as far back as 1935, 74 different federal agencies had 108 separate regional schemes to carry on their varied administrative tasks.<sup>24</sup> Many of these coincided only partially with the socio-cultural regions, some not at all. Most of them were composed of variant aggregations of states. All of the schemes were supposedly the best at the time from the point of view of the specific tasks to be performed. To be sure, all of them were *within* the United States with its rather high degree of economic, social-psychological, and political unification. Furthermore it should be kept in mind that in the United States, as in other nations, in the intra-national administrative regions the administrative *purpose* came in large measure as the *effect* of some sufficient set of regional homogeneities consciously recognized. These homogeneities were, in considerable part, the products of mutual dependencies, and common conditions and interests, and they posited common administrative needs.

In world organization it is questionable if there can be a single division into all-utility divisions for administrative purposes. It is also doubtful whether all administrative tasks should be carried on by more or less autonomous regions. The expedient area and aggregation of states and peoples has to be determined by the specific administrative and constructive tasks to be performed. A few examples will suffice. Police and military regions would have to be established on the basis of ready access and intensity of potential problems of order and supervision.

Economic tasks, such as those of promotion of industrialization, mechanization of agriculture, development of land transportation and land reclamation, or those of reorganization of land owning systems, or improvement of conditions of labor, or stabilization of prices, foreign exchange and tariffs, would be carried on where they are most needed. Some of the economic tasks would be determined by physiographic factors and would

<sup>23</sup> H. W. Briggs, "Post-war International Organization," in *The Impact of War on America* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1942), p. 149.

<sup>24</sup> *Regional Factors in Social Planning* (Washington: National Resources Committee, 1935). See also James W. Fesler, "Criteria for Administrative Regions," *Social Forces*, 22 (Oct. 1943), 26-32; Fesler, "Standardization of Federal Administrative Regions," *Social Forces*, 15 (Oct. 1936), 12-21.



be a matter of rather limited areas; most of them, in the present interlocking world, are global in scope and operation and must be a matter of unrestrained and undivided global attention and cooperation. Interdependence has reached a point where domestic stability and international stability are inseparable. Regional compartmentalization of economic activity would be only slightly less cramping than national from the point of view of universal well-being and world peace. Today we have world demands, world use of local resources, partial but rapidly developing world division of labor, world capital, world markets, world prosperity and depression, world provision and utilization of techniques and technicians, the necessity of world-wide uniformity in conditions of workers and in wages to equalize costs of production, world-wide necessity of material well-being, but at the same time world inequality as to nations and peoples. As Sir George Paish put it, if we had a freely cooperating economic world, each of us "could claim to own the world."<sup>25</sup>

Minority and ethnic problems, so serious as to merit or require international attention would be special tasks where they are most acute, as in Central and Southeastern Europe, India, or South East Asia. The tasks relating to the supervision of colonial and "backward" peoples, and their preparation for full political and economic participation would have to be regionalized on the basis of the areas in which there are colonial or "backward" peoples—Africa, the South Pacific, South East Asia, and possibly the Near East. North America, Europe, North Asia, possibly South America, would not be directly involved. It is inconceivable that the most appropriate and efficient administration of these and many other essential supervisory and regulatory tasks by regions could be carried on in regional divisions of the earth having common boundaries.

Many tasks of supervision or operation do not lend themselves to regional administration at all; certainly not of regions with any separate autonomy respecting the handling of the task. Such are the regulation or supervision of disease and epidemic control and other health problems ("germs know no frontiers"), telegraph and radio communication, international postal service, most international transportation, but especially that by air, the stabilization of currencies and the control of

the business cycle, world policing and most military sanctions, the restriction and production of armaments, weather reporting, and the supervision of canals and straits of international importance. These are world-wide problems.

Certainly also most standards of well-being and social rights—civil rights of the "Bills of Rights" variety, self-determination of minorities and peoples, cultural autonomy, religious freedom, education, in brief, the "Four Freedoms" or social development generally, if they ever become approved world objectives in fact, must be promoted and supervised by some universal organization.

It was not a matter of chance that some of the services or activities of a universal character have been carried on by semi-public international bodies such as the Universal Postal Union (since 1874), the Telecommunications Union, the Copyright Union, the Patents and Designs Convention, the Geodetic Union, the Hydrographic Union, or by organizations of the League of Nations such as the International Labor Organization, the Health Organization (with its epidemiological intelligence service, international standardization of biologicals and serologicals, and nutrition services), the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Supervisory Body, and the Social Questions Section, not to mention the promotion of committees and conferences dealing with a host of economic problems.

It must be remembered that if these various and numerous global administrative tasks are not carried on in the most efficient manner known to men today, it means checks to universal well-being, prosperity, and peace, and this, in turn, means global war. There is no escape from this conclusion.

All this does not mean that the operational personnel for these world-wide tasks will not be found in every pertinent area of the earth, organized as local administrative subdivisions. They will be, but they will be representative of the universal service or regulatory body, and will be functioning with the world as the unit.

By way of conclusion, it appears to the present writer that regional treatment of tasks affected with an international interest is primarily a matter of administration; such tasks should be handled regionally only as a matter of convenience, expediency, and greater efficiency. There should be a great variety of regional divisions of the world for different types of essential purposive action.

<sup>25</sup> Sir George Paish, "The World Situation," *International Conciliation*, 354 (Nov., 1939), 534-546.

Some tasks would appear only in certain areas of the earth. Those that need to be performed globally will be highly diverse in nature; some can best be conducted in regional federations; others will require for most expedient and efficient performance one division of the world into administrative regions; other tasks will be conducted through still a different division, and so on. Some cooperative tasks will not involve an area or contiguous peoples at all, such as those performed so well by the British Commonwealth of Nations which almost all world regionalists, somewhat inconsistently with their basic tenets, wish to see incorporated in their schemes.

Most states will be members of regional federations. Practically all peoples and nations will be involved in numerous, different functional setups. These will overlap as to the peoples and nations included, but not necessarily as to the operations performed. In most cases, some sort of minimal world organization will have to have supremacy in international relations, regardless of the forms and functions of subdivisions. Thus the United States, conceivably, would itself be a political federation, and at the same time a participant in a Pan-American League, a Conference on the Pacific, possibly other similar organizations as well as in the numerous crucial administrative setups of the world involving economic matters, health, military affairs, transportation and communications, and so on.<sup>26</sup>

9. CAN REGIONALISM BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT AN OVERALL WORLD ORGANIZATION OF SOME KIND? A world regionalism, whatever its forms and functions, which is effective in producing and maintaining world peace—peace in terms of political and economic security, individual and national freedom, and progressive general social well-being—is almost inconceivable without a world organization with some limited but authoritative overall powers. This point of view is supported by the following contentions.

a. Controversies and antagonisms of serious proportions are very likely to occur between nations, or racial, nationality, religious or class groups *within* a region. There is always the possibility, for example, that some nation, like a revived Germany, might seek to acquire military, economic, and political dominance within its region.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Eugene Staley, "Economic Organization of the Peace," *International Conciliation*, 369 (April, 1941), 394-423, especially p. 422; Q. Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

For some time to come, under the most ideal conditions, small states are likely to be at a disadvantage. Furthermore, historic national antagonisms do not immediately evaporate, regardless of the nature of the political "sunshine."<sup>27</sup> Major religious cleavages may threaten disaster, as in India at present, or in the Balkans recurrently. Social classes or races, even though minorities, because of their strategic dominance might become a source of disaffection, as in South East Asia.<sup>28</sup>

It would be desirable if local regional machinery could adjudicate such difficulties satisfactorily, and every effort should be made to develop it. But peace is essential. A general organization would provide subsidiary—possibly final—support in the maintenance of peace; it would ordinarily be more objective in its activities, and, because of its greater neutrality, be more respected as a referee by the disputants.

b. Any regions set up will be dissimilar and unequal in many respects. As noted above, world sectionalism, based on long existent or readily potential animosities, is a distinct possibility. Regions are liable to be aggressed against by the other regions. The very fact that areas of the earth are set up as regional organizations in an ununified world is likely to develop friction. A balance of regions would be as unstable as a balance of states or empires has proved to be. Peace *between* regions must be maintained at all costs if world holocausts are to be avoided. One way of doing this is to make all of them component parts of the larger framework. Regionalism can only operate successfully within a system of world security.<sup>29</sup>

c. There is so much interplay between and interdependence of all parts and activities of the earth that a universal organization is necessary to facilitate these. One cannot think of a single reconstructive or administrative task that is not

<sup>27</sup> For example, the "sunshine" of Locarno.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Mills, *op. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> Says Doman, "Any proposal embodying a concept of regionalism should be opposed by friends of collective security, unless accompanied by and subordinated to a universal world organization." Conversely "... the fundamental nature of the problem of security is universal and cannot be substituted for by continental or regional panaceas alone." Nicholas Doman, "World Reconstruction and European Regionalism," *Social Forces*, 21 (March, 1943), 265-272, specifically, pp. 268, 271.

affected with world interest and significance and that does not require at least a degree of world collaboration. Political and military security, production, trade, and finance, sanitary and health conditions, population problems, and social conditions, to repeat only the most obvious, involve every nation and continent. Even colonial security and development concern everyone directly or indirectly, whether carried on by an international organization or by some mandate arrangement. Many of the tasks, as noted, have long been carried on on a universal scale and would not gain by regionalization. Again an overall organization to coordinate the efforts of the regions and to conduct or supervise the universal tasks seems to be indispensable. In the opinion of many, most tasks of world peace organization, social and economic construction, and political administration can be carried on more effectively by a universal organization; they believe that regionalism is unnecessary, even undesirable. Certainly there must be a balance between regionalism and universalism.

10. SHOULD THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN PEOPLES NATIONALLY ORGANIZED BE ADHERED TO? There is no reason for believing that nations will cease to be the main form of organization of peoples in the near future. They may in time lose—possibly freely surrender—some of their sovereignty along certain lines. But nation-state organizations are the basic units to be utilized.

The general proposition is posited that all peoples should be permitted to maintain their national status, whether the world union be organized on a regional or universal basis, or both. If such national consciousness and organization has not yet occurred it should be fostered. The bulk of the problems that associated human beings are concerned with are internal, local affairs, and these have to be administered by efficient states. But *inter-national* affairs, which are becoming more and more important, require that people and countries be thus organized. In the long run, any form of essential international administration requires stabilized, unified, responsible, and competent operative units—not unjelled masses of people, or discordant or politically unsophisticated conglomerates held together by external power, however benevolently paternalistic it may be, even if this power be exercised by a regional or world organization. In the short run, of course, during a transitional period, procedures of a tutorial nature may have to be resorted to to develop the political and social maturity of various areas and peoples.

This proposition relating to the necessity of national status will be discussed briefly with respect to (a) the peoples who have a well-developed national consciousness and stabilized statehood; (b) the minority peoples who have a cultural and ethnic consciousness and nationalistic aspirations, but are subjected peoples and not autonomously organized; and (c) the colonial peoples who are socially, economically, and politically dependent.

a. In an age when nationalism has been and is the supreme political objective, none of the politically activated and nationally conscious peoples will be willing to sacrifice their political autonomy and cultural identity—beyond a certain point, for any larger union, organized either on a regional or universal basis. Says Tomasic:

... such a shift in allegiance would require a social and ideological revolution replacing national for international loyalties, which is not likely to happen in the immediate future. Much less would any politically mature people, whose loyalties have become definitely moulded to its own separate culture and traditions, accept a union dominated by another nation. If the principle of "sovereign rights and self-government" is denied to such a people, the reaction resulting from the loss of dignity and from the frustrated drive toward full statehood will certainly take a violent and revolutionary course.<sup>30</sup>

The United Nations are committed to the defense of "life, liberty, independence, and religious freedom," and to the preservation of "human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands;" moreover, "They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."<sup>31</sup> The nations now enjoying their sovereign rights will not permit any notable retreats; among the nations and peoples everywhere suffering under totalitarian misrule and oppression there will be a vast and powerful resurgence of nationalism. No post-war planning which ignores such realities can possibly be successful. Such concessions of sovereignty as will be made to any

<sup>30</sup> Dinko Tomasic, "Reconstruction in Central Europe," *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 37 (Oct., 1943), 888-903. Most of the present discussion and that in (b) following is taken from or suggested by this article by Tomasic.

<sup>31</sup> "Declaration by the United Nations," January 1, 1942 and Atlantic Charter, Sec. III.



international organization will only be those which promise even greater gains in well-being and security—possibly those set forth in the Atlantic Charter.

b. In some sections of the earth we find ethnically mixed populations so "splintered" by their divergent cultures, racialisms, and nationalisms that no strong territorial and political loyalties exist. This is especially true of many of the minority peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, among such peoples, the desirability of being part of a stable state unit is clear. The conversion of such peoples into a state is a simple matter in a totalitarian regime; they are forcibly held together. But there is increasing soundness in the contention that all political systems imposed from above, whether arbitrary or benevolent, tend to fail against the increasing resistance of the people in a rapidly awakening world. The successful "going concerns" are increasingly a matter of "voluntary participation."

Tomasic presents several possibilities among the two main forms of ethnically and culturally diverse peoples. For the irredentist groups, that is, those who have spilled over borders and confused them, one solution is to partition the contested territories between the contesting nations. Such a partition could also be made on the basis of a plebiscite, financed and conducted by some international authority, permitting the majority of each minority to decide their allegiance. Where the minorities are so dispersed that clear lines of demarcation cannot be formed, some population transfer, as that between Greece and Turkey in the early twenties, though working hardships, can be effected, thus eliminating tensions.

For enclaves or pocketed minorities who do not feel sufficiently confident to form an independence movement of their own, he suggests the principle of self-determination in the form of local self-government within a multi-ethnic federated state which however permits autonomous growth devoid of domination or hegemony. In the last analysis it is only by such means that a genuine solidarity could develop between the peoples and countries conceived.<sup>32</sup> Only as minorities become satisfied cooperators in nation states do they cease to be threats to world peace.

c. To put colonial and backward peoples "on their own" prematurely would invite aggression among them from without, and would also open

the way to class or racial cliques within them taking over manipulative power for exploitive purposes, due to the political ignorance and ineptitude among them. This means some form of foreign tutelage. Joint international control is usually ruled out as a bad solution; the colonial peoples themselves would resent it as a retrograde step, which in their opinion would simply postpone their independence. Moreover, joint international control has usually been prolific of friction and disputes where attempted. Some application of the League Mandate principle, in which the experienced colonial powers would administer the affairs, under some general supervision by a world organization, seems to offer the best possibilities.<sup>33</sup>

Since the colonial peoples range from those almost ready to stand on their own feet, such as the Philippines, Syria, Morocco, and Algeria, to those who will need tutelage for a long time, no precise and universal procedure can be laid down.

But the prime considerations should be the remedying of their educational backwardness; the hastening of their economic development; and providing them with political training by allowing them to participate more and more in local government. The ultimate objective is either complete political independence or full self-government in the form of dominion status or home rule. Regardless of the form of administration utilized, the principle of trusteeship, both for the sake of the local inhabitants and for the rest of the world, should be adopted. Unless the colonial peoples are administered in this spirit, the possibilities of unrest and rebellion among them are tremendous.

In most instances during the transition period the colonial peoples would not be full participants in the regional organizations of their particular world areas, if such existed. They would be represented by the colonial powers exercising trusteeship or through some partnership arrangement.

11. SHOULD THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BE CARRIED ON ACCORDING TO DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES? There

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Lennox A. Mills, *op. cit.*; B. Gerig, "Colonial Aspects of the Post-War Settlement," *International Conciliation*, 379 (April, 1942), 195-217; Julian S. Huxley, "The Future of Colonies," *Fortnightly Review*, 153 (Aug., 1940), 120-130; Lord Hailey, "A Colonial Charter," *Fortnightly Review*, 153 (July, 1942), 1-7; S. R. Chow, "The Pacific After the War," *Foreign Affairs*, 21 (Aug., 1942), 71-86.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 897-901.

can be no insistence at this time that all nations and peoples carry on their *internal* affairs in a democratic way. Some competent and respected nations have achieved their present internal order and efficiency and their present world status by "mixed" methods. Moreover, as noted above, to rush democracy in some areas would be against the best interests of the peoples themselves; full enfranchisement and self-government would be both premature and dangerous, likely to create chaos instead of order. It must be remembered that we have in the world at present twentieth century, nineteenth century, even sixteenth century nations, and peoples ranging downwards in cultural development from the latest stages of the machine-age to the paleolithic. Nevertheless, history seems to indicate that long-time, as compared with immediate, internal national peace and prosperity rests solidly on democratic principles and procedures. However, whatever the expedient internal governmental procedures are at the moment, they should be compatible with world order and well-being.

Democratic principles should prevail in all *international* affairs, including the participation in regional or world organizations. Both experience and logic point to the importance of such rights as equality of all men and nations before the law, representation in international bodies, freedom of speech and criticism, free consent and contract, and cultural autonomy as the basis of honorable peaceful cooperation. Inclusion in regional or other international organizations should rest on consent or contract by treaty and not be a matter of fiat or arbitrary assignment for purposes of administrative expediency. Autochthonous cultural and political development should be freely permitted.

Not all peoples or nations are committed to such principles at the moment, some need to establish their worthiness for such participation, and perhaps not all would act wisely, but these should be the objectives. Cultural and political independence within a wider system of collective security seems to be the way by which nations and peoples can be integrated into the wider associations which are essential and unavoidable in the present world.

12. IS THERE ENOUGH UNITY AND ENOUGH INTEREST IN AND WILL FOR WORLD COOPERATION TO MAKE WORLD REGIONALISM FUNCTION EFFICIENTLY? In the United States well-established, war-hewn national unity came to prevail over sectionalism. Then regionalism developed more

or less spontaneously, in part as an effect of our "settling down" and stabilizing as self-conscious areas of differentiation within the larger interdependent, interrelated whole, and in part as an implementing factor in permitting the greater whole to operate cooperatively in avoiding giantism and dead-levelism on the one hand and sectionalism and areal isolationism on the other. Regionalism today would not be of any great consequence in the United States were it not for the existing unifying attitudes and spirit and the overall federal organization. Must a similar process occur before an unforced world regionalism appears?

No effective psychological or spiritual global unity exists. In the world as a whole the only homogenizing factor of sufficient power—at best vaguely recognized by both leaders and peoples—is the need for that world security which is the objective and condition of peace and prosperity. Can this be broken down into commonly understood phases of mainly political and economic existence so that the interest in these can serve as a spiritual basis for world-regional administrative operations? Are there *enough* potent international loyalties and interests to serve as substantial psycho-social foundations for successful, cooperating global regions?

Administration for peace might involve military force for enforcement; but military force, in the long run, cannot hold the peoples of a region together or serve as the basis for political operation. It is, at best, an emergency remedy, not a successful, permanent agency. There must develop a sufficient unity of objectives and will, and a common cooperative spirit. Can this be expected, even regionally, in a reasonable period of time, except in such world regions as the ready-made U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R., where it already exists in large measure? Is it possible or likely that under a common political administration, if managed wisely, enough common aspirations and ready cooperations would develop to produce a working stable unity?

It must be admitted that the matter of world regions largely takes the form of a *hope* that some day they *might* develop the socio-cultural and social psychological characteristics of national regions as they have been envisaged.

There are certain existing factors of a general character that give some foundation for optimism, though, in the main, they emphasize universal rather than regional uniformities. The development of the means of transportation and communi-

cation, as these have produced a more and more specialized, contracted and interlocking world, have not only necessitated an ever wider cooperation but have also brought about a greater international mobility of people and goods, and a vastly accelerated diffusion of many cultural elements. The physical essentials of world regionalism exist, some sort of regional interdependence is a reality, inter-areal cooperation is a growing necessity, and a degree of uniformizing and coalescence of culture traits is in process.

For some time for many people the activities and interests occasioned by propinquity of residence have constituted a shrinking proportion of their total activity and interest. This broader area of interest has expanded from local community to nation, and very recently, in *crescendo* manner, is becoming supranational and inter-national. Cultural interests, such as those of art, travel, literature, and religion, have been important; but economic and/or political security and prosperity have been the primary factors. While the hypothetical world regions may have diverse folkways and mores, they will have increasingly more uniform and universal stateways and technicways, to use Odum's terms. From some points of view it would seem that we have fewer and fewer local elements of culture, or that they play a smaller part in daily living, while on the other hand, we have more and more local adaptations of universal technicways and stateways. Certainly in an interlocking world that is prosperous and peaceful we will need many more of these universals; we have to live together and exchange services and goods with a common functional "coinage."

The very necessity of administrative cooperation within regions, with its likely utilitarian advantages, and its uniformizing of certain activities, might produce a growing sense of community and mutual appreciation, and lead to psychic and spiritual unity in time. Such things occasionally have happened on a smaller scale. There is also a rather widely accepted sociological principle to the effect that larger cooperation produces larger loyalties, and that larger loyalties tend to submerge local and lesser antagonisms. Many existing areas are now susceptible to larger loyalties and outlooks. For example, Nicholas Doman, viewing European regionalism, writes,

While Czechs, Hungarians and Rumanians may have diametrically opposed views on the question of territorial regulation in regard to their national states, they

have nevertheless a particular Danubian outlook toward many political, economic, and social issues, as opposed to the outlook of the people of other regions. Casting aside ideological factors arising out of class differences, the similarity of approach toward many vital questions is not to be denied.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, many of the nation-states in existence today, as they have emerged from historic military and diplomatic conflicts, have little relation to economic or cultural realities. Cultural affiliations and loyalties, which are so important in the psychology of individuals often cut across political relations. Racial, religious, and national loyalties coincide in only a few small homogeneous states. Says Lorimer, "... the lines of cultural association crisscross political lines which in turn crisscross major economic relations except in great federal states like the United States and the Soviet Union."<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, it may be conceded that what is desirable is not cultural uniformity—certainly not cultural dead-levelism—but enriching diversity. By asserting their cultural distinctiveness and affirming their unique values the various peoples of the earth not only find possibility of self-realization, but they make specific contributions to the community of nations, stimulate the growth of a world civilization, and enrich humanity as a whole. This implies cultural autonomy and self-determination for all peoples, with all that is involved in the way of political guarantees and implementations.

Nevertheless, in spite of the actual homogenizing forces at work, the possibility of others becoming effective at some future time, and the hopeful qualifications mentioned, no calm realist can feel very optimistic about a potent world or even regional unity and will.

It has been suggested above that any regionalism, whether intra-national or global, can only operate if a system of security prevails which is co-extensive with *all* the regions. Regionalism in its very nature implies, not sectionalism, provincialism, rivalry or divisiveness, but cooperation, unity, progress, peace. While the hope for world security is strong, can it be made effective in the troublous transition period? At such a time people are war weary; they are emotionally exhausted and

<sup>24</sup> "World Reconstruction and European Regionalism," *Social Forces*, 21 (Mar., 1943), 265-272.

<sup>25</sup> F. Lorimer, "Population Factors Relating to the Organization of the Peace," *International Conciliation*, 369 (April, 1941); 440-453.



tired of making sacrifices and steeling themselves for stupendous tasks; the "big job is over with" and they crave "Back to Normalcy." The political "outs," the jingoists, the demagogues, the chauvinists, make class or nationalistic or isolationist or "escapist" appeals to these weary people which invariably are subversive of gains in larger cooperation made during war. The illusion also exists that peace is automatic "when the shooting stops;" we fail to perceive that peace must be continuously and persistently waged, and that the task is more arduous and exacting than waging war.

Also, however idealistic and hopeful one may be, one must still admit that in many areas of the earth powerful divisive influences exist, deeply rooted in the centuries. Many of these are acute in time of war; many others have flourished best in the interim between wars. There are the racialisms, the conflicting minorities and nationalities, the present and potential nationalisms, the class cleavages, the class and national ideologies, the imperialisms, the militant religions, even the various types of diverse and antagonistic sects within possible regions (as, for example, the five or six national brands of Catholic Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe). Similarly, as noted repeatedly, vast lethargies, lags and actual and potential differences and antagonisms exist between possible world regions. Some of these carry an explosive potential of emotionalism which easily overrides more rational considerations, and is capable of wrecking the best schemes and "going concerns."

Perhaps as significant a difficulty as any is that of the crucial lagging of world common mental consciousness and unity behind the accomplished facts of the communicative and spatial

contraction of the world, and the consequent widespread cultural exchange and interdependence along all lines, including the political and the economic. People have not "gotten it into their heads" that time and space, physical and cultural isolation, independence and self-sufficiency have been almost annihilated and that they have to live *together* in this shrinking world. They have not yet comprehended fully that the *world* is the war and peace area; that we must accept the world *as it is*, and act together with conviction. Acceptance of this viewpoint depends upon an understanding of the ingredients of the situation; and this must be an act of will based on an act of learning. The peace-minded must become militant educators.

In conclusion it might be stated that if it were not for the apparent immediate need of world regions for some administrative purposes, it would seem to be better to let them develop spontaneously as "natural" areas of the interlocking and shrinking world. Certainly we must be sure of unifying attitudes and something in the way of sufficient world organization before we go far with world regionalism as it is currently presented. A common sacrificial *interest* in world peace, bolstered by powerful favoring attitudes and thought patterns, translated into and demonstrated in all action of extra-local significance, and diffused among the leaders of all kinds as well as the rank and file of the peoples of the earth to such an extent that it dominates all antagonisms and differences, all partial interests, objectives, and efforts, would seem to be the basic essential for world regionalism. All other related interests must be compatible with and contributory to this one.

#### NEWS NOTE FROM DUKE UNIVERSITY

Professor Charles A. Ellwood, Professor of Sociology in Duke University, after forty-five years of teaching university classes in sociology, will retire this coming June. After receiving his doctor's degree in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1899, he began teaching sociology as an instructor that year in the University of Nebraska. The next year he was called to the newly-created Department of Sociology at the University of Missouri, where he remained for thirty years, but finally accepted a call to organize a Department of Sociology at Duke University in 1930.

Dr. Ellwood is a past president of the American Sociological Society, the International Institute of Sociology, and Pi Gamma Mu, as well as an honorary member of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie, Société de Sociologie de Genève, and Masaryk Sociological Society, Czechoslovakia. His bibliography includes more than a dozen books and over 100 articles.

Professor Howard E. Jensen, who has been associated with Professor Ellwood at Duke University since 1931, will be chairman of the Department at Duke next year.

## THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL PLANNING

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THE dearth of articles published on social planning after the depression has been overcome by the discussion of war and post-war planning.<sup>1</sup> A prudent but obvious prediction would seem to be that whatever the outcome of the war, whatever the form of government the future may bring, planning will remain a live topic oscillating with the crises of many decades. The purpose here is to outline an adequate definition of social planning and to discuss some of its possibilities and limitations.

Two reasons seem apparent for a confusion in the terminology of social planning: lack of adequate definition or consensus on definition, and lack of unbiased analysis. "Social planning" is a term applied to the design and construction of city sewerage systems, housing, the NRA, or a socialist form of government. Although these phenomena have in common an element of planning, they vary sociologically and in the interest of clear thinking need distinguishing terms.

The second reason mentioned above arises from the desire of many writers to emphasize the pros or cons of social planning rather than its analysis. One cannot deny the desirability of such discussions from the point of view of certain value systems, but these discussions are not always conducive to scientific analysis. For a century the concept of social planning has been identified with socialism. Most analyses were by Marxians while many social scientists steered clear of the topic, although the about-face in the last decade is not all that could be wanted. As James Bossard has

indicated, social planning has become a fashion for many social scientists without realization of its difficulties and implications.<sup>2</sup> "Social planning" is now well on its way to becoming a stereotype and it will undoubtedly become a word in the vocabulary of party slogans. Greater caution must be had by social scientists if they are to convey more than do the popular shibboleths.

## ANTECEDENTS TO SOCIAL PLANNING DISCUSSIONS

Since this paper is not concerned with a history of social thought, we will begin with two recent trends in social theory which have a direct influence on discussions of social planning.<sup>3</sup> These are first, chronologically speaking, emphasis on man as a rational animal, and second, the contemporary emphasis on man as an emotional animal.

Discussions of man's rational nature had their modern beginning in the birth of science, mechanistic French thought, the writings of John Locke and the laissez-faire economists. It is clear that the assumption of man's rationality was used both for and against social planning, depending on one's social philosophy. Liberal<sup>4</sup> economists argued that each individual knew best his own interests and that the best economic control was the automatism of the market. By way of science applied to society, others argued for rational controls set up by the state. Each of these theories had its peculiar interpretations in sociology. Spencer's general reasoning seems to have been that man is engulfed in an inevitable progressive evolution. State interference would only mean an "unnatural" and therefore undesirable result.

<sup>1</sup> Several good bibliographies on planning exist: E. C. and L. M. Brooks, "Five Years of 'Planning' Literature," *Social Forces*, 11, No. 3 (Mar., 1933), 430-465; same authors, "A Decade of 'Planning' Literature," *ibid.*, 12, No. 3 (Mar., 1934), 427-459; K. McNamara, *Bibliography of Planning 1928-1935* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936); and John E. Ivey, Jr., et al., *An Uncritical Bibliography on Regionalism and Planning*, mimeographed (University of North Carolina, 1942). Two annotated bibliographies on postwar planning have appeared: Fawn Brodie, *Peace Aims and Post-War Planning*, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1943) and Adolf Sturmthal, *A Survey of Literature on Postwar Reconstruction* (New York: New York University, 1943).

<sup>2</sup> "Sociological Fashions and Societal Planning," *Social Forces*, 14, No. 2 (Dec., 1935), 186-193. He states five limitations to social planning, although several are debatable. See also the warning by E. C. and L. M. Brooks, "A Decade of 'Planning' Literature," *Social Forces*, 12, No. 3 (Mar. 1934), p. 427 that "planning" may become a meaningless catch-all.

<sup>3</sup> For a brief history of the social planning idea see Harry E. Barnes, "Should Social Change Be Consciously Directed," *Frontiers of Democracy*, VI, No. 50 (Jan. 15, 1940), 106-110; and Lewis L. Lorwin, "The Origins of Economic Planning," *Survey Graphic*, 21 (Feb., 1932), pp. 472-475, 512.

<sup>4</sup> Meaning laissez-faire as more commonly used by Continental writers.

On the other side of the fence are Comte, Ward, Cooley, and Ross who in some degree accepted the rationality of man and defended state control. Comte envisioned society, the state, being controlled scientifically by sociologists, although he admitted the necessity of an ideology which for him should be a humanistic religion. The three American sociologists mentioned above have put great faith in the ability of democratic government, public education, and intelligent state control to solve peacefully all social problems. Lester Ward was emphatic on the need for social planning, or social telesis as he called it. The planners were to be sociologists who by some miracle would have ability in all fields of knowledge. C. H. Cooley and E. A. Ross had far more insight into the basic controls of all societies: the institutional patterns. They reflected the democratic ideals of their society, however, without adequate analysis of the social problems which they hoped to ameliorate.

A second school of thought has emphasized man's emotional acceptance of social norms. Man is said to live by his habits, customs, values, and institutional patterns. These patterns of behavior are traditionalized: hence they necessarily change slowly. In times of rapid social change, revolution and excessive or misdirected state control the patterns break down and anomic results. This approach was developed by many European writers and in this country by Sumner who used it vehemently to attack state control and to advocate laissez-faire. Several contemporary sociologists have used this institutional approach to criticize social planning adversely. Recently, however, the tables have been turned by indicating that if an ideology of social planning is accepted, planning itself becomes an institutional pattern.<sup>6</sup>

Thus the assumptions of man's rational and emotional natures have each had their influence on theories of planning. Each has been used to indicate both the limitations and the possibilities of social planning. The confusion is partly of terms and partly a failure to define frames of

reference. Sociology can now point out that state control is not "unnatural." Such control has dominated the history of states, and its extent depends on general social conditions. Faith in democracy, education, and state control as a solution for social problems, however, are also misdirected if other factors such as the class structure and anomie are ignored. Equally blind is faith in the desirability, inevitability, and immediacy of social planning.

#### THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL PLANNING

Is social planning more than mere state control? A current tendency is to identify these concepts. States have often controlled large spheres of social life, but such states have never been immune to disintegration. Modern states are experimenting with more laws, more controls, more services. The ICC and NRA have been called social plans. They are agencies of control, but probably they lack some characteristics which the word "plan" connotes.

The dictionary definition of *plan* describes it as a method of action. *Plan* is distinguished from *design* by less emphasis on the purpose, from *scheme* by less emphasis on the speculative, and from *project* by more emphasis on the practical. The dictionary defines *control* as the power or authority to regulate.<sup>6</sup> It would seem that in ordinary language planning is action which involves consideration of a practical means of attaining an end; whereas control is merely the power to undertake such action. Without control, planning is impossible, but planning does not necessarily follow from control.

It is well to expand and make explicit four characteristics of planning.<sup>7</sup> First, planning in-

<sup>6</sup> See Webster's *New International Dictionary* for definitions given here.

<sup>7</sup> See Francis J. Brown, "Social Planning Through Education," *American Sociological Review*, I, No. 6 (December, 1936), 934-942; F. H. Hankins, "Discussion" (of article by E. A. Ross), *American Sociological Review*, I, No. 1 (Feb., 1936), 33-37; Sidney Hook, "The Philosophic Implications of Economic Planning," in Findlay Mackenzie (ed.), *Planned Society: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937), 663-677. These authors list from two to five characteristics of planning, but the writer is nevertheless in basic agreement with them. For purposes of analyzing the problems of social planning the fourfold classification seems most adequate. Hook's article is the most analytical and is less philosophical and more social than

<sup>6</sup> See Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940); and Hans Speier, "Freedom and Social Planning," *American Journal of Sociology* XLII, No. 4 (Jan., 1937), 463-483. Mannheim's book is the most complete and careful discussion of the problems of planning in modern society including extensive bibliographies on various subjects. Speier's article is an excellent theoretical analysis of the prerequisites to social planning.



volves acceptance of a goal; an end which must be specifically defined. In the case of a plurality of goals, they must be mutually compatible. Second, practical means of attaining the end must be known. It should be realized that few planning situations fully meet this requirement. There is nothing incongruous with planning and changing the means as further understanding dictates. This happens in the application of the sciences of engineering and medicine. Agreement is complete on the ends of building a bridge or the health of an individual, but the means of attaining these ends are changed when quicksand at the foundation or an unforeseen cancer is found. These sciences, also, may disagree and compromise on the means of meeting these complications. Similarly, perfect prediction of future contingencies and absolute agreement on means are unnecessary in social planning.<sup>8</sup>

Third, general acceptance of the means to the

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the title implies. Hankins rightfully points out that social planning does not automatically follow from mass education.

<sup>8</sup> Sorokin claims that social planning is impossible because sociology will never be able to predict accurately. See: "Is Accurate Social Planning Possible?" *American Sociological Review*, I, No. 1 (Feb., 1936) and its "Discussion" by Henry P. Fairchild, *ibid.*, 12-28. Sorokin's empirical proof is completely irrelevant to the question. He shows that individuals cannot predict to the minute what they will be doing in the future. It is irrelevant, first, because social planning is not individual planning. Just as the chemist is usually interested in predicting the *average* atom, the social planner is interested in the general social relationships. Second, the question is not one of accuracy possible in terms of perfection, but in terms of the accuracy *desired* by the population. In effect, Sorokin says that accurate social planning is impossible because John Jones, let alone other people, cannot predict to the minute at what time he will brush his teeth tomorrow night. The general situation, not the time element measured to the minute, is the important consideration for social planning. Third, as Fairchild has pointed out, Sorokin has confused planning with prediction. In all planning situations, prediction of what will happen in the uncontrolled situation is not what is wanted. Understanding of the processes concerned and then direction of them toward predetermined ends is involved. It might be countered that even Sorokin's individual guinea pigs could not direct their action accurately. The rebuttal is that their ends were not to brush their teeth at a specific time, but merely to brush them.

ends is necessary. While this is automatic in individual planning, a minimum of consensus among experts, leaders, and the public is needed in the group situation. Again, the application of other sciences often lacks perfect agreement. Usually several means are considered possible. This leads to compromise among experts and a certain amount of experimentation. A flexibility of means is considered desirable for, rather than incompatible with planning.

Fourth, a prerequisite to planning is enough control of the situation to make it a more efficient method of attaining ends than the unplanned course of events. No planning situation actually has complete control. Control is possible only in a given frame of reference. The laboratory experiment may be a case of complete control *within* a scientific field, but a fire in the building may defeat the plan. Individual, social and national planning, likewise, will always be susceptible to "accidents," e.g. the influence of factors beyond the sphere of control such as death, the natural elements, and the acts of other nations.<sup>9</sup> Usually there is lack of complete control, however, within the planned frame of reference. This is true in social planning, but also in other fields such as the application of medical science. The amount of control is limited by the knowledge of causal processes and, where human behavior is involved (present in medical and social planning), by the authority to control. Complete control of future events in any field of action is impossible. To repeat, the amount of control necessary for planning is a function of the desired efficiency *within* a definable universe of relationships.

These four characteristics, which involve ends, knowledge, means and control, are inseparable constituents of the planning structure. Discussion of planning has often questioned the perfection of knowledge and control or the agreement on ends and means. Such discussion is misleading because absolutism in these attributes is seldom, if ever, possible or necessary. Planning is a configuration of the four conditions in which each is met sufficiently for the practical needs of the total situation. Planning is not a static thing: a blue print, a paper plan or a utopian ideal. It is a dynamic phenomenon. Planning is a directed process of action toward a given goal with the use of sufficient understanding, methods, and author-

<sup>9</sup> Such factors have been listed elsewhere purporting to show that social planning is impossible.

ity to attain the goal within the limits of accuracy deemed practical.

The attainment of a goal in human action is irrelevant to the existence of planning. A hit-and-miss process of action may reach the desired goal. On the other hand, man's imagination and faith often leads him to attempt the impossible. Lack of adequate knowledge, of means, or of control brings failure in goal-directed activity and planning is absent. The failure to attain a goal when the four characteristics are present, however, does not always indicate the absence of planning. Planning may fail to obtain its objectives because events occurred which were outside the planned frame of reference. Absolute control of means in action by human agents probably is impossible in this universe of ours. This is as true for the "natural" scientific, as it is for the social situation. Hence, attainment of goals in social planning is limited in this respect as it is in other types of planning.

The types of planning may be classified according to the agents that do the planning—individuals and groups—and to the frame of reference of the plan—extrinsic planning and self-planning. From these categories we have four basically different types of planning: individual extrinsic planning, individual self-planning, group extrinsic planning, and group self-planning (social planning).

Individuals commonly and successfully plan for ends outside themselves. They plan for extrinsic material ends as in cooking and even for ends involving social relationships as illustrated by entertainments and business enterprises. To a limited extent individuals also plan themselves; e.g., their social roles.<sup>10</sup> The individual may adopt life goals, understand the methods of attaining them, accept means to these ends, and control his own action commensurate with practical needs. The structure of this type of individual planning requires knowledge and understanding of one's own ability to cope with the social mechanisms necessary to attain the goals. Control in this case is "self-control" and planning here consists largely of action directed toward the acquisition of social roles. Planning of one's own personality, however, is greatly limited, if not impossible, because one's habits and emotions become partially fixed early in life. Even if the individual develops insight into his own personality, he usually lacks

control over these relatively fixed patterns of action.<sup>11</sup> In planning social roles the individual can only plan in terms of given cultural situations. If through cultural change what were possible goals and means become socially impossible, the action of the individual is still planning because such change was outside the frame of reference of his control.

On the other hand, the bulk of human action is unplanned. Behavior consists of individual habits and customs without explicitly defined goals and without full understanding of the results of action. Where goals are defined they are either changed before they are realized or the trial and error process is used to attain them. It is not at all certain that our modern secular society contains more individual planning than the sacred non-literate society. Perhaps scientific knowledge has widened our sphere of planning for ends outside ourselves. In planning our social roles, however, our contemporary conditions cause many individuals to strive for goals far beyond what they can reasonably expect to attain. They lack understanding to fulfill the requirements of planning. Again, many individuals who sense an insecurity adjust themselves by a non-goal-directed process of day-to-day living.

Group planning, unlike individual planning, requires an institutional structure which enables group members to coordinate behavior relevant to the desired goals. It involves acceptance of means and ends by a number of individuals and their ability to direct the necessary factors. Much group behavior is totally unplanned. Primary groups and groups which exist for purposes of recreation or promotion of intellectual or esthetic interests may lack any or all the characteristics of planning. The homogeneity of small groups may make planning an easy matter, but the lack of any goal whose success needs the coordination of the members' activity makes planning unnecessary or the coordination present is not utilized for attaining a group-accepted goal. Authority to control must be granted to leaders and the advice of experts must be obtained in proportion as the group is large, or heterogeneous, or as the planning becomes complicated. Goal-directed activity by

<sup>11</sup> The further development of psychiatry may make possible the planning of one's personality. See Karen Horney, *Self-Analysis* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1942) for an optimistic statement of this point of view and a critical review of this book by Lionel Trilling in *The Nation*, 155, No. 11 (Sept. 12, 1942), 215-217.

<sup>10</sup> This is contrary to Sorokin's point of view. See *op. cit.*

leaders is not group planning until the structure of activity is accepted by the dominant opinion of the group.

Group planning for extrinsic ends, however, is frequently illustrated in the history of man. The feudal manor and the craft guild planned production as the modern business enterprise plans production and profit. Political parties plan their campaigns. Lobbies and reform groups may plan their material or social ends, although much of their activity involves wishful and utopian thinking which means lack of understanding and lack of adequate control. The city and state plan roads, parks, and bridges. This type of group planning is what is often meant by city, technological, and regional planning.

Group planning for extrinsic ends uses the social structure of the group to attain the end. When the group plans itself it has to utilize its social structure, but it also is planning its social structure (from a sociological point of view the social structure is the group). This latter type of group planning is group self-planning or *social planning*. This more limited use of *social planning* is implicit in most of the literature on the problems of planning, although the distinction is seldom made. The above fourfold classification of planning situations makes clearer the structure and problems of social planning.

Social planning defined as a process of action is a better working definition than the criterion of perfection in attainment of goals, but there remain factors limiting its development. Like all group planning, social planning requires consensus of the group on means and ends and like individual self-planning, social planning requires understanding of its own structure. The difficulties of individual self-planning and social planning are analogous only superficially in the characteristic of "self." The patterns in human relations which we call institutions are to be the results of social planning. Like the patterns of personality in individual self-planning, the social patterns in social planning have existence only as individual habit structures. The difference between these two types of self-planning lies both within the individual and in the relationship of the individual to the planning. The social patterns or customs which are also habits of individuals have less resistance to change than the personality structure (e.g., extroversion, introversion, neurotic tendencies, etc.) of the individual. Individuals change their social habits (folkways and mores), whereas once their per-

sonality is formed it is more impervious to change. The relationship of the individual to social planning is not that of planning oneself, but of planning something for oneself. The group member in social planning, therefore, can be more objective than if he were self-planning. Furthermore, as in individual planning, social planning may seek the advice of experts on the compatibility of ends and the efficiency of means, but social planning is unique in its ability to educate new generations which have as yet not learned the social customs, if the older age groups are unable to accept the new customs. These points suggest that social planning is more possible than individual self-planning.

The social structure of most groups was not planned. It developed into forms, through a process of trial and error in individual action, which were oftentimes never envisioned by their members. This typifies in general such groups as families, communities, religious groups, labor unions, and political parties. Many such groups do not practice social planning because their center of interest is on goals other than their own social structure. A patriarchal family is not planned and patriarchy often develops even where the couple think they believe in the equality of the sexes. Thus the social structure of primary groups is the result of the interplay of personality types and it is rarely successfully planned by their members. Other groups mentioned emphasize as ends higher wages, success at the polls, the teaching of morals or conversion; and their own structure is immaterial to their interests. Where self-planning is practiced by these groups, it is usually not successful planning. The reason for this is because most groups are integral parts of the larger societies in which they exist. The ends and means to ends of the groups are continually changing because of changing memberships and changing social conditions surrounding the groups. It happens, therefore, that in the relatively small groups where social planning is presumably easiest, most of the social structure is unplanned.

Many examples of fairly successful social plans, nevertheless, can be cited even though they are obvious and concern simple situations. Some churches, clubs, philanthropic groups and interest groups have planned the social relations between their leaders and followers, the methods of succession to office, the means of recruiting members, and the codes of behavior for different types of members and situations. These "articles of the constitution" have often worked in practice for



decades without modification. The situation meets the general requirements of planning, but it is planning a very simple situation. Most groups control only a small part of the behavior of their members and those that dislike this control can resign their memberships. It is social planning, but planning limited to a homogeneous group whose members unanimously want the plan.

The histories of the utopian and religious communities provide illustrations of attempts at more complete social planning.<sup>12</sup> Most of them had the characteristics of accepting means and ends and adequate controls by constituted authorities, but many lacked understanding of a social system. This latter point is demonstrated many times in their failure to institutionalize a system for succession to power. Idealism and worship of the first leader blinded the Perfectionists at Oneida to the problems of carrying on after his death. The result was conflict over leadership and final disintegration of the group. Another general weakness was a failure to provide adequate honor systems or incentives for participation. The Owenite communities even tried to dismiss entirely praise and blame which are probably necessary constituents of organized social life.<sup>13</sup> A third common limitation to social planning in these communities resulted from the tendency to make the planning exclusively a matter for the leaders. Dictatorial social planning is certainly possible, but the specific means and ends have got to become a part of the common social life to be successful. Vague idealism is not enough.

The failure of these community experiments has probably been over-stressed in some of the literature. Even though none of them had permanent success in terms of the original plans, many of them experienced temporary success in spite of the inadequacies mentioned above. Thus the community at Oneida lasted over thirty years; at Hopedale, Massachusetts nearly fifteen; Dr. Kiels' community at Aurora, Oregon for twenty-nine years; a Fourierist settlement at Red Bank for thirteen

years; an Icarian settlement at Corning, Iowa for eighteen years; and some of the Amana communities are still operating in a modified way. The primary reason for the eventual disintegration of most of the utopian communities was probably that they were surrounded by an alien society which was being rapidly industrialized and increasing its standard of living. With a small division of labor these communities could not compete with the outside and the attempt to integrate their economies with the outside caused the financial ruin of many. It was the uncontrolled influence from the larger society or the lack of knowledge and ability to control this outside influence more than the inability to plan itself which weakened the structure of these communities.

Various degrees of social planning are being used by other groups today. The modern large-scale business organization is finding that where efficiency and reliability of human action are important, social as well as technological planning is necessary.<sup>14</sup> Progressive education has as one of its ends the planning of teacher-pupil relations rather than allowing these relations to be determined by the uncontrolled response mechanisms of the personalities. Producers and consumers cooperatives are further attempts to plan social relations. The United States Government has launched several plans, the outstanding ones of which have been the TVA, the Matanuska project of Alaska, and the subsistence homesteads projects.<sup>15</sup> These illustrative attempts at planning, whether governmental or private, have in common the same limitations which the utopian communities and all planning by sub-groups have, namely, that they are all influenced by uncontrolled factors of the larger society. This does not prevent planning, but it makes completely successful planning less possible.

<sup>14</sup> See F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934) and T. N. Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936).

<sup>15</sup> See K. McNamara, *op. cit.*, for bibliography on TVA. See Charles P. Loomis, "Rebuilding American Community Life," *American Sociological Review*, 5, No. 3 (June, 1940), 311-324 for a critical discussion of the subsistence homestead projects. Many New Deal programs such as the NRA cannot be considered social plans because they attempted to deal with a phase of our culture without adequate consideration of the larger social structure with which they were inextricably related.

<sup>12</sup> See Dorothy W. Douglas and Katherine Du Pre Lumpkin, "Communitistic Settlements," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IV (New York, 1934) for brief article and extended bibliography.

<sup>13</sup> See Hans Speier, "Honor and Social Structure," *Social Research*, 2, No. 1 (Feb., 1935), 74-97; same author's application of this to planning, *op. cit.*; Talcott Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV, No. 6 (May, 1940), 841-862.

## THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETAL PLANNING

The term "social planning" more often than not refers to the planning of whole societies. This is a type of group self-planning or social planning, but it has as its frame of reference the potential control of all social behavior as contrasted with planning by other groups which are concerned with only a phase of individuals' behavior. Social planning of societies has been called *societal planning*.<sup>16</sup>

The broad frame of reference for this type of social planning raises doubts concerning its possibility and desirability. Is the knowledge and understanding gained from the present development of social science enough for such an undertaking? Would such a policy endanger our democratic principles, take away our civil liberties, and lead to a dictatorial form of government? For what are we to plan? Can we agree upon ends or must planning be for the interests of a particular class? Are the ends which we want compatible? Are we willing to accept the necessary means? Shall we allow specialists to decide the necessary means to our ends? Only the course of future events can give the final answer to most of these questions. On the other hand, there is an accumulating sum of evidence as well as an essential agreement on many points by a number of social scientists.

What will come hard to some popular and vague social planners is that societal planning entails *potential* control of *all* social behavior and that the only contemporary group in a position to exercise this control is the state acting through the institutions of national government.<sup>17</sup> This statement does not link planning with any particular "ism" and its harshness is lightened by two considerations. First, the state may delegate authority to both public and private local agencies

as seems desirable, and second, much social behavior may be left to individual choice. The point is that no societal planning is possible while preconceived limits to state control are set, with the exception of those limits which may be a part of the ends of the plan such as civil liberties and other individual constitutional rights. The social structure is simply too complicated to foresee all of the state action which from time to time may be necessary. All planning situations are tentative processes in that the means must be modified as circumstances warrant.

The statement above does not mean that the government must control all behavior. As a matter of fact, no government could effectively control all informal and personal relationships. In final analysis the relation of the given social structure to the aims of the plan determines the necessary degree of state control. With reference to the possibility of planning, the question of whether the state should control is rapidly becoming an academic one. Before the war and even before the Great Depression, Occidental states were assuming new functions and controls. The practical questions are how and for whom control should be exercised and whether we are to have hit-and-miss legislation by logrolling or social planning.

The structure of state planning requires the institutionalized role of the specialist, although this is superfluous for much individual planning and planning by small groups. Again, this is an academic question as the technical adviser is already here in both the dictator and democratic nations. He has entered, however, through the back door as the personal adviser, the lobbyist, the administrator and now has become the salaried technical staff of government departments. His relationships to the legislative and administrative branches of government are now being worked out in custom and law.

The expert's relation to the legislative branch of government is still a "problem" for democratic planning. In dictatorial planning, a separate legislative branch composed of the people's representatives is abolished and in many cases the expert becomes the legislator. Under democracy, it is necessary to have elected representatives of the people decide the objectives of legislation and under planning it is necessary to have the means (the laws and detailed functions of government) determined by experts. Before effective social planning is possible, the influence of these experts must be extended. Their function must be accepted by

<sup>16</sup> Emory Bogardus, "Types of Societal Planning," *Sociology and Social Research*, 22, No. 6 (July-Aug., 1938), 568-576, and Constantine Panunzio, "Social Science and Societal Planning," *ibid.*, 19, No. 4 (Mar.-Apr., 1935), 324-334. The term social planning is used in the present article to include the planning of any or all social relationships—economic, political, religious, etc. To the extent that all institutional patterns are interrelated, societal planning necessarily concerns all phases of a society's structure. The TVA is an example of societal planning of one area of the nation.

<sup>17</sup> For a statement on the comprehensiveness of social planning, see Howard W. Odum, "Sociology in the Contemporary World of Today and Tomorrow," *Social Forces*, 21, No. 4 (May, 1943), pp. 394-396.



public opinion and by their representatives. It means a corresponding loss of functions for legislators, but it must be realized that the test of democracy lies in the people's ability to influence the ends of government. The selection of ends and compromise on incompatible ends will remain an important function for them. To a large extent the function of deciding means is now performed by the executive branch of government, but it must be linked to more nonpolitical experts, must be extended and must be accepted in a well formulated institutional pattern.<sup>18</sup>

Coincident with the new role for the expert, more state control will entail an extension of bureaucratic structure. Since bureaucracy has become an emotionally tinged symbol for inefficiency, arbitrary rules, and over-centralization, it cannot now be advocated successfully from the public platform. If bureaucracy is defined as a type of impersonal social structure in which the hierarchy of authority and function is specifically defined and limited and where the ability of the personnel is commensurate with its status, it becomes a heuristic concept for scientific investigation.<sup>19</sup>

Bureaucracy is a type of social structure which existed in several of the ancient civilizations, developed in the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages and has become particularly characteristic of modern business and governmental organizations. It is a type of structure which would seem to be inevitable for large-scale enterprises unless a feudal structure of pyramided personal relationships (e.g., our political party machines) or a dictatorial one with no limitations of power is accepted. As for the efficiency of a bureaucracy it would seem that in both business and government the spoils system of appointment and the lack of adequate mechanisms for advancement, both of which prevent the coordination of ability with status, are the basic reasons for inefficiency.

<sup>18</sup> Stuart Chapin in "Social Theory and Social Action," *American Sociological Review*, 1, No. 1 (Feb., 1936), p. 11, suggests that a board of social science experts is needed to review proposed laws.

<sup>19</sup> See Carl J. Friedrich and Taylor Cole, *Responsible Bureaucracy, A Study of the Swiss Civil Service* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), chap. I, for an analysis of its development and characteristics. Robert Merton in "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," *Social Forces*, 18, No. 4 (May, 1940), 560-568, discusses its negative aspects. The general answer of the latter is that a bureaucratic structure has its difficulties but so do all social systems.

Rules are necessary in a bureaucracy for the protection of the populace and the rules need not become ends in themselves. Centralization is not a necessary characteristic of this structure. Both the initiative for new legislation and the administration of existent laws may be highly decentralized to regional, state, or community agencies.<sup>20</sup> Given the size of our population and modern technical production, the question with which we are faced is not the existence of bureaucracy but the type of bureaucracy which we are going to have. A bureaucratic structure is not itself dictatorial but it may be used for either dictatorial or democratic ends.

The most crucial problem for practical planning is the process of the acceptance of ends and means. Democratic societal planning requires the expert to decide the means and representatives to decide the ends. In practice, however, means become ends in the minds of people and it seems to be difficult for democratic legislators working under the party system to agree upon ends. The principle counteracting this difficulty is the pressure of a crisis situation which tends to limit the number of acceptable ends.<sup>21</sup> A corollary of the statement is that the continual increase in the standard of living in Western countries and the inability of a planless organization to allow an attainment of this standard have led to what might be called a perpetual crisis situation. If a case for the possibility of societal planning is to be made, it would seem that the necessary controls and the crises which bring more agreement upon ends are setting the stage for its attainment.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> See Louis Wirth, "Localism, Regionalism and Centralization," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLII, No. 4 (Jan. 1937), 493-509, for excellent discussion of localism and centralization. The growing interest in regionalism promises to provide an efficient counterbalance to federal over-centralization. See *Regionalism in Transition* (pamphlet published by *Social Forces* containing articles published in 1942 and 1943). Effective societal planning must be geared to the local folk cultures of the nation. See Howard W. Odum, *op. cit.*, pp. 390-396.

<sup>21</sup> See Hans Speier, "Freedom and Social Planning," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLII, No. 4 (Jan. 1937), 463-483.

<sup>22</sup> The development of a class struggle is the outstanding limitation here. The general concept of planning, however, is compatible with much in American culture. See Howard W. Odum, "A Sociological Approach to National Social Planning," *Sociology and Social Research*, 19, No. 4 (Mar.-April, 1935), 303-313.



The possibility of adequate knowledge for social planning is a question which only experimentation and time can answer. Several writers doubt that adequate knowledge exists.<sup>23</sup> Social scientists lack adequate knowledge on many questions, but the current impression that there is complete lack of agreement among these scientists is unfounded. There is often disagreement on the best method of reaching an objective, as there will always be in an inexact science, but there is much agreement concerning those methods which simply cannot work and those which have some utility. The argument on the perfection of social scientific knowledge, however, is somewhat beside the point. The feasibility of social planning at the present time rests mainly on public opinion concerning our method of social change and the structure of the governmental system. All planning is a tentative process where new experience is constantly enlarging one's understanding and increasing the adequacy of means. If we wait for the perfection of scientific knowledge, we will never plan because it is only in the planning experiment that such knowledge can be perfected. On this point, the NRA and current attempts to ration goods and fix prices should be looked upon as laboratory experiments from which many practical generalizations can be derived.

In broad outline, then, the structure of societal planning is similar to that of all planning—individual, natural scientific (engineering and medicine), and group planning. Examples of practical and successful planning are all about us. It would seem that there is nothing “innately” impossible about societal planning, but there are certain difficulties in the way of its achievement at the present time. Its peculiarities as a type of planning arise from the need for agreement upon means and ends by a large population; the dependence upon state control; and its reliance on an objective social science. Although there are many indications that we are travelling the road toward social

<sup>23</sup> See Pitrim Sorokin, *op. cit.* Robert Merton, in “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” *American Sociological Review*, 1, No. 6 (Dec., 1936), 894-904, gives several limitations to the possibility of social planning. His points concerning the problems of causal imputation and social prediction are well taken except that he tends to identify the problem of planning with that of prediction (see former reference to Sorokin). Merton concludes that no categorical answer to the feasibility of social planning is possible.

planning by way of governmental bureaucracy, there are obstacles such as the inability of our political and economic institutions to produce enough agreement upon compatible ends and our lack of faith in and insistence upon democratic control of an enlarged “social service state.”

#### PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PLANNING

In the interest of formulating more exactly our understanding of social planning, there is given below a number of generalizations.<sup>24</sup> They at least state in a more concise form some of the ideas presented and may suggest projects for more complete verification. They range from some rather obvious statements to those that are less so and hence probably more open to doubt. We call them principles and hypotheses of social planning, letting the reader take the responsibility of classifying them. If this is not science, it is at least a step in the direction of scientific investigation.

- I. The existence of social planning is functionally related to secondary groups for:
  1. Secondary group planning involves planning of formal rules and laws.
    - (1) Social planning in primary groups would involve the greatly limited, if not impossible, problem of self-planning personality.
  2. Secondary groups have a functional need for planning in that the definition of individual roles, functions, and authorities cannot be taken for granted.
    - (1) Primary groups assume the social position of individuals; their interest in planning, if any, is planning for something other than their own structure.

<sup>24</sup> The recent trend in sociology to state precisely in the form of propositions or principles the significant relationships found in our data is encouraging and perhaps indicative of a more mature science. The danger of implying more than we really know will, perhaps, be counteracted by forcing us to verify a few specific generalizations. The broader term “social” instead of “societal” is used here because many of the generalizations apply to planning of small groups as well as to societies. To reiterate, “social planning” refers to a *process of social change* in which the characteristics of planning (acceptance of ends and means, adequate knowledge of means and ability to control) have been applied to changing the social structure and adequately met to insure a high probability of attaining objectives, barring interference from external uncontrolled factors. Social planning is neither a blue print for action nor society's planning of ends external to its own social structure. The writer is indebted to Hans Speier for some of the principles.

- II. The possibility of social planning increases when the social structure is in crisis or danger (war, famine, depression, level of living below standard of living).
  1. Cohesion of the group under pressure and necessity for action are the factors responsible for this.
  2. The possibility of social planning increases as its means and ends can be justified by more immediate structural dangers.
    - (1) Effective danger is subjectively felt danger, which may have no relationship to actual danger.
- III. The possibility of social planning varies directly with man's acceptance of social change.
  1. Social planning is more possible in the phases of culture which undergo rapid changes and less possible in the basic mores.
    - (1) If planning itself becomes one of the basic mores, then radical planning of the other mores becomes more possible.
  2. Traditionalism (familism, caste system, etc.) greatly impedes social planning.
- IV. The existence of societal planning is functionally related to bureaucratic governmental structure, to centralized government control in spheres of plan and to popular participation in government programs.
  1. Objectives of plan may be popularly demanded or initiated with popular consent.
  2. Bureaucratic government controls may be administratively decentralized.
  3. If the government is democratic, democracy is found less in the voting for men than for policies, and is found less in voting than in opportunity for social and economic participation.
- V. The extent of successful (*i.e.*, ability to attain ends) social planning varies directly with the comprehensiveness of the means.
  1. The police power of the state is inadequate for social planning.
  2. Positive education (if not propaganda) and reconstruction of social structure is necessary for social planning in proportion to the scope of the plan.
    - (1) Pork barrel legislation and logrolling inhibit social planning.

The practical use of such principles is found in their application to current social conditions—the prediction and direction of those conditions. Even if there were adequate verification of the principles as stated, the sociologist is still confronted with the fundamental and unsolved problem of evaluating the relative significance of the

factors. Granting this difficulty as basic to all sociological prediction, the sociologist can make crude predictions by avoiding the common error of attempting the impossible task of predicting events in a broad frame of reference of uncontrolled variables. No science is able to do this. All that sociology should attempt is to predict the probability of events under limited or given conditions.

It is highly probable that the ideology of social planning will be used more and more in the American political arena. It is quite another question to predict how near the method of social change will approach a constructed typology of societal planning. Contemporary conditions favoring societal planning include the following variables: (1) the increased use of the expert and bureaucracy in government; (2) increased public control of social behavior; (3) acceptance of relatively rapid change in many spheres of social behavior (economic, marital, and educational relationships); (4) crisis in social structure not only from war but from loss of primary group controls, growth of interest groups, psychological and economic insecurities, inadequate level of living relative to standard of living, and the business cycle; (5) growing non-logical consent for, or faith in, planning; (6) growth of social sciences and their emphasis on objectivity; and (7) modern means of communication, education, and propaganda at the disposal of government.

Contemporary conditions hindering societal planning include: (1) lack of popular appreciation of the crisis in the social structure; (2) lack of social cohesion in the class structure and hence inability to agree on means and ends of social planning; (3) vested interests in the status quo and traditionalism in certain phases of the social structure (religion, professionalism, constitutionalism, states' rights, private property); and (4) the belief in a *laissez-faire* policy which prevents comprehensive planning.

The greater number of points favoring social planning indicates nothing concerning its probability. Even though the trend in these conditions has been correctly stated, their present or future development may be inadequate for social planning and the relative weight which they should be given is largely unknown.

What is more important to many Americans is the possibility of democratic social planning in this country. Our traditions and constitutional rights to civil liberties and political democracy are in its favor. Also, the pressure from public opinion on

government control tends to promote equal distribution of whatever advantages are derived from planning. Our open-class philosophy and broad educational base would tend to make planning for the exclusive benefit of the elite classes unworkable.

Since dictatorial regimes, as well as social planning, tend to arise in crisis situations, it is not at all unexpected to find dictatorships the first proponents of planning. Their coincidental development, however, does not indicate that planning brought about the dictatorships; in fact, quite the reverse was true.<sup>25</sup> Still a current trend of thought which is not uncommon among social scientists pictures social planning as the entering wedge for dictatorship. If the problems of social order and

stability persist as they are likely to, the possibilities for the future social structure lie between a dictatorship where the planning (not social planning) is for the maintenance of power and social planning for the maintenance of democracy. We probably lack the choice between plan and no plan, but it is conceivable that we could successfully plan our social structure for the maintenance of democratic principles. The greatest danger to such an achievement, as the Italian philosopher Croce recently put it, is active ignorance.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Germany and Italy are better examples of the use of modern natural and social science to gain and maintain power than they are of societal planning.

<sup>26</sup> *New York Times*, Sept. 30, 1943, 4:6.

## ECOLOGY AND HUMAN ECOLOGY

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**H**UMAN ecology, from its inception to a comparatively recent date, is reminiscent of Alice's curious experience in the rabbit hole when she, after consuming the pretty little cake, opened out "like the largest telescope that ever was." Emerging abruptly in the early 1920's, human ecology quickly became, as an otherwise unkind commentator puts it, "one of the most definite and influential schools in American sociology. . . ."<sup>1</sup>

It is now beginning to appear, however, that the period of burgeoning growth has given way to a second phase in which sober criticism rather than feverish application is the prevailing note. Re-examination and reappraisal are the order of the day.<sup>2</sup> This cannot be anything but welcome, for it is a necessary preface to the sorely needed reconstruction of human ecological thought. Hence the addition of still another voice to the developing symposium may not be amiss.<sup>2a</sup>

<sup>1</sup> M. A. Alihan, *Social Ecology, A Critical Analysis* (New York, 1938), p. xi.

<sup>2</sup> M. A. Alihan, *ibid.*; J. A. Quinn, "Human Ecology and Interactional Ecology," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, V (Oct., 1940), 713-22; and W. E. Gettys, "Human Ecology and Social Theory," *Social Forces*, XVIII (1940) 469-76.

<sup>2a</sup> I am indebted to the late Professor R. D. McKenzie for most of the ideas set forth in this paper, but responsibility for their statement here is entirely mine.

Perhaps it is to be expected that the sudden ascent to popularity of an innovation in scientific thought should be accompanied by a certain amount of confusion as to its specific connotation. If so, human ecology has satisfied expectations, for after twenty years it remains a somewhat crude and ambiguous conception. A perusal of the literature that has accumulated under the name can hardly fail to produce bewilderment. One finds it variously argued that the study deals essentially with "sub-social" phenomena, with the effects of competition, with spatial distributions, with the influence of geographic factors, and with still other more or less intelligibly delineated aspects of human behavior. There are some writers who would have human ecology encompass the whole field of social science, and there are others who prefer to relegate it to the status of a mere sociological research technique. Between these wide extremes the subject can be found identified in turn with biology, economics, human geography, sociology, and, as if not to overlook a possibility, it is sometimes described as marginal to all other life sciences.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, the sole point of agreement among the many diverse conceptions of

<sup>3</sup> For a more exhaustive discussion of the variety of points of view in human ecology see J. A. Quinn, "Tropical Summary of Current Literature in Human Ecology," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, XLVI (Sept., 1940), 191-226.



human ecology seems to be that it pertains to some phase of man's relation to his physical universe. This, unfortunately, is no distinction, since most of the sciences of man may be characterized in the same manner.

Whatever may be said regarding the confusion as to the nature of the study, it cannot be charged to a lack at the outset of careful attempts at systematic theoretical formulation. The success of human ecology in attracting and holding the large share of attention it has enjoyed is largely a result of the ingeniousness, simplicity, and utility of the early definitive statement.<sup>4</sup> But these seem to have been accepted as dogmas rather than, as intended, as suggestions of the possibilities of an ecological approach to the study of human social life. Subsequent work in the field, with very few exceptions, was not aimed at exploring the full implication of ecology as applied to man. Instead there was a wholesale application of a little understood point of view and in consequence the theoretical development of the discipline received scarcely any attention. In fact, most so-called ecological studies have been occupied with incidentals and by-products of the approach, and not a few are totally irrelevant to the caption under which they appear in print.

But to be more specific, responsibility for the existing chaos in human ecology, it seems to me, rests upon certain aberrant intellectual tendencies which have dominated most of the work that has been done. The more significant of these may be described as: (1) the failure to maintain a close working relationship between human ecology and general or bioecology; (2) an undue preoccupation with the concept competition; and (3) the persistence in definitions of the subject of a misplaced emphasis on "spatial relations." Whether such habits of thought originated from one source or another is unimportant. What is important is that they have consistently confused the issue thereby hampering the progress of the discipline. The purpose of the present paper is to indicate the deficiencies of these elements of human ecological thought and thus to aid in clearing the way for a reorganization of the subject.

<sup>4</sup> See R. D. McKenzie, "The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community," in R. E. Park, E. W. Burgess, and R. D. McKenzie (eds.), *The City* (Chicago, 1925), pp. 63-79; R. E. Park, "The Urban Community as a Spatial Pattern and a Moral Order," in E. W. Burgess (ed.), *The Urban Community* (Chicago, 1926), pp. 3-18; and R. D. McKenzie, "The Scope of Human Ecology," *The Urban Community*, pp. 167-82.

Probably most of the difficulties which beset human ecology may be traced to the isolation of the subject from the mainstream of ecological thought. Although it seems almost too elementary to mention, the only conceivable justification for a human ecology must derive from the intrinsic utility of ecological theory as such. Obvious as this may seem, it is not a fact that is generally taken seriously. Exponents of human ecology, despite their steadfast adherence to the name, tend to view with indifference or regret the fact that their subject has any connection with the parent discipline. This is indeed a paradox. If a person chooses to call this work ecology, it would appear reasonable to assume that his studies are intended to parallel, at least in some particulars, those of others working under the same general title. However, very few persons who regard themselves as human ecologists indicate an awareness that they are logically committed to follow out in the study of man the implications of ecology.

In general, students are divided into two camps with respect to the relation of human to general ecology. One group, taking the position that ecology offers an essentially biological approach to the study of the human community, has recognized a close association between the two.<sup>5</sup> But while this admission has been accompanied by a relatively free borrowing of terminology, it has yielded very little in the way of theoretical unity. The second group expresses a somewhat reactionary viewpoint. Its representatives strongly oppose even a suggestion of similarity between the two phases of the discipline on the ground that any assumption of analogy as between social and biological phenomena is invalid and impractical.<sup>6</sup> Human ecology, according to this view, should be developed independent of other branches of ecology.

Without entering into a detailed consideration of either of these positions, it will be sufficient to point out that the conception of ecology contained therein is actually a misconception. The widespread belief that ecology is a biologism, as it were, has no logical support, not even in the conventional academic distinction between sociology and biology. That ecology is basically a social science has long been clear to most serious students of the

<sup>5</sup> See, R. E. Park, "Human Ecology," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, XLII (July, 1936), 1-15; and A. B. Hollingshead, "Human Ecology," in R. E. Park (ed.), *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, (New York, 1939), pp. 65-74.

<sup>6</sup> See W. E. Gettys, *loc. cit.*, pp. 470-71.

subject.<sup>7</sup> It is apparent, moreover, in almost every aspect of the discipline: in the root of the term ecology; in the historical details of the subject's development; in the large place given to sociological concepts such as community, society, niche, commensalism, symbiosis, dominance, succession, etc.; and in the manner in which problems for investigation are stated. But all of this appears to have escaped the majority of so-called human ecologists; they have proceeded without benefit from the theoretical position they believe themselves to have adopted. Evidently it is for such reasons that the concept competition and the interest in spatial analysis have absorbed so much of the energies of students of the subject.

The assignment of the concept competition to a key role in human ecology is, in fact, premised largely on the biological interpretation of the subject. The steps which lead to this inference may be simply stated. Struggle, of which competition is but a refined expression, is the law of biological nature and the circumstance out of which all order arises. Competition is therefore a biological phenomenon. Moreover, since competition is definable as a process in which individuals or other units affect one another through affecting a common limited supply of sustenance materials, it does not presuppose consciousness or social consensus in the units concerned,<sup>8</sup> and what is not social must therefore be biological. Hence, it is concluded, to base human ecology on the concept competition is to carry through to the study of man the distinctive ecological approach. Thus has competition come to be regarded as the necessary hypothesis of the study,—as the efficient cause, so to speak, in the development of ecological phenomena. "Human ecology," writes one author, in what may be considered a representative statement, "deals with society in its biological and symbiotic aspects that is, those aspects brought about by competition and by struggle of individuals, in any social order, to survive and to perpetuate themselves."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See C. C. Adams, "The Relation of General Ecology to Human Ecology," *Ecology*, XVI (July, 1935), 316-35; J. Braun-Blanquet, *Plant Sociology*, trans. by G. D. Fuller and H. S. Conrad (New York, 1932); F. E. Clements and V. E. Shelford, *Bio-Ecology* (New York, 1939), p. 24 ff.; J. Arthur Thomson, *Darwinism and Human Life* (New York, 1911), pp. 72 ff.; H. G. Wells, Julian S. Huxley, and G. P. Wells, *The Science of Life* (New York, 1934), pp. 961-62.

<sup>8</sup> R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1929), p. 506.

<sup>9</sup> A. B. Hollingshead, *loc. cit.*, p. 70.

The defects in this line of reasoning are manifold. The desire on the part of human ecologists to achieve a thorough-going natural science treatment of human behavior undoubtedly lies at the roots of their theorizing relative to competition. But the question as to whether the struggle for existence is categorically a natural, in the sense of biological, phenomenon is seldom considered. To insist that it is, for no other reason than that the conception was first extensively used in connection with a biological problem and later became recognized as a part of the language of biology, would appear to indicate a stronger addiction to words than to thoughts. As a matter of fact, a cogent argument can be made in favor of the inherent sociological quality of the idea of struggle. Unless I am mistaken, "struggle for existence" pertains primarily to the behavior of organisms relative to one another.<sup>10</sup> If this be the province of biology, then *ipso facto* all social science resolves itself into biology.

Further difficulty in this respect arises from the belief, not limited to human ecologists, that a natural science must seek causation outside the sphere of consciousness. Competition, because of its essentially unconsciousness or asocial character, is assumed to provide a definitely natural science, i.e., objective and impersonal, avenue of approach.<sup>11</sup> Why the natural and the conscious should be regarded as mutually exclusive categories it is impossible to say. Surely it is as natural for man to think and act accordingly as for a squirrel to store nuts or for a rock, when loosened, to roll down the mountain slope.

However, and more to the point, the distinction between conscious and unconscious activity is difficult if not impossible to maintain in practice. It presents problems of observation for which there is no yardstick. Whether competition does or does not include conscious elements is a matter of definition and therefore subject to individual opinion. What is important, if true, is that individuals do affect one another through affecting the available supply of required materials. This is all that need concern the ecologist. In any event, as economists, anthropologists and others

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Charles Darwin, *Origin of Species* (New York, 1925), Chap. III. One exception exists in the fact that struggle may occur between an organism and the physical and mechanical conditions of the environment. But this, in the ecological point of view, is a major stimulus to inter-organic behavior.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *An Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1935), p. 122.



have amply shown, an objective or so-called natural science approach does not stand or fall on an exclusive use of unconscious behavior as data.

The application of competition as an hypothesis also involves a number of serious problems. For example, it presupposes a knowledge—not always at hand—of the intrinsic qualities of the individuals or other units concerned, i.e., in regard to homogeneity or similarity of life requirements. Frequently individuals who at first glance might be considered competitors turn out to be so differentiated, through the operation of genetic processes and early conditioning, as not to be competitors at all. Braun-Blanquet states: "It has further been said that certain species [of plants] are in general confined to certain soils, but when they come into competition one wins on calcareous soil, the other on siliceous soil." But, he continues, "the life requirements of these pairs of species are so different that the question of competition cannot arise."<sup>12</sup> This illustrates the ecologist's need for an adequate taxonomy, a need which has been sadly neglected in the social sciences. The utility of competition as an explanatory tool will remain in doubt until a fuller knowledge of functional or social types is developed.

A related problem exists with regard to the observability of the operation of competition. The specific sequence of changes by which a homogeneous aggregate is converted into a differentiated and interdependent population has not been described in detail. Consequently it is almost impossible to indicate what to look for in order to see competition in action. The situation is not improved by pointing out that the process is a type of interaction, that is, a process of mutual internal modification. Ecologists, unfortunately, lack the technique for the observation of internal phenomena. Defined in terms of competitive interaction, ecology amounts to little more than the contemplation of a concept.<sup>13</sup> This, parenthetically, seems to be the net result of interactional theory in general so far as its use by sociologists is concerned. It would appear that psychologists are better equipped to deal with such a matter.

<sup>12</sup> J. Braun-Blanquet, *Plant Sociology*, Trans. by G. D. Fuller and H. S. Conrad (New York, 1932), pp. 15-16 (Parentheses mine). See also Gardner Murphy, Lois B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, *Experimental, Social Psychology* (New York, 1937), p. 339.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. James A. Quinn, "Human Ecology and Interactional Ecology," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, V (Oct., 1940), 721-22.

There would be no cause to mention this problem had human ecologists actually treated competition as an hypothesis to be tested and demonstrated. However, in no instance, so far as I am aware, has a student of the subject applied himself to such a task. The truth of the matter is that the concept serves in practice as a *post hoc* interpretation. This being the case, the question whether the concept describes what it is supposed to describe remains unanswered. Doubt will linger on this point until the prerequisites for observation have been fulfilled.

It has been fairly well established, however, that the competitive hypothesis is a gross over-simplification of what is involved in the development of pattern, structure, or other manifestation of organization. As a matter of fact, the customary interpretation of the Darwinian "struggle for existence" to mean that the primary and dominant relationship in animate nature is opposition whether clamorous combat or the more subtle competition, forms one of the neatest illustrations of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" that may anywhere be found. Darwin used the phrase in "a large and metaphorical sense,"<sup>14</sup> subsuming under it all expenditures of effort to maintain and expand life. Combination and cooperation as well as competition and conflict are embraced in the concept. That mutual aid is just as fundamental and universal as opposition has been abundantly shown in numerous field and laboratory studies by students of plants and animals.<sup>15</sup> There seems to be no reason to assume that human collective life is any more amenable to monistic explanation.

These remarks should not be taken to imply that competition has no place in ecological thought. The criticism is directed solely at the loose and extravagant use of the concept which enabled it to become accepted as the basic theoretical element in human ecology. The significance of competition may better serve as a topic for a separate discussion and hence will not be taken up here. Certainly competition is not the pivotal conception of ecology; in fact, it is possible to describe the subject without even an allusion to competition.

Another persistent inconsistency in human ecology, which also reflects the failure of the dis-

<sup>14</sup> *Origin of Species* (New York, 1925), p. 78.

<sup>15</sup> For a brief but excellent summary of this literature see W. C. Allee, *The Social Life of Animals* (New York, 1937), chap. III. See also M. L. McAtee, "The Malthusian Principle in Nature," *The Scientific Monthly*, 42 (May, 1936), 453 ff.



cipline to develop in close relation to general ecology, exists in the emphasis put upon spatial relations or spatial aspects of human interdependencies. The origin of this peculiarity may be found in early definitions of the subject, such as, human ecology is "a study of the spatial and temporal relations of human beings as affected by the selective, distributive, and accommodative forces of the environment."<sup>16</sup> While such a statement has the advantage of concreteness and was highly useful in the "absence of any precedent," it seemed to indicate a subordination of interest in symbiotic relations to a concern for the spatial pattern in which such relations are expressed. Thus it permitted human ecology to be construed as merely the description of distributions of social phenomena.

Accordingly, much of the research identified as human ecology has consisted in compiling inventories of the observable characteristics of community life and in plotting their distributions on maps. It is sometimes difficult to understand why this kind of work should be called anything other than geography, except possibly—out of deference to the geographers—because of the inferior cartographic skill which is often exhibited. The mapping of phenomena, however, is usually a first step in the establishing of correlations between crime, delinquency, domestic discord, mental disorders, etc., on the one hand, and housing conditions, recreational facilities, proximity to city center, and other physical features, on the other hand.<sup>17</sup> But so far as the determination of the degree of correlation is the sole aim of the study, which seems to be the rule rather than the exception, it is not ecological; it is rather more in the nature of a statistical study in psychological behaviorism. The prevalence of the use of the word ecology in connection with such work as this has been so great that it has come to be regarded, in some quarters, as a "method" to be compared and contrasted with

so-called statistical, case-study, and historical methods.<sup>18</sup> In other words, one of the techniques employed in ecological research—mapping—has been mistaken for the discipline itself.

That space and time are merely convenient abstractions by which to measure activities and relationships has been rather consistently overlooked. To contend that human behavior is bound by such dimensions is but to insist that it occurs in an experiential universe and is therefore subject to observation and measurement. This is what is meant, fundamentally, when it is asserted that human ecology is a natural science. But it is important to note that every enterprise which may be called science is a natural science in at least this sense of the term. Every science, that is, must deal with the spatial and temporal aspects of its own subject-matter. The differences between scientific disciplines arise not in respect to method but rather in respect to problems. And in the case of human ecology as elsewhere the problem is the distinguishing feature. Spatial and temporal considerations are incidental to the investigation of the ecological problem.

Now it may be asked: What remains of human ecology, if its usual mainstays—the concept competition and spatial analysis—are removed to positions of minor importance? Before entering into a discussion of this question, it may be well to give some thought to the matter of preference of one definition or another for a given study. By what prerogative may one say that human ecology is this or that? The answer, of course, depends on how the criteria of appropriateness of a discipline happen to be regarded. Probably few will deny however, that the problem with which a study is to be concerned must not only be significant but must also be a problem that is not already preempted by other disciplines. It is no easier to defend a needless duplication of effort than it is a preoccupation with irrelevant issues. Unless human ecology has a problem of its own, then, it is nothing and may as well be forgotten. But just as urgent is the necessity that a discipline be coherent within itself and consistent with the point of view it pretends to represent. There is no basis, in other words, for calling a study human ecology, if it is not ecological. Both of these considerations should be kept in the foreground in any definition

<sup>16</sup> R. D. McKenzie, "The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community," *loc. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>17</sup> E.g., A. W. Lind, "Some Ecological Patterns of Community Disorganization in Honolulu," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, XXXVI (Sept., 1930), 206-20; E. S. Longmoor and E. F. Young, "Ecological Interrelationships of Juvenile Delinquency, Dependency, and Population Mobility," *Amer. J. Sociol.*, XLI (March, 1936), 598-610; and Stuart A. Queen, "The Ecological Study of Mental Disorders," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 5 (April, 1940) 201-10.

<sup>18</sup> Calvin F. Schmid, "The Ecological Method in Social Research," in P. V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research* (New York, 1939), chap. XII.

or redefinition of the nature and scope of a subject for study. It is desirable, then, in returning to the original question, to begin with a review of the rudiments of general ecology.

Briefly stated, ecology is concerned with the elemental problem of how growing, multiplying beings maintain themselves in a constantly changing but ever restricted environment.<sup>19</sup> It is based on the fundamental assumption that life is a continuous struggle for adjustment of organism to environment. However, the manifest interrelatedness of living forms, which leads students to speak of the "web of life," suggests that adjustment, far from being the action of independent organisms, is a mutual or collective phenomenon. Drawing together the relevant facts, it seems that the inevitable crowding of living forms upon limited resources produces a complex action and reaction of organism with environment and organism with organism in the course of which individuals become related to one another in ways conducive to a more effective utilization of the habitat. As the division of labor which thus develops approaches equilibrium, such that the number of organisms engaged in each of the several activities is sufficient to provide all the needs that are represented, the aggregate of associated individuals assumes the aspect of a compact viable entity, a superorganism, in fact. The (biotic) community, as such a functionally or symbiotically<sup>20</sup> integrated population may properly be called, is in effect a collective response to the habitat; it constitutes the adjustment, in the fullest sense of the term; of organism to environment.

The subject of ecological inquiry then is the community, the form and development of which are studied with particular reference to the limiting and supporting factors of the environment.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Environment, as used here, pertains to the physical and mechanical conditions of the habitat. It includes everything but the behavior of the organisms themselves.

<sup>20</sup> Symbiosis may be defined as the mutually beneficial living together of unlike forms.

<sup>21</sup> This definition differs but slightly from others. For example: (1) Ecology is the science of "the correlations between all organisms living together in one and the same locality and their adaptations to their surroundings." (Ernest Haeckel, *The History of Creation*, II, New York, 1896, p. 354); (2) "Ecology is the science of the relation of organisms to their surroundings, living as well as non-living; it is the science of the 'domestic economy' of plants and animals." (R. Hesse, W. C. Allee, and K. P. Schmidt, *Ecological*

Ecology, in other words, is a study of the morphology of collective life in both its static and its dynamic aspects. It attempts to determine the nature of community structure in general, the types of communities that appear in different habitats, and the specific sequence of change in community development.

Two elements, one implicit and the other explicit, in the conception as outlined here merit special emphasis. Not immediately evident perhaps, though nevertheless of basic importance, is the fact that the units of observation, *i.e.*, the data, are neither physiological processes nor anatomical structures but are rather the activities of organisms. Taxonomic characteristics are relevant only so far as they serve as indexes of behavior traits.<sup>22</sup> "When an ecologist says 'there goes a badger'" writes Elton, "he should include in his thoughts some definite idea of the animal's place in the community to which it belongs, just as if he had said 'there goes the vicar.'" <sup>23</sup> Thus if the term species and species designations recur frequently in ecological discussion, it is simply because that is the most convenient way of referring to the expected or observed occupations of the organisms denoted.

Secondly, as already indicated, life viewed ecologically is an aggregate rather than an individual phenomenon. The individual enters into ecological theory as a postulate and into ecological investigation as a unit of measurement; but as an object of special study he belongs to other disciplines, *e.g.*, physiology, genetics, psychology, etc. The focus of attention in ecology is upon the population which is either organized or in process of becoming organized. This cannot be too

*Animal Geography*, New York, 1937, p. 6.); (3) "... the essence of ecology lies in its giving the fullest possible value to the habitat as cause and the community as effect, the two constituting the basic phases of a unit process." (F. E. Clements and V. E. Shelford, *Bio-Ecology*, New York, 1939, p. 30.); and (4) "The descriptive study of the interrelations between co-existing species, and, more generally, their environment, is the province of ecology." (A. J. Lotka, "Contact Points of Population Study with Related Branches of Science," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 80, Feb., 1939, p. 611).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. H. C. Cowles, "An Ecological Aspect of the Conception of Species," *The American Naturalist*, XLII (1905), 265-71.

<sup>23</sup> Charles Elton, *Animal Ecology* (New York, 1927), p. 64.



strongly emphasized, for it places ecology squarely in the category of social science.

Human ecology, like plant and animal ecology, represents a special application of the general viewpoint to a particular class of living things. It involves both a recognition of the fundamental unity of animate nature and an awareness that there is differentiation within that unity. Man is an organism and as such he is dependent on the same resources, confronted with the same elementary problems, and displays in essential outline the same mode of response to life conditions as is observed in other forms of life. Thus the extension of patterns of thought and techniques of investigation developed in the study of the collective life of lower organisms to the study of man is a logical consummation of the ecological point of view. One important qualification is necessary, however; the extraordinary degree of flexibility of human behavior makes for a complexity and a dynamics in the human community without counterpart elsewhere in the organic world. It is this that sets man apart as an object of special inquiry and gives rise to a human as distinct from a general ecology.

While to reason from "pismires to parliaments" would do violence to the facts, it is nevertheless necessary to keep the phenomenon of culture in proper perspective. When man by virtue of his culture-producing capacity is regarded as an entirely unique type of organism the distortion is no less acute than if this quality were completely ignored. Human behavior, in all its complexity and variability, is but further evidence of the tremendous potential for adjustment inherent in life. Culture is nothing more than a way of referring to the prevailing techniques by which a population maintains itself in its habitat. The component parts of human culture are therefore identical in principle with the appetency of the bee for honey, the nest-building activities of birds, and the hunting habits of carnivora. To argue that the latter are instinctive while the former are not is to beg the question. Ecology is concerned less now with how habits are acquired, than with the functions they serve and the relationships they involve.

Thus despite the great difference between the behavior of men and that of lower forms of life—a difference which appears to be of degree rather than of kind, the approach described as general ecology may be applied to the study of man without radical alteration. In simplest terms, human ecology is

the descriptive study of the adjustment of human populations to the conditions of their respective physical environments. The necessity that life be lived in a specific place and time, operating upon man as it does upon other organisms, produces an inescapable compulsion to adjustment which increases as population increases or as the opportunities for life decrease. And out of the adaptive strivings of aggregated individuals there develops, consciously or unconsciously, an organization of interdependencies which constitutes the population a coherent functional entity. The human community, in other words, is basically an adaptive mechanism; it is the means whereby a population utilizes and maintains itself in its habitat. Human ecology, then, may be defined more fully as the study of the development and the form of communal structure as it occurs in varying environmental contexts.

The human community, of course, is more than just an organization of symbiotic relationships and to that extent there are limitations to the scope of human ecology. Man's collective life involves, in greater or less degree, a psychological and a moral as well as a symbiotic integration. But these, so far as they are distinguishable, should be regarded as complementing aspects of the same thing rather than as separate phases or segments of the community. Sustenance activities and interrelations are inextricably interwoven with sentiments, value systems, and other ideational constructs. Human ecology is restricted in scope then not by any real or assumed qualitative differences in behavior but simply by the manner in which its problem is stated. The question of how men relate themselves to one another in order to live in their habitat yields a description of communal structure in terms of its overt and visible features. It does not, however, provide explanations of all the many ramifications of human interrelationships. The external and descriptive approach of ecology is ill-suited to the direct study of the psychological counterpart of symbiosis, although it may serve as a fruitful source of hypotheses concerning that aspect of the community.

It may be helpful to call attention to the fact that the problems of human ecology, and ecology in general, are basically population problems. The broad question, as previously indicated, concerns the adjustment of population to the resources and other physical conditions of the habitat. This resolves itself into a number of related problems, such as: (1) the succession of changes by which an



aggregate passes from a mere polyp-like formation into a community of interdependencies; (2) the ways in which the developing community is affected by the size, composition, and rate of growth or decline of the population; (3) the significance of migration for both the development of the community and the maintenance of community stability; and (4) the relative numbers in the various functions composing the communal structure, together with the factors which make for change in the existing equilibrium and the ways in which such change occurs.

Clearly, human ecology has much in common with every other social science. The problem with which it deals underlies that of each of these several specialized studies of human social life. Its data are drawn from the same sources and it employs many of the same techniques of investigation.

The points of convergence are, in fact, too numerous to detail in this paper.<sup>24</sup> There is no basis therefore to conclude from what has been said that human ecology is an autonomous social science: it is quite unlikely that there is any autonomy in science. The distinctive feature of the study lies in the conception of the adjustment of man to habitat as a process of community development. Whereas this may be an implicit assumption in most social science disciplines, it is for human ecology the principal working hypothesis. Thus human ecology might well be regarded as the basic social science.

<sup>24</sup> See R. D. McKenzie, "Demography, Human Geography, and Human Ecology", in L. L. Bernard (ed.), *The Fields and Methods of Sociology* (New York, 1934), pp. 52-66; and A. J. Lotka, *loc. cit.*

## PRAGMATISM: A STUDY IN MIDDLE CLASS IDEOLOGY

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### I

WITHIN the past few years, an increasing trend in American middle class thought has centered about a searching criticism of the basic concepts of pragmatism. Robert Hutchins in education, Archibald MacLeish in the arts, Reinhold Niebuhr in theology, Eliseo Vivas in philosophy, to mention a few, have openly attacked the belief that scientific method was a sufficient tool for understanding human experience and directing social action.<sup>1</sup> The invidious terms "anti-naturalism," "defeatism," "obscurantism" have been used by such eminent people as John Dewey, Ruth Benedict, Sidney Hook, and Ernest Nagel to characterize these diverse forms of criticism, and give some indication of the seriousness with which the development is regarded.<sup>2</sup>

To the student of social science, this evidence

<sup>1</sup> The Catholic position, although non-pragmatic, is not included here since the Catholic refutation of pragmatism has not developed out of recent experience.

<sup>2</sup> Articles by Dewey, Benedict, Hook, and Nagel, concerning this problem appear in *Partisan Review*, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 1943, under the title, "The New Failure of Nerve."

presents two questions: (1) Why is such a trend considered dangerous? (2) What are the conditions which have led to acceptance and rejection of pragmatism?

It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss adequately the first of these problems. Summarizing briefly, however, Dewey has argued that the moral and political consequences which follow logically from anti-naturalistic assumptions are inconsistent with democracy.<sup>3</sup> Sidney Hook has analyzed non-pragmatic theories psychologically, and has asserted that under the overwhelming pressures and frustrations of modern life, these theories offer irresponsible escape from intellectual responsibility.<sup>4</sup>

These hypotheses suggest that studies are needed in social organization and ideology,<sup>5</sup> particularly in

<sup>3</sup> This view is most fully developed by Dewey in his *Freedom and Culture* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939).

<sup>4</sup> Sidney Hook, "The New Failure of Nerve," *Partisan Review*, 1 (1943). Hook uses such expressions as "those who have been *panicked* into new varieties of transcendental *consolation*." (italics mine.)

<sup>5</sup> The use of the term "ideology" here differs from Mannheim's restricted use of it to include only those

primitive societies where a democratic social structure may obtain along with what, in their terms, may be considered ideology, namely, a mystic and charismatic religion. Moreover, to substantiate the psychological argument, types of non-naturalistic philosophies must be distinguished and their concepts specified. It has not been made clear, for example, whether the guilt concepts of Neo-Thomism and of Kierkegaard's mysticism are identical, whether they perform the same psychological functions for all classes, nor under what psychological and historical conditions they may be judged as irresponsible and politically undemocratic.

The second problem of the acceptance and rejection of pragmatism by the middle class belongs to the broader problem of the sociology of knowledge, the major premise of which may be roughly stated as follows: the degree to which an ideology is accepted or rejected is dependent upon (1) the degree to which it corresponds to the content of experience, past and present; (2) its effective strength in reinforcing goals already established or in providing new goals; (3) its feasibility as a program of action for achieving desired goals. This general hypothesis would presumably include the ideologies of groups seeking to maintain themselves in power as well as the ideologies of groups excluded from power. Of the groups excluded from power, they may or they may not orientate behavior toward establishing themselves in power.

When the content of experience has undergone significant change, where goals are being questioned, or where the means either for buttressing existent goals or realizing new goals are considered ineffectual, the ideology may persist in the form of ritual or may after a period of debunking be rejected.

From a knowledge of the three strategic points outlined in any social situation, the career of a given ideology may be predicted. Returning to the original problem, we may now set up the concrete hypothesis that the growing sceptical attitude of pragmatism by the American middle class

ideas which transcend the immediate situation but never succeed "de facto in the realization of their projected contents." He reserves "utopia" for ideas which not only transcend the immediate reality but "break the bonds of the existing social order." Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1940, pp. 173-174). Ideology here will include both "ideology" and "utopia."

reflects a growing hiatus between middle class experience and the ideology of pragmatism.

## II

If we examine pragmatism as an ideology, we find three major concepts which characterize in general the work of William James, Charles Cooley, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, John R. Commons, and certain others working in philosophy, social science, psychology, and jurisprudence.

1. HUMAN NATURE. The pragmatists' conception of human nature is one of faith and confidence in the creative ability of human beings to direct their own affairs, free from any extra-natural necessity. The "tough-minded" individual was one of optimistic scientific temper, willing to face the "no" of fact, but refusing to accept the fatalistic limitations of theories which reduced human behavior to the discovery of what had already been given. James, while never fully appreciating the social aspects of behavior, placed primary emphasis on the genuine novelty which men could introduce into the world. Writing in 1890, he said:

But the whole feeling of reality, the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends upon our sense that in it things are *really being decided* from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago. This appearance, which makes life and history tingle with such a tragic zest, *may not be an illusion*. As we grant to the advocate of the mechanical theory that it may be one, so he must grant to us that it may *not*.<sup>6</sup>

The essential faith in human nature continues through Dewey, Mead, and Cooley, but the focus is shifted from the individual to the environment. Dewey writes:

the development of native impulse must be stated in terms of acquired habits, not the growth of customs in terms of instincts.<sup>7</sup>

The "self" for Mead emerges through the continuous social process of "role-playing," of taking the attitudes of others towards one's self within the framework of experience in which both are involved.<sup>8</sup> Cooley underlined the importance of

<sup>6</sup> William James, *Principles of Psychology*, I New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1890, pp. 453-454.

<sup>7</sup> John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: The Modern Library edition, 1930), p. 91.

<sup>8</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

"primary groups," the home, the neighborhood, the playground, the school in the formation of behavior.<sup>9</sup>

The superior force of the environment, however, did not preclude, for these writers, the possibility of introducing change. Creative intelligence, the trained habit of properly and fully evaluating means and ends in solving the problems of experience, gave to human nature the power to control the environment and re-direct it to serve human needs.

The political correlate of this conception of human nature was reform through social legislation. It implied the responsibility of the state to intervene in secular affairs and insure an environment conducive to the best in human welfare. Laws were advocated for controlling factory conditions, for providing decent housing, for protecting small business against the unfair encroachment of trusts, safeguarding farmers against discriminatory practices of railroads and similar groups. In the non-political sphere, liberal educators established parent-teachers movements, adult and vocational education programs. Child guidance was made available, and steps were taken to bring social workers into juvenile courts. The approach is best summarized in Cooley's discussion of poverty:

The fundamental remedy for poverty is, of course, rational organization having for its aim the control of those conditions which lead people into it and prevent their getting out. The most radical measures are educational and protective in the very broad and searching sense of the words—the humanization of the primary school system, industrial education, facilities for play, physical training and healthy amusement, good housing, the restriction by law of child labor and of all vicious and unwholesome conditions. . . .<sup>10</sup>

2. INSTRUMENTAL TRUTH AND MORALITY. Logic and morality for the pragmatists were to be found in the procedure of scientific method. Truth and the Good were not fixed a priori realities, but the man-made adjustments to problems of experience. Explicitly stated by Dewey:

"If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems, are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they

succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up confusion, uncertainty and evil when they are acted upon, then are they false."<sup>11</sup>

In effect, instrumentalism undermined the authority of traditions. Ideas were no longer true and ways of behaving no longer sacrosanct because of precedent. The final arbiter was the experiment in experience.

On the political level this notion of truth and morality was a signal for initiating new ways of dealing with problems, ways which not only had no authority in the past but may have run counter to ways explicitly used in the past. Against a "state's rights" doctrine, centralization had to prove itself instrumentally. Interpretations of the Constitution were open to experiment, to be re-evaluated in the light of concrete consequences by each new generation. This comes out clearly in Commons' instrumental approach to the legal concepts of capitalism. Under the changed conditions of modern capitalism, the definition of "property" could no longer be restricted to tangible objects, but must be broadened to include the worker's labor power and the small entrepreneur's "good will" which they offer in the wage and price bargains, to be guarded with the same vigilance as tangible property.<sup>12</sup>

In the broader social context, the instrumentalism of morality was a necessary tolerance for new urban codes of behavior abruptly deviant from rural mores. Women going into industry encountered exigencies which were to influence conceptions of marriage and family life. Moreover, the impact of immigrant groups presented alternative ways of behaving which could only be judged by practical experiment in the environment.

3. MEANS AND ENDS. The interdependence of means and ends was a description of social change and reiterated the role of thinking in the social process. Thinking was a social activity of evaluating ends in view and selecting the means to fulfill these ends. Thus the ends determined the means used, and the means modified the ends. The end, according to Dewey, is:

merely a series of acts viewed at a remote stage; and a means is merely the series viewed at an earlier one. The distinction of means and end arises in surveying the

<sup>9</sup> C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916).

<sup>10</sup> Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 299.

<sup>11</sup> John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), p. 156.

<sup>12</sup> Commons, *op. cit.*



course of a proposed line of action, a connected series in time. The 'end' is the last act thought of; the means are the acts to be performed prior to it in time. To reach an end we must take our mind off from it and attend to the act which is next to be performed.<sup>13</sup>

In this conceptual scheme, the notion of a disjunction between means and ends and the implied maxim "the end justifies the means" becomes a failure to analyze fully the end as the total consequences of a given line of action.

The political interpretation of the means-ends theory forced attention on the means used for the achievement of goals. Cooperation and intelligence were the desirable means for bringing about needed change rather than the violence of dogmatic class-conflict and revolution. Cooley, the reformer, had little sympathy for political extremism, "the naive views that ignore the solidity of the present order, which ensures that any change must be gradual and make its way by reason."<sup>14</sup> Similarly, Commons was committed to the view that liberalism was a gradual adjustment of concepts to current needs.<sup>15</sup> Dewey was, perhaps, furthest to the left in urging fundamental change of property relations. But again Dewey's conception of radicalism was one which emphatically denounced force:

But radicalism also means, in the minds of many, both supporters and opponents, dependence upon use of violence as the main method of effecting drastic changes. Here the liberal parts company. For he is committed to the organization of intelligent action as the chief method.<sup>16</sup>

In practice, the significance of the means-ends principle was a reinterpretation of education. The school was not a place for learning fact, but for developing habits of critical thinking and developing plans of action. On the adult level, local organizations for studying social issues were advocated, and action was to proceed from them. Intelligent action was the least costly and most satisfactory way of meeting problems. If force bred force, intelligent action must breed intelligent social organization, insuring human welfare.

<sup>13</sup> Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 34.

<sup>14</sup> C. Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 241.

<sup>15</sup> Commons, *op cit*.

<sup>16</sup> John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935), pp. 62-63.

### III

In the preceding section, we have tried to summarize the three major concepts of pragmatism and their political and social interpretations. We have then to establish the correspondence between the concepts and the experience of the American middle class.<sup>17</sup>

The formation of middle class experience may best be understood in terms of the economic development of the country, the way in which this determined available alternatives for judgment.

Following the Civil War, in the period of industrialization, unlimited opportunities were open to the middle class. With initiative and enterprise, one could rise from the lowest level of the economic scale to its glittering heights or reasonably near. The "self-made" man was a statistical reality, and in temperament he was the "tough-minded" individual, willing to work within the realities of the situation and with reasonable assurance of success. The content of experience was self-confidence and accomplishment. Within this frame of reference, no situation could be regarded as hopeless. Neither extreme doctrines of radicalism nor resignation could take root in this soil. Radicalism looked at the evil of the parts and challenged the whole; resignation observed the evil of the parts and turned its back on the whole. But the ethos of the day was the metaphysical optimism of James, "The evil of the parts is undeniable, but the whole can't be evil."<sup>18</sup>

The machine age made new fortunes possible, and if fortunes were not to be made in one generation, at least one's children would be off to a good start. The middle class had little time for introspection, and had much reason to be busy, occupying itself with the practical business of getting ahead. When James wrote that pragmatism "agrees with nominalism . . . in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions and meta-

<sup>17</sup> The definition of "middle class" here is in terms of objective relation to economic power. It implies no subjective notion of "class consciousness," nor is it an income distribution. It is that stratum of American society which falls roughly between those who control productive property and those who are almost completely dependent because of their lack of specialized skill and organization, giving them almost no bargaining power.

<sup>18</sup> William James, *Pragmatism* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), p. 14.

physical abstractions,"<sup>19</sup> he had touched the common sense philosophy of Middletown:

the distrust of "planners," "idealists," "intellectuals," of all men who let their thoughts and imaginations run beyond the immediacies. Big steps in a world devoted to gradualness were suspect. It is all right on public occasions to let oneself go a bit and spin big dreams, but everybody knows that isn't the way to get the world's work done.<sup>20</sup>

The early vertical mobility and wide horizon of opportunity began to harden and contract with the development of large scale centralized industry, trusts, and monopolies. The middle class was slowly experiencing the "injustice" of environmental forces over which it had no control, and the natural reaction was to turn to the state for help. It was the function of the state of protect the individual from the unscrupulous practices of big business and deprivations which came from an exploitation of natural resources. The causal analysis of the social psychologists, placing responsibility upon the community environment, was an ideological contact with the experience of the middle class.

The shrinking of opportunity, however, was not sufficiently direct for the middle class to challenge the entire system. Depressions were in fact temporary phenomena and always promised return to greater prosperity, nor were class positions rigidly fixed.<sup>21</sup> From the point of view of the middle class, social legislation, regulation of monopolies, a new administration, civil service reform, "direct primaries," revisions of the currency system were logical solutions for their temporary difficulties.

The concept of instrumental truth and morality was an ideological point confirmed in the experience of the middle class in a period of rapid social change. Children were leaving rural homes to work in cities, and the new urban situations required new standards of right and wrong. With

the introduction of farm machinery, rural patterns, as well, underwent change. Professions and vocational fields were opening up that had previously never existed. Sons were not compelled to follow their immigrant grandfather's or father's footsteps when greater success was promised in other directions. Parents, themselves, expected that their children would move into different social and economic strata necessitating new ways.

The American parent expects his child to leave him, leave him physically, go to another town, another state; leave him in terms of occupation, embrace a different calling, learn a different skill; leave him socially, travel, if possible with a different crowd. Even where a family has reached the top and actually stayed there for two or three generations, there are, for all but the very few, still larger cities or foreign courts to be stormed.<sup>22</sup>

The sex equality which women enjoyed in industry permeated social behavior. Women began to demand a relaxation of divorce laws, and in cases of divorce the guardianship of children. Education, as well, was regeared to fit the new needs of industry. Universities began to turn out business executives, insurance salesmen, accountants, and industrial engineers. The middle class was not concerned with abstract disciplines or "knowledge for knowledge' sake," but with education of a practical value. Under these circumstances of rapid social change, it is clear that an ideology granting freedom from tradition would be accepted.

The political and social interpretation of the means-ends theory was one of peaceful and gradual change by organized creative intelligence. Force was posited as an alternative method to the intelligence of scientific method, and the class struggle was not one of economic classes but of the struggle between a class trained in the habit of scientific method and a class willing to flounder along by undirected tradition. In terms of middle class experience, there was little reason for resort to force. Incidents of gross exploitation were made public by the liberal press and could be satisfactorily erased through parliamentary procedure and judicial interpretation. Business interests spent much money and effort to convince the middle class that their interests lay with a business administration, but for the middle class this was

<sup>19</sup> James, *Pragmatism*, pp. 53-54.

<sup>20</sup> R. S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1937), p. 124.

<sup>21</sup> C. A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization, II* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 716; "Between 1914 and 1919 the number of persons in the United States returning taxable incomes ranging from \$30,000 to \$40,000 a year increased from 6,000 to 15,000. . . . At the end of 1919, 42,554 individuals were able to report incomes of \$30,000 or more."

<sup>22</sup> Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry!* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1942), p. 39.

not manipulation or fraud. In the short run, their fate was tied up with production. High wages for parents meant better education for children, and better education meant opportunity to ascend the economic scale. With this experience, programs of revolutionary political action were entirely alien. The positive political program was to educate legislators to their social responsibilities, and to educate the electorate to what issues were really at stake.

#### IV

Turning to recent experience of the middle class, several factors may be suggested to clarify the contemporaneous criticism of pragmatism and a possible increase of this trend in the future.

The increasing rigidity of the class structure has narrowed down opportunities for "getting ahead."<sup>23</sup> It is more likely that one's children remain within the social and economic class in which they were born. On the subjective level, security is replacing the goal of economic success to be gained by adventurous speculation. To this factor, the depression, unprecedented both in extent and duration, may be added. Unless national policy establishes vertical mobility and re-

<sup>23</sup> *Final Report of Temporary National Economic Committee.*

moves economic insecurity, we may expect an increasing repudiation of faith in human nature and identification with ideologies which recognize fixed class position and the limitations of individual effort.

The frequency of war and violence to settle conflicts may lead to a sceptical attitude toward the notion that in the modern world progress can only advance by reason and political action, rather than force. Within the middle class, we may find segments of opinion repudiating the "gradualism" interpretation of the means-ends theory. Ideologies which despair of all forms of political action or ideologies which acknowledge and advocate the use of force may be more widely accepted.

For those who have regarded the philosophy of pragmatism as one which is basically democratic and insures the progress of social science, these trends are alarming but may not be as foreboding as they appear. They are not yet crystalized, and perhaps, contradictory trends may exist which have not been noted here. The growing discrepancy between middle class experience and pragmatism is significant enough, however, to suggest a redefinition of pragmatism which would at once preserve its constructive character and correspond to the experience of the middle class, providing it with effectual means of realizing its goals.

## A SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF MORALE

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**S**TUDENTS of human behavior cannot rely upon most of the current expositions of morale. During the present war the term has come to be an abridgement of virtues. Morale is menaced by propaganda, a summation of impending evils which has persisted since World War I. The international struggle is registered as a conflict between morale and propaganda. Citizens are enjoined to ally themselves with morale before it is too late. Prophets of press and radio implore and cajole us to preserve morale and reject propaganda. Lurking ever near, enticing and threatening us, is propaganda, but in the end morale will win out if we do all the things we should. Indeed, there is the possibility that our morale

may induce propaganda to turn upon the enemy, tormenting him until his morale succumbs and victory is ours.

In this personification of morale and the consequent drama of good and evil we are likely to lose sight of explanations which require specificity in the use of the term. For some reason sociologists have not done much to resolve the confusion in thinking about morale. Indeed, they have done little toward assigning definite sociological content to the term. So far the attempted contributions to the discussion have been based almost entirely upon the acceptance of conclusions of scholars in other fields. Undoubtedly there is merit in the sharing of definitions and concepts across the sev-



eral divisions of the social sciences. This article is in no way a criticism of that practice, nor is it an effort to indulge in etymological fine points. The proposition, simply stated, is that a thoroughgoing sociological explanation of morale would clarify to some extent the questions about its nature, which popular discussion has obfuscated. Sociology has a contribution that should not be overlooked or neglected.

In organized societies individuals are taught a sense of mission. They learn in childhood that some behavior is approved and some not. There is no such animal as a care-free adult person. Life is dramatized so as to require cooperation in order that good may overcome evil.<sup>1</sup> Institutionalized associations have their characteristic dramatic patterns. Family, church, and state, each reveals objectives and goals for its members. Confucius recognized five social duties, three of which had to do with the family.<sup>2</sup> Classical Chinese stories deal significantly with conflicts between those seeking to live according to these duties and those opposing. In the feudal period the family was the predominant institution in Chinese society. Its proponents sought to imbue the young with the acceptance of the virtues peculiar to that institution. We begin to understand the relationship of morale to mores if we add the word "institutional" to Sumner's definition, and say that mores are institutional "usages and traditions, when they include a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare, and when they exert a coercion on the individual to conform to them, although they are not coordinated by any authority."<sup>3</sup>

An association of people for institutional purposes places the individuals under the compulsions of the culture of that institution, mediated through the leadership of the association. In every such group the institutional ideology is subscribed to in greater or less degree by each of the members. It is up to parents, ministers, statesmen, and leaders fulfilling institutional offices, to promote the acceptance of the institutional ideology, which may be said to involve the following four characteristics: (1) belief that the institution is a reality transcend-

ing its members, (2) belief in the superiority of the institution, (3) belief in the righteousness of the aims of the institution, and (4) belief in the inevitability of the institution's success.<sup>4</sup> To the extent to which an association, or organized group, controls its membership by means of the mores of the group, to that extent the morale of the group is high or low, strong or weak.

The popular notion that morale is something good which is helping us win the war is scarcely more befuddling than some of the definitions recently set forth by scholars. It appears that most of the writers on morale are not primarily sociologists. In a special issue of a sociological journal devoted to "national morale" only three of the seventeen contributors were identified as sociologists.<sup>5</sup> There was little agreement on the nature of morale but all the writers seemed to agree that it is a good thing and that we ought to get it, build it, and promote it. Like propaganda, morale has drawn a variety of meanings out of conflict situations. Unlike propaganda, morale, even for scholars, has taken on qualities of goodness which make it difficult to write on the subject without writing in its praise. Consequently, the recent explanations are no more enlightening than those which came forth during the last World War. In 1920 G. Stanley Hall published a book with the title of *Morale: The Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct*. In it he wrote as follows: "Morale is simply this—to keep ourselves, body and soul, and our environment, physical, social, industrial, etc., always at the very tip-top of condition. It implies the maximum of vitality, life abounding, getting and keeping in the very center of the current of creative evolution; and minimizing, destroying, or avoiding all checks, arrests, and inhibitions to it."<sup>6</sup> This is more like an exhortation than an explanation of a term in common usage. The tendency for exhortation to displace explanation of morale continues.

An almost complete lack of understanding of the nature of morale retards research in the field. The dictionary definition as "conditions as affected

<sup>1</sup> See Richard T. LaPiere and Paul R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (second edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1942), pp. 115-116.

<sup>2</sup> Trumbull G. Duvall, *Great Thinkers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 34.

<sup>3</sup> William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906), p. iii.

<sup>4</sup> Daniel Katz and Richard L. Schanck, *Social Psychology*, (New York: John Wiley and Company, 1938), p. 179.

<sup>5</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941).

<sup>6</sup> Quoted by Carroll C. Pratt, "G. Stanley Hall's 'Morale,'" *The Saturday Review of Literature*, XXV (July 4, 1942), p. 15.

by, or dependent upon such moral or mental factors as zeal, spirit, hope, confidence, etc.," is certainly too vague.<sup>7</sup> Acting as guest editor of a special issue of *The Saturday Review of Literature* Eleanor Roosevelt in her editorial entitled, "What Is Morale?" fails to answer the question. She concludes that she finds herself "thinking that the most important thing which gives us morale, is character," and that morale "has to be in the character of the nation. . . ."<sup>8</sup> Definitions of morale seem to fall into three categories: (1) those which undertake to explain morale as an individual or personal qualification, (2) those which regard it both as an individual and as a group qualification, and (3) those which explain it primarily as a group characteristic.

Into the first category are the definitions of several well-known authorities. W. E. Hocking, who also wrote on the subject during the first World War, proclaims that "Morale is a character of the will in reference to a particular undertaking (either of one's own or of outside suggestion); it is a measure of one's disposition to give oneself to the objective at hand."<sup>9</sup> Rundquist and Sletto, in their studies on *Personality in the Depression*, indicated that "Morale is a person's confidence in his ability to cope with whatever the future may bring."<sup>10</sup> With this definition Gordon W. Allport seems to agree.<sup>11</sup> At another place, however, he writes, "Morale has to do with individual attitude in a group endeavor."<sup>12</sup> The psychologist, Dr. R. A. Brotemarkle, holds that, "Morale refers to the readiness for optimal response of the human personality."<sup>13</sup> Eric Estorick, a student of British morale, offers the following: "Morale has been defined as a state of abundant psychosomatic health marked by an energetic, decisive resolution to achieve a given goal and objectively by spirited,

unyielding, cooperative, or coordinated efforts in the direction of that goal; or, lacking proper stimulus, morale is a state of readiness for such determination and such efforts."<sup>14</sup> Delbert C. Miller defines morale as "the confidence held by all the people in the ability of the nation to cope with future."<sup>15</sup> At another place he holds that "national morale pertains to all factors in the individual's life that brings about his energetic participation in the tasks which most effectively secure the national goals."<sup>16</sup> Mosher and Kingsley give some attention to morale in dealing with the matter of the efficiency of employees within an organization. They write of it as "that spirit, that state of mind which expresses itself in 'enthusiasm, loyalty, cooperation, devotion to duty, pride in the service.'"<sup>17</sup> Referring to some experiments which have been carried out in industrial plants Kimball Young says that morale, "relates to the subjective, internal state—ideas, attitudes, feelings, and emotions—associated with a job, qualified, of course, by various features of the wider social configuration. More specifically it refers to the zest for activity, cooperativeness, sense of satisfaction and well-being, loyalty, and courage to carry on a task."<sup>18</sup>

Among the contributions to the second category of definitions may be listed that of Brigadier General James A. Ulio, who writes of military morale as "that conditioned quality, in the individual soldier and in the unit of command, which holds the soldier, holds the unit, to the performance of duty despite every opposing force or influence."<sup>19</sup> The idea of R. E. Park seems somewhat akin: "Morale has not only its spiritual but its physical, more specifically its physiological, aspect. From the point of view of physiology, and perhaps of sociology, morale seems to be the ability of an individual or of a society to maintain tension over

<sup>7</sup> Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 1936 edition.

<sup>8</sup> Vol. XXV, No. 27 (Saturday, July 4, 1942), p. 12.

<sup>9</sup> "The Nature of Morale," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941), p. 303.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted by Gordon W. Allport, "Liabilities and Assets in Civilian Morale," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 216 (July, 1941), p. 88.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> "The Nature of Democratic Morale," in *Civilian Morale*, edited by Goodwin Watson (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1942), p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> "Development of Military Morale in a Democracy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 216 (July, 1941), p. 79.

<sup>14</sup> "Morale in Contemporary England," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941), p. 462.

<sup>15</sup> "The Measurement of National Morale," *American Sociological Review*, 6 (August, 1941), p. 487.

<sup>16</sup> "Effect of the War Declaration on the National Morale of American College Students," *American Sociological Review*, 7 (October, 1942), p. 632.

<sup>17</sup> William E. Mosher and J. Donald Kingsley, *Public Personnel Administration* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 533.

<sup>18</sup> *Personality and Problems of Adjustment* (New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1940), p. 602-3.

<sup>19</sup> "Military Morale," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941), p. 321.

a period of time; to carry on an action or an enterprise to completion."<sup>20</sup> Perhaps Goodwin Watson should also be placed in this category, for he recognizes five factors in morale, and maintains that, "Morale is stronger in those persons who feel themselves a part of a larger group, sharing a common goal."<sup>21</sup> E. C. Lindeman makes the following disclosure: "The word 'morale' as used in modern times, has acquired at least three distinct elements of meaning, namely, belief that collective conduct is right conduct, confidence in the cause underlying the crisis, and voluntary submission to discipline."<sup>22</sup> Apparently Read Bain was attempting to cover both the individual and the group when he wrote: "The measure of a man's morale is the sacrifice he will make to preserve his personal integrity which is a correlate of his group identification."<sup>23</sup>

Only a comparatively few writers on morale have been found in the third category, with emphasis mainly upon the group characteristics of morale. George Creel, who was chairman of the Committee on Public Information during the first World War, appears to regard it as a condition of the group mind, or the "national mind."<sup>24</sup> James M. Landis has a similar explanation. He writes, "Morale is a particular state of mind which is shared by members of a group," a distinctively human motive power which raises the action of the group to its maximum of efficiency. Morale is a group devotion to an idea.<sup>25</sup> Henry Durant is more clearly in this category when he writes: "Morale is the relationship of a group to a given end. The end is always set by an authority—by the management of the corporation in the case of industrial management morale, by the military authorities for the army, and by the government for its civilian subjects."<sup>26</sup> Louis Wirth recognizes the group aspects of morale in the following: "By 'morale' we mean that element in collective action which enables the

participants to persist in their determination to achieve their collective will to see an action through until the objective is reached. We ascribe morale to a group to the extent that it maintains this steadfastness of purpose, maintains its solidarity, its integrity, and its will to victory even in the face of adversity. Morale should be distinguished from *esprit de corps*, or collective enthusiasm, which, while it may be conducive to morale is not identical with it, but is as different from it as high spiritedness and evanescent enthusiasm differ from quiet endurance and undemonstrative, persistent, imperturbable adherence to a cause."<sup>27</sup> This approach to a sociological definition of morale is somewhat more concisely stated by Werner J. Cahnman, in the following: "Morale is not to be seen as an independent unit which can be produced at will; it is indicative of the degree of integration of a society. If a society is well integrated, morale is high; if a society is in the process of disintegration, morale is low."<sup>28</sup>

In the main the above variety of trials at explaining the nature of morale may be classed as psychological. They have to do with what is in the mind of man. In slightly differing terminology they speculate on the feelings of individuals. There are some signs of progression toward a sociological distinctiveness as we pass from the first category to the third. Perhaps reluctance to accept the idea of "the group mind" handicaps those who are inclined to state a completely sociological approach to the study of morale. There is scarcely any need for using the term to describe the mental and emotional life of the individual. A person may be well or sick, elated or depressed, loving or hating; he may be noisy or quiet, but what could an individual's having morale mean? To bring in the idea of 'will' does not help. If it is something we ascribe to individuals, how does it differ from motives? In other words, the use of morale in explaining the state of an individual, or of many individuals, adds nothing to the present psychological understanding of man and his behavior. Employed in this way we are compelled to assume that morale is high or low by studying objective aspects of his behavior. We evaluate his 'morale' by examining his expressed opinions or his actions.

<sup>20</sup> "Morale and the News," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941), p. 367.

<sup>21</sup> "Five Factors in Morale," in *Civilian Morale*, p. 33.

<sup>22</sup> "Recreation and Morale," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941), p. 394.

<sup>23</sup> "Morale for War and Peace," *Social Forces*, 21 (May, 1943), p. 418.

<sup>24</sup> "Propaganda and Morale," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941), p. 340.

<sup>25</sup> "Morale and Civilian Defense," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941), p. 331.

<sup>26</sup> "Morale and Its Measurement," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941), p. 406.

<sup>27</sup> "Morale and Minority Groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (November, 1941), p. 426.

<sup>28</sup> "Jewish Morale in Our Time," *Social Forces*, 20 (May, 1942), p. 491.



Morale thus becomes no more than 'right attitudes' presumed to exist by observers of behavior.

It is interesting to note some similarity between the above characteristics of the institutional ideology and certain explanations of morale. For example, Miller says that the components of national morale include, among others, "belief in the superiority of the social structure of the ingroup . . . belief that sources are available to hurl back any threats to the ingroup, confidence in the permanence of the national goals."<sup>29</sup> Anderson makes the following statement: "Morale is the presence among the members of a group of (1) a conviction of the desirability of attaining agreed common values, (2) motivation to achieve and protect those values against resistance and opposition, and (3) consistency of individual with group values and policies."<sup>30</sup> We may now take the next step and say that morale is not a characteristic of individuals at all, but rather of institutional associations.

Families; armies; religious, economic, educational and governmental organizations, are moreholding and mores-propagating associations. The term morale is best used to indicate the relative success or failure of such institutionalized organizations. If morale is high the mores are generally accepted, the leadership firmly established. If morale is low there is a disruption of leadership and a falling away of members. At the beginning of this war morale of the German nation was high, now it is lower. But individual Germans continue to have their hopes, fears, loves, and hates. It is gratuitous to dilate upon the morale of an individual German. It makes sense to say that the morale of an army, division, or regiment, is high or low, but a similar remark about Jones is an ascription without meaning as to his physical, mental or emotional condition. No soldier is just a soldier. Morale may be high in the family to which he belongs and low in his company, or *vice versa*. It might be high in a man's factory, but low in his club. On the eve of the war morale was high in some of the industrial organizations of France while it was relatively low in the national government. In the early centuries of the Christian era it was high in the growing church while it was low in the Roman government.

<sup>29</sup> Delbert C. Miller, "Effect of the War Declaration on the National Morale of American College Students," *American Sociological Review*, 7 (October, 1942), p. 632.

<sup>30</sup> C. Arnold Anderson, "Food Rationing and Morale," *American Sociological Review*, 8 (February, 1943), p. 25.

It is characteristic of our society that people belong to competing organizations with overlapping memberships. High morale in one may be contemporaneous with low morale in another, although both may include some or all of the same individuals. During the twenties morale was relatively high in industrial organizations and educational institutions in this country. Many were in an expanding process. Concomitantly, morale was relatively low in governmental and in familial institutions. During the thirties it was low in business organization and high in national government. Church morale may be low in times of economic depression and in times of international war. We have seen national state morale rise in the recent depression and in the present war.

Before the Reformation, the modern state, and the capitalistic system, impoverishment and war weakened the morale of the existing governmental and economic arrangements, but resulted in strengthening of the morale of the church. Religious organizations served the people with food and protection. Gregory the Great (590-604), for example, witnessed a rise in church morale at a time of economic and governmental turmoil. As a state fails its morale declines. At the same time the individuals who are associated in its membership belong to other organizations which may be so satisfying their needs that their loyalty to them is unwavering, their confidence in them strong. In earlier days the church in the West once was the most important such institutional association. It may be said that in a particular period there is a sort of accommodative arrangement of institutions among a people with a common social heritage. Morale may be rising in one and falling in another.

Morale has been called a state of health.<sup>31</sup> From a sociological point of view it is a state of institutional, or associational, health. The institutional associations of men in the process of integration have rising morale, the disorganized institutional associations have declining morale.<sup>32</sup> In some parts of the world we have observed national state morale rising to a crescendo then rapidly going down with the declining significance of a national state. Doubtless there will be violent fluctuations in national state morale in the days ahead. There

<sup>31</sup> See Eduard C. Lindeman, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

<sup>32</sup> See Emory S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology* (third edition, New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942), chap. XXXII, "Group Morale," pp. 476-487.

is the possibility that other types of associations will again rival the national state.

The membership, or personnel, of an institutional association divides roughly into leaders and followers. The former have relatively more at stake in the perpetuation of the institution. They believe more strongly that the organization is necessary and it is their responsibility to make it so appear to all other members. Morale is high in those institutions which are so successful in indoctrinating their members with the institutional ideology that they accept their mores. At present the national state has surpassed other institutional arrangements in the competition for loyal members. The leaders devise various measures to insure ever more complete identification of personal satisfactions with the institution. Food, clothing, shelter, and equipment, are brought under its control.

Routine, ceremony, ritual and practices in participation are called forth. Exercises in citizenship are invoked. A great deal is done for the avowed purpose of improving and building morale.

The national state is the most powerful and most important institutional association in modern times. It performs the most functions and satisfies the most needs. The acme of its success is reached in war, as that of business is in profits, of the church in missions, of the family in parenthood. Morale reaches a climax. Then the members begin to look after those needs which they suppose to be satisfied more adequately by other institutions to which they belong. Morale has to do with the health of institutional associations, not with the psychosomatic condition of individuals. Seen in this light studies of morale become significant in understanding and appraising institutions.

## BALANCE AND IMBALANCE IN HUMAN SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT\*

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### THE HUMAN STRUGGLE FOR ADEQUACY

WHEREVER life is found, it is found in an environment. All forms of life enter into instrumental relationships of sustenance, end-seeking, and survival with their environments. A century ago Charles Darwin was insisting that in the struggle for existence the price of survival is adaptability, adjustability, plasticity. Those forces of life capable of rapid adjustment have had, in organic evolution, better chances of surviving. Mobility, intelligence, a developed nervous system,—these have been the attributes of superiority.

In these characteristics the uniqueness of the human animal has become a commonplace observation. No species has mastered more drastically changing forms of environmental necessity than man, and no animal is more widely distributed across the earth than he. His inherent behavior (intelligence, among other things) and his acquired behavior (culture) have enormously enhanced his survival prospects where they have not assured them. The demands of man's physiographic environment ("the natural landscape") have been

countered ("balanced") with the possibilities of a man-made environment ("the cultural landscape")

The primary human search seems to have been for the establishment of an equilibrium with the environment of a given time and place. In part, such an adjustment has been achieved by man, as by other animals, through biological methods: excessive fertility, migration, conquest. In part, balance has come through "technology": the creation of cultural equipment and behavior patterns which have mediated man's relationships with natural conditions in glaringly different parts of the world. The history of human society is, thus, a record of this changing balance.

The persisting human problem has been one of order. For human behavior, like that of all forms of life, is a continuing adjustment process. The demands of the organic and inorganic environments call for techniques of adjustment. These adjustment techniques,—tools, equipment, medicines, foods, groups, ideas, philosophies, sciences—

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are learned and transmitted. They pattern the behavior of men in society and in nature. Collectively, they constitute the "culture" of man. They make possible "society." Human society, thus, is an interlocking and intricate system of learned or cultural behavior patterns which have grown out of man's attempt to organize his life adjustments to his physical and social worlds. His adjustment processes and patterns are his resources in an unfriendly environment. The possession of such resources yields adequacy (balance). The loss of such resources brings inadequacy (imbalance).

#### THE CRITICAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

Human society appears, therefore, to be determined by the need for adequacy in the face of crisis. Man's cultural behavior, unparalleled in the far reaches of organic evolution, is born of imbalance. Like all animals, man has had to meet relentless ruptures of routine. Earthquakes, fires, floods, droughts, famines, disease, crimes, delinquencies, accidents—all the countless threats to security or pleasure, all the numberless demands of individuals or groups may represent a crisis calling for adjustment. Few of them, if any, can be adequately handled by instinctive patterns; and all of them usually call for the readjustment of previously formed patterns ("habits"). The pattern of action which emerges from the crisis defines or mediates the behavior of the individual and/or the group until a later break in adjustment requires a new definition. This situation-sequence is "the cultural process"; it is also the process of societal equilibrium.

The systolic beat of balance and imbalance can be illustrated endlessly from the data of human society where it has operated more variously than anywhere else in the range of reality. Our concern here will be with the equilibration of nature and human numbers: the bases, methods, and social implications. The many other areas of social experience—group relations, personality, institutional behavior, cultural evolution—in which the challenge and response of social adjustment take place will be neglected for this process which underlies all others.

#### NATURE AND NUMBERS: THE BALANCE OF POPULATION

Most forms of life are amazingly fecund. Indeed, there seems to be a rule that they increase at

such a rapid rate that, if not destroyed or checked in some way, the progeny of a single pair would in a relatively short time cover the earth. Man is no exception to the rule. However, like other organic beings, he is subject to certain checks on these propensities: in his case,—land, level of living, economic culture, lethal agents, birth controls. As a result, in the long run nature and human numbers balance.

"Numbers" mean that a species may multiply up to the limit of the supporting power of their habitat: this is "the iron law of numbers." Among sub-human life-forms, it is customary to say that their numbers depend on the "land," meaning "sustentation field":  $P = f(L)$ . In a general sense, this relation is true of man also. However, the development of culture has added other factors to this

relation, somewhat as follows:  $P = f \frac{(L \times E C)}{L L}$  or

$L L = f \frac{(L \times E C)}{P}$ . That is to say, population

(numbers) is dependent on the land as developed by or multiplied by the economic culture (the arts); but all three factors reflect the demands of the level of living. Balance can be achieved by manipulating any one of these factors: by extending the land, by encouraging the arts, by changing the level (standards plus planes) of living, by directly controlling the birth and death rates. Thus, an industrial revolution, or land conquests, or education in home arts, not to mention trade (as a phase of the economic culture) can entail tremendous changes in the "man-land ratio". It was no accident that during the nineteenth century the population of Europe which was undergoing an Industrial Revolution was also witnessing a great increase in numbers, about three hundred percent, a gain hitherto unmatched in human annals.


Apparently, then, human culture has freed man of the rigidities of the "life-land ratio" as found among sub-human life-forms, which must pay a terrific price in loss of numbers in order to survive. Moreover, culturally man can live at any balanced relationship with the "land" which he chooses. Thus, overpopulation in a given habitat is a result of the pressure of numbers on the land in spite of, usually because of, the level of living and the level of the arts. Underpopulation is a condition which obtains when such pressure does not, perhaps is not likely to prevail. Optimum population is a condition in which the population lives at such a stage of the arts and on such a level of living as to enable



a maximum use of resources. All three conditions depend basically on a social agreement as to the level of living and/or as to the development of the arts.

The strategic controls, thus, are the arts and the level of living. Ironically enough, in the history of human society there has been a tragic reluctance to exploit these controls in a time of imbalance. Instead, adequacy is sought in the direct control over birth or death or in seizures of land: a num-

bers policy or a land policy. Falling birth rates are defined as calling for increasing births or for increasing land space, rather than for a revolution in the arts. A "numbers" policy or a "land" policy has dominated the "arts" policy in the achievement of balance. Fascist imperialism in the 1930's has been the most recent sample of the futility and wastefulness of this technique of balance. The diagram illustrates the possible lines of population balance.



#### SCARCITY AND SATISFACTION: THE BALANCE OF ECONOMY

Whatever the population policy, the balance of nature and numbers is basic and inevitable. It is interesting to see just how basic and inevitable it has been. Economic history is illuminating in this connection.

The man-land formula implies a struggle among men for subsistence. This struggle is seldom, if ever, in isolation, but in groups. It is customary to work and fight in a group. In a sense, then, "the social" is a product of numbers. In consequence, man has evolved customary adjustment techniques: maintenance systems along with other institution-patterns, such as the family, marriage, the state, and so forth. In short, man has lived in and organized "societies" with characteristic "cultures." Clearly responses to life-conditions, human societies have been dynamic, driven by external necessity or internal compulsion. In the course of human evolution, societies have been differentiated into types, in some cases growing out of preceding types, in other cases

(probably most of them) independently developed from environmental challenges.

There have been several useful classifications of these forms of association. They will not be reviewed *in toto* here, but the main theme which they underscore is worth careful attention. Man, it seems, lives in a world of scarcity. His problem is one of balancing his ever-growing needs (mouths to feed, physical and cultural demands) with a niggardly nature. He must resort to economy, to a husbandry of his resources. Economic activity, therefore, is simply the utilization of scarce resources to satisfy abundant ends. An economy is the cultural organization which develops around some central mode of economic activity. For example, early man achieved a balance of scarcity and satisfaction by an economy of collection. Once the conquest of weapons and tools was made, a hunting economy prevailed. A sustenance field characterized by ample vegetation made possible a pastoral economy. Agricultural economy represents a tremendous advance in the economic arts; it greatly increases the possibilities of the

man-land ratio. Commercial and industrial economies are relatively recent economic organizations balancing nature and numbers.

Most types of economy are severely limited geographically. They tend to be fairly efficient adaptations to specific man-land situations. Indeed, these have been only two universal human economies: that of peoples with simple hand-power, chipped flint tools, who engage in hunting, fishing, and collecting; and that of modern commercial, industrial peoples. All the other economies—the preceding list is a sample only—have been native to deserts, boreal forests, inland tropical forests, grasslands, river valleys, and so forth. But whatever the geographic spread, a given economy works within the framework of the man-land relationship, at a given stage of the arts, and governed by the level of living. Human economies are, in a sense, cultural configurations built up around an arts policy. Few economies change their arts policy; those which do, change very slowly. Most of the associations of men have worked within the economy as given, fearful of modification of the economic arts. Instead, they choose to alter the other factors in the man-land ratio: birth rates, death rates, size of the land, level of living. Only modern industrial economies have achieved a conscious, telic control of their arts policy.

However, it is a most revealing indictment of modern industrialism to say that purposive control of the arts policy seems to come only through the process of revolution. The Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was more than a revolution in things—tools, instruments, machines. It was even more profoundly a revolution in ideas and in human relationships. Likewise, the new Industrial Revolution, to realize which seems to be the destiny of the twentieth century, presents an equally wide-ranging reconstruction of the arts policy. Thus far, twentieth century industrialism has found it desirable to fight two "world" wars in order to forestall the volcanic eruption of social habits which this new and basic revolution in the arts involves. Instead, balance between nature and numbers is being sought through decimation and a lowered level of living.

#### RIGHTS AND REVOLUTION: THE BALANCE OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The particular patterning which the "man-land" ratio takes at a given time and place tends to be

legitimized, sanctified, supported, and usually instrumented by the political organization. In some economies the political organization is informal, co-extensive with the culture itself; in others it is formal, institutionalized as the State. Revolution is a re-constitution of the State by swift, often violent, far-reaching action. The function of a revolution is a reversal or a consolidation, either progressively or regressively, of the arts policy of a society. It usually occurs when it is widely felt that the existing organization of the State is making impossible a re-consideration of and a re-direction of the arts. The complaints vary: oppression, tyranny, ossification, decadence, demoralization, slowing down of class circulation, unconstitutional usurpation of powers, and so forth. In any case, as Woodrow Wilson declared: "Repression is the seed of revolution."

Revolutions—I refer to institutional revolutions as over against factional *coups*—occur in a society which is economically ascendant or which feels itself capable of economic progress, other things being changed. The Minister of Justice of Louis XV, d'Argenson, wrote: "A philosophical wind is blowing. Today all classes are discontented. . . . A riot might become a revolt, and a revolt a complete revolution. . . ." These words were written at a time when the peasants of France were quite the most prosperous of all Europe and when the French middle-classes had been gaining in wealth, intelligence, and social status. The goal-object of revolution is the transfer of power ("the process of social decision") from an inadequate group to one which is growing in the resources of power. The goal-value of revolution is that the political organization must be the servant of an arts policy as defined by the economic and cultural potentials of the society. If protests cannot make headway, if reforms proved to be *Wahnschaffen*, then the inventive genius of the society must turn to the arts of revolution. Those arts are conceived to be liberative of all the other arts, and if their use plunges the society into the tragic dilemma of ruthlessness versus release, then there is only the hope that the drama of social destiny will move through the social waste to achieve a new release of the human mind—as defined by the revolutionists.

Obviously, then, the language of revolution greatly enriches the vocabulary of human rights. All the great revolutions have been fought in the name of rights, those of class, nation, individual, nature. Essentially, the philosophy of rights is the sense of justice risen from the ranks of resent-

ment to the society of sophistication. What abuse has destroyed, systemic justice will reconstruct.

The technique of revolution is the translocation of the bases, criteria, privileges of social decision. It is the climax of the conflict process which begins in the personalities of a few people, is sensed and shared by the many, and is instrumented finally by the conquest of power. Revolution grows out of the frustrations which a narrowly conceived and unequally (not to mention ineptly) administered arts policy fosters among a people. It is a cyclical expression of human behavior; equilibrium—blockage—frustration—protest—revolution—satisfaction—equilibrium. It is, thus, an equilibrating process by means of which the larger balance of numbers and nature can be realized.

It follows, therefore, that the best insurance which a society can have against revolution is the

pursuit of an arts policy which, while enabling an expanding population, does so at a time of a rising level of living. At the center of the problem of social balance and imbalance is the plane at which people live in conjunction with the standard which they feel they ought to have. Men will rise, wrote Sir John Fortescue in his *Governance of England*, "for lack of goods, or for lack of justice. But certainly when they lack goods, they will rise, saying that they lack justice." An expansive arts policy whose objective is an abundance of means in order to balance the abundance of human ends is the only answer to social injustice. It is, indeed, the goal-condition of revolutionists. It has been the matrix of all the Golden Ages of man. It has been the lodestar of every brave new world since the beginning of social time. It alone is the genuinely and uniquely human technique of balancing nature and numbers.

#### ROBERT EZRA PARK

1864-1944

Dr. Robert E. Park, Emeritus professor of sociology of the University of Chicago and visiting professor of sociology at Fisk University, died at his home in Nashville, Tennessee, February 7, 1944. Until a few weeks before his death he was actively pursuing his studies, being then engaged upon the sociology of law, the sociology of knowledge, and the role of the missionary in the process of acculturation.

As a teacher and as a scholar Dr. Park was notable for his eagerness in searching for knowledge and, most of all, for insight and understanding. Perhaps his most significant studies have been in race relations, communication, and acculturation, but in many other areas of sociology he was an intellectual pioneer, opening up possibilities for further investigation. His contribution lies not only in his own studies but also in his leadership and inspiration of others who have developed his creative suggestions. A wise and careful scholar, one of the greatest of American sociologists, is at rest from his fruitful labors.

Peabody College

H. C. BREARLEY



## PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

### SOCIAL ENGINEERING: A STUDY OF THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT

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**S**Ocial engineering has been defined as "the rational, scientific molding of the structural organization of society with the purpose of promoting social progress."<sup>1</sup>

According to this definition, the social engineer has an objective in mind which requires change in the framework of society, and a plan of procedure which will prevent new cracks and fissures from appearing. It should be pointed out that social engineering goes far beyond social reform, which is palliative in character, because of its willingness to attack social problems at their structural foundations.

In terms of this definition, it is clear that the birth control movement displays many features of social engineering. It has a well-defined purpose—the extension of contraceptive information to all families regardless of economic or social status. In working toward this objective, it has followed a plan of procedure. And, finally, it challenges certain of the mores, the laws, and the cultural institutions of society.

Since the birth control movement has many characteristics of social engineering, it is logical to assume that a study of its history and procedures would prove helpful to students of social engineering. Therefore, after briefly reviewing the history and methods of the movement, I shall try to draw a few conclusions and formulate a statement of the ultimate values upon which this movement has been based.

<sup>1</sup> Henry Pratt Fairchild, *General Sociology* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1934), p. 544.

#### HISTORY

The Birth Control Movement which we shall analyze is that portion of the universal search for contraceptive knowledge which has been gathered up by the leadership of Margaret Sanger and organized into an effective force for social progress. In other words, we are primarily concerned with the years since 1912 during which great advances have been made in the national and international fields.

Before considering Margaret Sanger's contribution, however, one must realize that throughout history man has been deeply concerned by the problem of uncontrolled human fertility. In ancient Egypt, contraceptive recipes were recommended in the Petri papyrus of 1850 B.C. and the Ebers papyrus of 1550 B.C. Contraceptive methods and prescriptions for producing abortion are also described in the ancient documents of India, China, Persia, and the early Hebrews; while Aristotle, Pliny, Lucretius, Dioscorides, and Soranus are among the Greek and Roman scholars who handed on their knowledge to the medieval world.<sup>2</sup>

The year 1798 saw the first appearance of Thomas Malthus' great work, *The Essay on Population*. In the century which followed, there was continued interest in population problems. Scientific contraception was among the reforms advocated by Robert Dale Owen. In 1877 public attention was focused on the subject by the famous

<sup>2</sup> Margaret Sanger, "Birth Control Through the Ages." *Twice a Year—A Book of Literature, The Arts and Civil Liberties* (1940), p. 430 ff.

trial of Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Shortly thereafter the Malthusian League was organized in England, while thirty years later Dr. Marie Stopes became prominent among British leaders.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, in 1878, the first birth control clinic in the world was organized in Amsterdam, Holland, by Dr. Aletta Jacobs; about the same time Dr. Johannes Rutgers began training Dutch nurses and midwives to instruct women in contraceptive techniques; and in 1882, Wilhelm Mensinga, also of the Netherlands, contributed greatly to the medical technique of contraception by inventing the occlusive diaphragms.<sup>4</sup>

Thus it would seem that in all corners of the world and during every period of his history, man has been preoccupied with his need for regulating his own powers of reproduction. Margaret Sanger's stature rests, in part, upon her willingness to become a storm center in this centuries-old struggle by declaring to all the world that a solution to the problem *must* be found.

Margaret Sanger's dedication to the problem of birth control began in 1912 when, as a visiting nurse in the East Side of New York City, she was aroused to the imperative need for spreading contraceptive education to poor women, as she stood over the bed of a young mother dying from a self-inflicted abortion.<sup>5</sup>

Realizing that without knowledge work could not be started, Mrs. Sanger set out to learn what contraceptive methods were then in use both in the United States and Europe. This information she assembled in a pamphlet, *Family Limitation*. During the same period, she coined the term—"birth control"—and began the publication of a monthly magazine, *The Woman Rebel*, for the distribution of which she was arrested. Her indictment charged her with violating the Comstock Act of 1873, a bill which had been rushed through Congress to ban the distribution of obscene literature through the mails. As interpreted by the authorities, this law judged scientific discussions of contraception as obscene!

<sup>3</sup> Margaret Sanger, *My Fight for Birth Control* (New York: Farrer & Rinehart, 1931), pp. 99-106.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 110-116.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 46 ff. (Note: Unless otherwise indicated, the material which follows is based upon Mrs. Sanger's two books, *My Fight for Birth Control* and *An Autobiography*. The latter volume was published by W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. in 1938).

Lacking funds for legal counsel and the facts with which to present her own defense, Mrs. Sanger left for Europe to prepare for her trial. When she returned to New York at the end of 1915, however, the charge against her was not prosecuted and so she was free to push ahead with the establishment of her first clinic.

This clinic—opened on October 16, 1916 in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn—was raided by the police at the end of a few days. Mrs. Sanger, Ethel Byrne her sister, and Fania Mindell were arrested and the sisters were given a 30-day sentence. Mrs. Byrne promptly staged a hunger and thirst strike which focussed nation-wide attention on the case, while Mrs. Sanger spent her time in prison planning the future course of the movement.

Despite the abrupt end of her first clinic, Mrs. Sanger never abandoned her dream of establishing this service for poor mothers. A legal basis for carrying out her dream was furnished in 1918 when Judge Crane handed down a decision in the Brownsville Case upholding the sentences given Mrs. Sanger and Mrs. Byrne but exempting physicians from the restrictions of the New York law. Mrs. Sanger decided to test this decision by opening a clinic to be headed by a woman physician. For many years Dr. Hannah Stone held this position. Thus, in 1923, the Clinical Research Bureau came into being—the first permanent clinic of its kind in the United States.

During the years which followed, medical techniques of contraception were improved, a scientific study of cases visiting the Clinic was begun, a National Medical Director was chosen to enlist the cooperation of doctors throughout the country, and international interest was increased through world conferences.

In 1928, Mrs. Sanger withdrew from the American Birth Control League, which she had helped to organize in 1921, because of differences over matters of policy; but she continued her educational work through the Clinical Research Bureau and the newly-established National Committee on Federal Legislation for Birth Control.

For the next eight years, a vigorous lobbying campaign was carried on in Washington designed to liberalize the Comstock Act. Because of this Act, it was still illegal for physicians to offer contraceptive information to married women whose health or well-being would be endangered by child-bearing. Liberalization was finally achieved in 1936, not through legislative action, but by an

interpretation of existing federal laws handed down by Judge Moscovitz.

In the remaining years of the 1930's the activities of the American Birth Control League, the Clinical Research Bureau which had become known as the Margeret Sanger Research Bureau, and the dissolved National Committee for Federal Legislation for Birth Control were merged into a new national organization known as the Birth Control Federation of America, Inc., which in turn changed its name in 1942 to the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.

Thus, in its very name, the organization sought to indicate the two-fold purpose of the movement: (1) to prevent conception when child-bearing would be injurious to the health of the mother or the welfare of the family and (2) to encourage child-bearing under planned and favorable conditions.

#### METHODS

In her book, *My Fight for Birth Control*, Mrs. Sanger gives an analysis of her 1916 plans:

During my thirty days in Queens County Penitentiary I had time to think. . . . There was no use in upbraiding, accusing or censuring women for not doing what I hoped they might do. The fact was that they did not feel this need as I did, and it was now my job to try to make them *see* and *feel* it by greater agitation and wider education.

I mapped out plans for a national campaign of four steps: agitation, education, organization and legislation. Just as I had had to change my plans and opinions after my visit to Holland, so now did I alter my plans of organization.<sup>7</sup>

As is true of many social phenomena, an overlapping occurs between these various activities. Moreover, this early blueprint gives insufficient attention to scientific research and fund-raising policies. Nevertheless, the four points envisaged by Mrs. Sanger in 1916 will serve as a useful framework for our discussion.

**Agitation.** Within a few months after her release from prison in 1917, Mrs. Sanger began publishing a monthly magazine, *The Birth Control Review*. This magazine served partly for agitation and partly for education during those early years. To enlarge its circulation, copies were offered for sale on street corners in New York City. Kitty Marion, an English suffragette and early supporter of Mrs. Sanger, succeeded brilliantly in this type of distribution even though on many occasions Mrs.

Sanger had to arrange her release from prison after her arrest by over-zealous policemen.<sup>7</sup>

Mass meetings served as another form of agitation while attacks by the Roman Catholic Church offered additional opportunities.<sup>8</sup> Mrs. Sanger did not deliberately seek out these duels, but neither did she avoid them; and much of the liveliest and most controversial public discussion was provoked as a result of these clashes. In this connection, Mrs. Sanger wrote in the April, 1918, issue of *The Birth Control Review*:

When one sums up the activities of the movement throughout the United States during the year, it is interesting to note that where arrests were made, where sentences were imposed upon advocates, there the movement is now strongest.

**Education.** Every media of education has been employed at one time or another by birth control leaders. As we have seen, books, leaflets, and monthly magazines have kept the subject before the public. Press releases have further enlarged the audience.

From time to time other media have been employed. The talking-slide film, "Why Let Them Die" was produced during the period of legislative activity. A letter-writing committee was organized made up of thousands of individuals who agreed to write their views to individuals or agencies whose support was needed by the movement. A Study Outline for group discussion was prepared and, in a number of cases, radio time has been obtained.<sup>9</sup>

Needless to say, letters themselves have proved of great importance in this educational work. Between 1921 and 1926, Mrs. Sanger received over a million inquiries from mothers asking for birth control information.<sup>10</sup> The replies to these and many other appeals received since 1926 have proved most helpful not only in informing the individuals themselves, but in enlisting their active cooperation in telling others about the work.

**Organization.** As has already been indicated, various organizations have been formed to direct

<sup>7</sup> For Kitty Marion's own account of her experiences: See, *The Birth Control Review* (September 1921), p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> *The Birth Control Review* (March-April, 1922), p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> National Committee on Federal Legislation for Birth Control, Inc., *A New Day Dawns for Birth Control* (July, 1937).

<sup>10</sup> Margaret Sanger, *Motherhood in Bondage* (New York: Brentano's 1928).

<sup>1</sup> *Op cit.*, p. 190.



the work on the national level. At the same time, active programs have been carried on by state and local groups which direct their own programs within the national standards as to medical techniques, fund-raising practices and educational emphasis.

During her many trips abroad, Mrs. Sanger has spread the idea of birth control in the international field, and has inspired the formation of local groups in many of the countries she has visited.

The Hawaiian Birth Control League was formed during her brief four-hour stop in Honolulu. In Japan a close friend of Mrs. Sanger, Baroness Shidzue Ishimoto, has done remarkable work despite the adverse political forces against which she has operated. Similarly in China, India, various countries of Europe and Latin America, local groups have been vitalized by the inspiration of Mrs. Sanger's work and by direct association with her.

International conferences also stimulated interest and world-wide activity. This was true of the International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conferences and of the great World Population Conference of 1927 which established the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems, of which the first President was Professor Raymond Pearl, and the International Information Centre in London.

Through these various organizations, the birth control movement has tried to strengthen itself on the local, national, and international level.

*Legislative.* Much concerning the legislative phase has already been discussed. It was carried on between 1928 and 1936 through lobbying in Washington and recourse to the courts. The birth control leaders marshalled every method of education discussed above and, in addition, devised special techniques to meet the particular requirements of the struggle.

The support of existing organizations was needed. By obtaining resolutions of support from over 1000 of these groups, great pressure was built up in favor of liberalized birth control legislation.

Leaders of medical, religious, legal, economic, and other fields of professional life gave their endorsements and appeared in behalf of the program not only at hearings before various Congressional committees, but also at hundreds of meetings throughout the country.

Lobbying was not overlooked. Countless inter-

views were arranged with Senators and Congressmen and their assistants. Moreover, special campaigns were organized to inform and arouse the citizens in selected constituencies, thus bringing extra pressure on key leaders in Congress.

Although these activities did not lead to favorable action by Congress, they built up an informed public opinion which helped to make possible Judge Moscovitz's liberal interpretation of existing laws.

*Medical research* has been a constant concern of the movement. From 1912 to 1914 and again in 1915, Mrs. Sanger searched for new methods in the United States and Europe. This search has never ended. Its first achievement was the perfection of a contraceptive jelly suitable for clinical use in the United States.

Even this proved too costly for use in such heavily populated regions of the world as China and India. Further research resulted in the foam-powder technique, introduced in 1935 as the most satisfactory solution that has yet been found for an inexpensive contraceptive.<sup>11</sup>

*Fund-raising.* Since the beginning, voluntary contributions have financed the birth control movement. No subsidies from commercial contraceptive supply houses are permitted. It is important to note this policy because many times the opposition has tried—and failed—to prove charges to the contrary.

It is not necessary for us to consider in detail the various fund-raising appeals which have been used from time to time; but it is highly important to emphasize Mrs. Sanger's complete faith that when work is essential, money to do it will be found. Time and again this faith has been justified. In 1916 when she wished to establish her first clinic, she had no idea how it would be financed; but on the very day she selected the Brownsville section of Brooklyn for her experiment, a check for \$50 arrived from a supporter in California.

This faith that funds will be found for her work is a characteristic which Mrs. Sanger shares with most of the great social reformers. It is one of the important reasons for her success.

<sup>11</sup> Robert L. Dickinson, M.D., (assisted by Woodbridge E. Morris, M.D.), *Techniques of Conception Control* (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co.), 1942.

## II

From this study it would seem that there are four states to the social engineering process: plan, organize, educate, achieve.

This deduction is logical in view of our original definition. "Molding" the structure of society "with the purpose of promoting social progress" implies a plan; "rational" methods suggest that the mind rather than external force will be the instrument of change—hence the need for education; while the "molding" of society will be ineffectual and will fail to achieve its goal if organization is not employed.

This chronology should be emphasized. When a social engineer begins work, he must first analyze his problem and his resources. Having planned his approach and his objectives, he must organize to best advantage the resources of support available to him. Unless he is employed by government, business, or some other agency which places force at his disposal, the only way he can strengthen his position and finally achieve his goal is through educating public opinion and thus winning increased support.

In these conclusions, therefore, I should like to analyze these four stages of social engineering and then continue with a fragmentary study of leadership and a statement of the importance of ideas to the social engineer.

## PLAN

One principle of social engineering can be dogmatically laid down: flexible strategy must be employed to attain a fixed objective. In other words, the social engineer, like the military leader, must have this well-laid plan of operation but he must be opportunist enough to exploit the mistakes of his opponents and rectify the unforeseen reverses of his own side.

In the birth control movement, this principle has produced spectacular gains. In 1929, Margaret Sanger did not expect a raid on her Clinical Research Bureau but, when it occurred, she swung the New York Academy of Medicine and physicians in all parts of the country to the public support of her Clinic because the police stupidly seized confidential case records which were the personal property of the physicians.

Flexibility can be purposeful only when it is directed toward a predetermined goal. For that reason our principle specifies that a fixed objective is essential to give focus and direction to the work at all times.

It is true that during the early days of the movement, Mrs. Sanger revised her objectives when she came to realize that education alone was not enough. Clinics were necessary and they must be available to *all* mothers. As early as 1916 she set her eyes toward the inclusion of birth control among the services of public health agencies . . . a goal that has not changed to the present day. The Clinical Research Bureau and the hundreds of private clinics since established could give a valuable basis of knowledge upon which nation-wide clinical service could be built, but they could not begin to satisfy the need. Eventually this responsibility must be assumed by government.

This leads to a second principle of planning: the social engineer in "molding the structural organization of society" usually finds that he must control force lest it be turned against his work. Since force is an attribute of the State, the social engineer in most cases finds that he must win State sanction and even State cooperation before his work is completed.<sup>12</sup>

## ORGANIZATION

One purpose of organization is to bring overwhelming strength to bear at the critical point in a struggle; another is to consolidate positions and to gradually achieve gains through infiltration tactics and extension.

Consider these objectives for a moment. The first is essentially aggressive; the second conservative. The conflict between these viewpoints is the organizational storm center for the whole birth control movement. Since it has spawned five national organizations in twenty-nine years, it seems to have been the victim of internal upheaval deserving the closest attention of the social engineer.

In all fairness, it should be pointed out that this centrifugal force is not a characteristic unique to the birth control movement. It is probable that any organization financed by private contributions will suffer from the natural reluctance of the contributors to dash ahead toward seemingly unattainable goals without taking conservative precautions against contingencies. Running an international business on faith and a shoe string is distasteful to the well-to-do.

Notwithstanding this more or less universal centrifugal tendency among social agencies, the tug-of-war within the birth control movement has been unusually bitter and prolonged. This is

<sup>12</sup> Fairchild, *op. cit.*, pp. 22, 242 ff.

largely due to the controversial nature of the work. High-spirited individuals with forthright opinions and a willingness to battle for them, gravitated toward birth control work. These qualities, which were the strength of the movement in its many external campaigns, shook the whole organization when they exploded over questions of internal policy.

The common denominator of most internal feuds seems to be the single question: Will the organization be the tool of the individuals within it, or will the individuals be cogs subservient to the organization? To explore this question further, we must consider various aspects of leadership in relation to social engineering.

*Leadership.* The birth control movement being largely a creation of Margaret Sanger, her strengths and weaknesses are built into the history of the movement. One of the most interesting examples is her relation to this organizational controversy.

From the beginning, Mrs. Sanger has been the heart of the movement. No matter where she happens to be, hers is the inspiration which stiffens the ranks, wins new supporters, envisages new opportunities. Now and then others have shared this function, but for the most part Mrs. Sanger has been the fountainhead of inspiration.

The real problems have occurred in implementing Mrs. Sanger's plans, for not only is she the heart of the movement, she is also a brilliant organizer and administrator. Her natural instinct has been to head up the work herself, since she can do it with a flair surpassing that of most of her assistants. When she has done so—during the years 1916–1921, 1923–1928 and 1929–1937—the birth control movement has pushed ahead with startling speed, whereas the years 1914–1916 in the National Birth Control League and 1921–1923 and 1928–1937 for the American Birth Control League, relatively modest gains were achieved.

Although Mrs. Sanger has always viewed organization as cumbersome, she accepted it as a necessary evil in 1921 when the American Birth Control League was formed. She realized that the work must go on during those periods when she was ill or away. Hence from 1921 to the present she has been searching for organizational structure and personnel that would not smother the fire of the movement but would help it to spread. In 1928 when conservatism made the American Birth Control League intolerable, she was even prepared to push her own organization aside and create again.

Before turning from the subject of organization, another significant point should be brought out with reference to leadership. Almost every great reform movement has been launched by an individual or a small handful of people who were indignant because of the injustice they saw around them and were willing to brave public abuse in order to make correction. The birth control movement follows this characteristic pattern. Margaret Sanger is a person of high social potential who has served as leaven to the movement since she was first aroused to the need in 1912.

#### EDUCATE

Any movement seeking to produce change, without recourse to force, must mobilize public support if it is to succeed. This requires education. People must come to recognize as important the values upon which the movement stands.

Naturally a social movement will be much more quickly accepted if its program can be identified with values which are already universally recognized. Health, economic security, pleasant surroundings, "happiness"—these are but a few of the advantages so generally craved that they may be considered ultimate values.

*Ultimate values.* It is obvious that the birth control movement has made full use of these desires in its educational program. The slogan: "children should be planned for in accordance with the mother's health and the father's income" shows the two-fold emphasis on health and economic well-being. These personal and family interests are so apparent that birth control has long enjoyed support from over 80 percent of our people.<sup>13</sup>

Controversy arises when state interest is injected into the discussion because the claim is often made that a high birth rate is essential to provide an adequate supply of soldiers for the defense of the country in case of attack.

Individual interests colliding with national interests might—and sometimes do—prove disastrous; but, fortunately, the advocates of birth control can introduce a third basic interest into the discussion which largely nullifies the contention that a high birth rate is a military necessity. This argument points out that only mentally and physically fit individuals are enlisted for military duty—that feeble-minded, crippled, or otherwise handicapped individuals are rejected. Thus, even

<sup>13</sup> Gallup Poll, January 1940. Fortune Magazine Poll, August, 1943.



the army and navy demand quality even when large numbers of enlistments are necessary. Because birth control helps to reduce infant mortality, maternal invalidism or death due to abortion, and the birth of more and more sickly infants into already overcrowded homes, it follows that birth control, far from undermining the population upon which the military depends, actually provides a larger pool of healthy acceptable potential soldiers.

We find these three points of view discussed by Mrs. Sanger as early as 1917 when she wrote as follows in the December issue of *The Birth Control Review*:

Not only are we fortunate in possessing the opinions of the best medical authorities, but we are also fortunate in possessing historical facts collected in Holland and New Zealand; where for years the knowledge of birth control has been disseminated among the working class women.

In these two countries we find the women largely free from so-called "female complaints" common to the women of the United States. There are two practical reasons for this. The first one is the fact that women go to the birth control clinic for instruction and information, thus giving the nurse the opportunity to detect any ailment or incipient disease, which, if present, is promptly treated by a specialist. The second reason is that owing to scientific knowledge of birth control, women are saved from the deteriorating and ghastly effects of abortion, which so many women of the United States frequently undergo.

Mrs. Sanger then pointed out the waste in human lives brought about by the laws and mores of the United States, inferring that such conditions cannot provide a firm foundation for the state in either its civilian or military requirements:

In this country our stupid and puritanical laws have been the cause of more than *fifty thousand* annual deaths resulting from abortions. These laws have caused hundreds of thousands of women to drag out a futile existence due to nervous exhaustion from too frequent child bearing. These laws are responsible for the birth of children tainted by syphilis who become not only a charge upon the public, but also a detriment to the human race...

In a final statement of purpose, Mrs. Sanger gives us an early appraisal of the ultimate values toward which the birth control movement has been moving:

What we need to do is to combine Reason with this higher sense of sympathy, and to encourage the birth

of those only whose inheritance is health, and only so many as can be brought up in cleanliness and happiness.

This, then, is the basis for all discussion of the ultimate values of birth control.

*Moral Aspects.* We cannot leave the subject, however, without considering the moral aspects of birth control especially insofar as they concern the position taken by the Roman Catholic Church.

The Catholic Church maintains that birth control is a sin because it is "unnatural." To this the supporters of birth control reply that wearing glasses, or consulting a doctor, or wearing clothes are also "unnatural" activities, but they do not provoke disapproval. Indeed, when one examines man's various activities, most of what he does is "unnatural" but it is precisely in these artificial or "unnatural" undertakings that he demonstrates his distinction from and superiority to other species.

On what grounds, then, is birth control different from the other "unnatural" activities of man? According to the Catholic Church, it is immoral. Henry Pratt Fairchild answers this argument in the following manner:

One who has grasped the real character of the moral code will recognize that the assertion that a certain thing is immoral, or even the fact that it is immoral, is not necessarily an argument against it, or a condemnation of it. Certain aspects of the moral code may be seriously at variance with the real welfare of society. Granted that a certain immoral innovation is in line with progress, the constructive procedure is not to abandon the innovation but to change the canons of morality.

Consequently, attacks upon the birth control movement on the grounds that it is immoral may logically be met with the answer, "Of course it is immoral. But it is socially useful. Therefore we propose to make it moral." Of course this answer does not obviate the necessity of demonstrating that it is socially useful. But it disposes of the objection on the grounds of immorality.<sup>14</sup>

As a matter of fact, the Catholic Church has modified its stand in recent years. It now accepts the *principle* of birth control but objects only to the *methods* which shall be employed, endorsing "the safe period" and denouncing mechanical or chemical contraceptives.<sup>15</sup> The sig-

<sup>14</sup> Fairchild, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

<sup>15</sup> Dr. Leo J. Latz, *The Rhythm* (1934).

nificance of this shift of emphasis cannot be stressed too much.

Although we have reviewed the moral aspects of birth control and discussed its ultimate values in terms of the individual, the state and the military interests of the nation, we cannot fully appreciate the significance of the birth control movement until we consider it in terms of its historic setting.

*Historical Perspective.* Thomas Malthus believed that population has the ability to increase at a rate approaching geometric progression whereas food and supplies of subsistence seem unable to increase by more than arithmetic progression.

According to Malthus, the resulting pressure of population upon the resources of a country could only be relieved by such "preventive checks" as postponed marriage, continence, and "prudential restraint" or by such "positive checks" as misery, war, and vice. Thus, at the dawn of the Industrial Era, we have a theory of population which gathered together the experience of man during the many centuries that had gone before.

The Industrial Era, the Age of Science, and the exploitation of new land, all contributed to make the nineteenth century a period of unprecedented expansion. Whenever expansion occurs, as Malthus recognized, an increase of population is inevitable.

Not only were new lands being opened up for settlement and economic exploitation, but medical and scientific discoveries were bringing down the death rate. This was achieved partly by conquering specific diseases and partly by saving the lives of many infants who formerly would have died.

These factors produced phenomenal population increases, the significance of which is indicated by the following facts:

According to the best estimates the population of the world in 1800 was about 700,000,000. In 1900 it was about 1,700,000,000. That is, world population increased a great deal more in a single century than it had in all the previous existence of the species.<sup>16</sup>

As the available land was occupied, and the markets for world commerce were appropriated, the resources for feeding this growing population began to be used up. Population was then com-

pelled to stabilize itself within the limits of the available food supply.

It was precisely at this moment in world history—the beginning of the First World War—that the birth control movement emerged. Its dynamic force may be partly explained by the fact that it provided a rational check to population increase at a stage in civilization when the "natural" restraints described by Malthus had become unbearable to man's humanitarian conscience.

Out beyond the immediate interests of the individual and the military concerns of the state, therefore, there are compulsions of history which give the concept of birth control great significance as one of the pivotal steps in man's progress. For without control over his own numbers, he cannot hope to achieve supremacy over his environment... the goal toward which mankind has always strained.

#### ACHIEVE

Although it is important for us to examine the actual achievements of the movement to date, it is imperative that we understand the inevitability of its eventual success.

At the present time seven States officially include contraceptive information among their public health services; thousands of doctors have been informed of the latest techniques; and progress has been made in enlisting the cooperation of Federal agencies. These advances in the United States somewhat offset the reverses in other quarters of the world.<sup>17</sup>

Regardless of the seesaw nature of the work, its ultimate result is already apparent. Wherever industrialization has taken place, the birth rate has begun to drop. The present war is hastening the introduction of industry into hitherto backward areas. It is only a matter of time before they, too, begin to feel the effects of a declining birth rate.<sup>18</sup>

Stimulating this development is the birth control movement which is but another example of what history has shown time and again: that an idea, powerfully believed, can sweep the world. The audacity of Margaret Sanger, an unknown

<sup>17</sup> Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., *Annual Report*, 1943.

<sup>18</sup> Dr. Frank Notestein, Paper read at the Annual Dinner of the Planned Parenthood Federation, January 26, 1944.

<sup>16</sup> Fairchild, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

nurse, flinging out the challenge: "I will be heard. No matter what it costs, I will be heard"—that audacity is breathtaking. And yet it was prophetic.<sup>19</sup> Her message has quickened the hope of millions of people in every quarter of the earth.

It is probably true that the three most dynamic forces in the world are the power of hunger, the power of love, and the power of an idea. In the last analysis, the social engineer is primarily con-

cerned with ideas. If his ideas are sound, much good can be accomplished; if they are unwise, distress may be the result.

The social engineer must never underestimate the forces with which he deals; but, if he respects those forces and tackles his work with a sense of responsibility, we have reason to expect a happier future as a result of his efforts "to mold the structural organization of society with the purpose of promoting social progress."

<sup>19</sup> Margaret Sanger, *My Fight for Birth Control*, p. 56.

#### EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOUTHERN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The Southern Sociological Society held its eighth Annual Meeting at the Biltmore Hotel in Atlanta, Georgia, on March 31-April 1. The Society has a paid-up membership of 188 for the year 1943-44. One hundred and fifty registered for the Atlanta meetings and 100 of these came from outside the metropolitan area of Atlanta. This was the first meeting of the Society since the Spring of 1942. The Society plans to hold its next annual meeting in Atlanta in April 1945. Copies of the program of the Atlanta meetings are enclosed.

There were section programs on Public Welfare and Social Work, Teaching of Sociology, Race and Culture, Social Research, and Population. At the evening session at 8 p.m. March 31, papers were given by Rupert B. Vance, University of North Carolina, President, American Sociological Society, on "Security and Adjustment: the Return to the Larger Community" and by Henry Pratt Fairchild, a former President of the American Sociological Society on "Post-War Population Problems."

Officers elected for 1944-45 are: Howard W. Beers, University of Kentucky, President; H. C. Brearley, Peabody College, First Vice President; Howard E. Jensen, Duke University, Second Vice President; Coyle E. Moore, Florida State College for Women, Secretary-Treasurer; E. T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University, Representative on the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society; and Mildred Mell, Agnes Scott College, and Ira DeA. Reid, Atlanta University, elected members of the Executive Committee.

COYLE E. MOORE  
*Secretary-Treasurer*



## THE COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress, in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

### CONSUMER PROBLEMS AND THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN THE CURRICULA OF SOUTHERN NEGRO COLLEGES

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IN THE fall of 1943 an inquiry on the teaching of Consumer Problems and the Cooperative Movement was sent to 75 Universities, Colleges, and Junior Colleges for Negroes in the Southeastern States; 57 responded.<sup>1</sup> The main emphases of the inquiry to be detailed in this article are as follows:

1. The amount of time given to study of Consumer Problems and the Cooperative Movement.
2. The academic department, basic texts, and information services involved.
3. General comments on (a) the need for study of Consumer Problems and for the organization of Cooperatives; (b) Cooperatives now functioning on the campus or in the immediate area; (c) hindrances to full and free consideration of consumer study and cooperative action; (d) the implications of the Cooperative Movement for furthering "emancipation."

Because the purpose of this study was to get an overall picture of the double-aspect subject in hand and because the participating colleges were assured that their replies would be treated con-

fidentially, the identity of the institutions is intentionally avoided. Toward the end of the article Tables 9 and 11 give the distributions of accredited and non-accredited institutions contributing to the study.

TABLE 1  
NUMBER OF COLLEGES TEACHING C. P. AND THE C. M.

PERCENT OF TIME	(a) C. P.		(b) C. M.	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Whole course.....	15	—	8	—
75-94.....	—	—	—	—
55-74.....	1	—	—	—
35-54.....	—	—	—	—
15-34.....	10	—	8	—
5-14.....	7	—	8	—
Not designated.....	13	—	9	—
Incidental to various courses.....	—	—	4	—
None.....	—	11	—	20
Totals.....	46	11	37*	20*

\* With the assistance of P. H. Steele, Jr., Alice Thorne, Gretta Jackson, Dorothy Andrews, A. C. Smith, and Mrs. Parepa Watkins, a special research group of students at the North Carolina College for Negroes, Durham, N. C.

<sup>1</sup> By States and replies: Alabama, 6; Florida, 4; Georgia, 10; Kentucky, 2; Louisiana, 3; Mississippi, 4; North Carolina, 9; South Carolina, 5; Tennessee, 6; Virginia, 5; West Virginia, 3. This represents a slight departure from the delineation of the Southeastern Region in *Southern Regions of the United States* by Howard W. Odum. A technical oversight brought in West Virginia and omitted Arkansas.

\* These totals are somewhat questionable since a half dozen replies seem to identify C. P. with emphasis on Cooperatives, the same answers and texts being indicated for both aspects of the inquiry.

In this discussion Consumer Problems will frequently be abbreviated as C. P. and the Cooperative Movement as C. M.

Is any study of C. P. and the C. M., either as a whole course or part of a course, now included in your curriculum? Total replies: 57.

As to the length of time in years and weeks that

has been given to these subjects the range is from the extreme of 12 years in one instance for the C. M. to one week in another case for C. P.

In what Department are C. P. and the C. M. studied? If in more than one Department indicate by double-checking where the greatest emphasis is given. Total colleges answering for C.

TABLE 2  
NUMBER OF YEARS OR MONTHS GIVEN TO THE  
TEACHING OF C. P. AND THE C. M.

TAUGHT FOR HOW LONG	(a) C. P.	(b) C. M.
11-12 years.....	—	1
9-10 ".....	2	2
7-8 ".....	1	2
5-6 ".....	8	6
3-4 ".....	8	9
1-2 ".....	11	7
Several years.....	3	—
2 months or less.....	1	1
Not indicated though answered "yes" in Table 1.....	12	9
Answered "no" or no answer in Table 1.....	11	20
Totals.....	57	57

What basic texts are used and what consumers' services are available in the college library or by subscription? See Tables 4, 5, and 6. For both C. P. and for the C. M., such a wide range of literature appears especially for C. P.—from general publications on Economics and Sociology to definitely pertinent textual and reference material—that only the most commonly employed titles will be presented in Table 4, roughly in the rank order of their use. In a very few instances two or more texts are mentioned for the course. A

TABLE 3  
AGGREGATE PERCENTAGE OF EMPHASIS BY  
DEPARTMENTS IN THE TEACHING OF  
C. P. AND THE C. M.

DEPARTMENT	(a) C. P.	(b) C. M.
Economics.....	47	45
Home Economics.....	35	16
Sociology.....	12	25
Agriculture.....	2	12
Business Administration.....	3	0
Education.....	1	1
History.....	0	1
Totals.....	100	100

TABLE 4  
TEXTS USED IN TEACHING C. P.

AUTHOR	TITLE OF TEXT	NUMBER OF COLLEGES USING
Gordon, L. J.	Economics for Consumers	7
Gordon, L. J.	The Consumer in Wartime	2
Reid, M. G.	Consumers and the Market	7
Coles, J. V.	The Consumer-Buyer and the Market	5
Andres, E. M. and C. D. Cocanover	Economics and the Consumer	3
Sorenson, H.	The Consumer Movement	3
Shields, H. G. and W. H. Wilson	Consumer Economic Problems	2
Tonne, H. A.	Consumer Education in the Schools	2
Wyand, C. S.	The Economics of Consumption	2

P., 46; for the C. M., 37. The percentages in Table 3 are weighted by giving the value 1 to each Department checked as studying the subject and the value 2 to each Department double-checked as giving the heaviest emphasis. It is clear that Economics and Home Economics lead in the consideration of C. P. and that Economics and Sociology predominate in the study of the C. M.

dozen other titles are given, mostly having to do with personal and home problems of consumption and finance. Another half dozen answers indicate the use of "no text; treat as one of the topics"; "materials brought in by the teacher"; "current literature"; "library books, bulletins, and co-operative publications"; "Public Affairs Pamphlets"; "Syllabus"; "Consumers Guide"; etc. Twenty-seven colleges omitted mention of textual

material but, as will be seen in Table 6 some of these colleges have access to *Consumers Guide*, *Consumers Research*, and *Consumers Union*.

For the C. M. a much more limited list of textual helps is in evidence. It should be pointed out that as yet there are very few available textbooks specifically on the C. M., this explaining in part the first item in Table 5 where only the most pertinent and commonly used titles are included. The

In answer to the question on the use of consumers' services, particularly *Consumers Guide*, *Consumers Research*, and *Consumers Union*, the distribution of their availability appears remarkably even as to library, group, and individual subscriptions and also as to the use of these services either regularly or occasionally. *Consumers Guide* is mentioned a little more frequently than the other two. The following tabulation sketches

TABLE 5  
TEXTS USED IN TEACHING THE C. M.

AUTHOR	TITLE OF TEXT	NUMBER OF COLLEGES USING
Various books mentioned as the main texts for C. P.		11
Cowling, E.	Cooperatives in America	4
Syllabus		3
Childs, M. W.	Sweden the Middle Way	1
Coady, M. M.	Masters of Their Own Destiny	1
Cooperative League Year Books		1
Kress, A. J.	Introduction to the Cooperative Movement	1
Report on Cooperative Enterprise in Europe		1
Warbasse, J. P.	Cooperative Democracy	1

TABLE 6  
PERIODICAL INFORMATION SERVICES USED REGULARLY OR OCCASIONALLY WITH AND WITHOUT BASIC TEXTS

SERVICE	WITH BASIC TEXTS		IS ONE OR MORE OF THE THREE CONSUMER PUBLICATIONS IN YOUR CAMPUS LIBRARY		
	By groups	By individuals	Yes	No	Answer not clear
Consumers Guide.....	12	11	17	3	8
Consumers Research.....	7	6			
Consumers Union.....	9	8			
	WITHOUT BASIC TEXTS		16	6	7
Consumers Guide.....	11	11			
Consumers Research.....	10	8			
Consumers Union.....	9	8			
Totals.....			33	9	15

same textual materials are frequently used for both C. P. and the C. M. Here, as for C. P., in a very few instances two or more texts are indicated. Three colleges, one with a decade of study already given to the C. M., use "Specially assigned readings", and three more colleges, "current literature". Thirty-eight institutions omitted mention of textual material but some of them refer to the several consumers' services.

details without distinction between C. P. and the C. M. Some answers were not clear or complete hence Table 6 may be considered only as roughly accurate.

An added query about any other information services resulted in the following: Yes, 25; No, 26; Answer not clear, 6. According to their frequency of mention these are Government pamphlets including Office of Price Administration material,



Library and general literature, Public Affairs Pamphlets, Cooperative League publications, Bread-and-Butter weekly sheet of Consumers Union, Federal Council of Churches Information Service, Homemakers Educational Services, and a scattering of others.

The institutions were invited to list in the order of their importance what a course in C. P. might do for students and for people in neighborhood study clubs. A condensed analysis of the responses by groupings which are inescapably over-

TABLE 7

BY GROUPS OF RELATED ITEMS, SUGGESTED OUTCOMES OF A COURSE IN CONSUMER PROBLEMS FOR CAMPUS AND NEIGHBORHOOD

GROUPS OF ITEMS	NUMBER OF TIMES INDICATED
Encourage better buying; emphasize quality, grading, and labelling; budget personal finances; improve record keeping and saving.....	40
Develop critically evaluative attitudes with regard to goods, prices, standards of living (diet, health, clothing, housing); with regard to published information services and advertising.....	21
Stimulate study of the profit system and non-profit system, and the organization of cooperatives.....	20
Help toward understanding and solving national problems of consumer income and expenditure.....	16
Foster interest in government efforts with regard to inflation, rationing, price ceilings, political pressures, and war emergency in general.....	8
Point to better understanding and management of projects in community, family, and race.....	5

lapping is sketched in Table 7. In addition to the above, here are a few direct comments:

To give all persons a philosophy which will enable them to plan a program for complete living.

To know that money income is only one means of satisfying the wants and needs of life.

To help prevent economic illiteracy.

To have sympathy for liberal movements.

To insulate students against advertising propaganda.

I try to cultivate a healthy disrespect for our present system of distribution.

Help understand the need for conservation of the materials of wealth, natural resources, etc.

About more active steps that faculty and students might take in leadership toward the fuller understanding of C. P. and toward the formation of Cooperatives, various suggestions and comments were submitted. In Table 8 the analysis of these

TABLE 8

BY GROUPS OF RELATED ITEMS, SUGGESTED ACTIVE STEPS IN LEADERSHIP TOWARD FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF C. P. AND TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION OF COOPERATIVES

GROUPS OF ITEMS	NUMBER OF TIMES INDICATED
Arrange forums, and study-discussion groups...	9
Educate for and start a cooperative project (possibly an experimental store or a buying club, Credit Union, book, health, or eating cooperative).....	7
Work in or with community groups.....	6
Use outside speakers, radio, and movies.....	3
Have distinct courses in college.....	2
Provide reading lists but see that they reach farther than the library shelves.....	2
Engage in outside organizations offering opportunity for cooperative participation....	2
Aim to have faculty and entire college support consumer and cooperative programs: (One says, "Faculty could initiate larger movement"; Another urges, "Don't leave it to just a few faculty members.").....	2

is given in condensed form. In some replies Cooperatives are seen as "beneficial in building confidence and managerial ability" and as "basic to the development of the New American Negro"; in others there are doubts or a negative tone: "prospects for organizing Cooperatives are not good now"; "problem is to get faculty leadership"; "people do not remain with the movement when trouble arises." Five institutions state that they are now active or soon to embark upon activity in consumer education or cooperative organization, expressed as follows:

Students' outside activities now include special teaching and leadership with consumer education group

We have a cooperative store, a farm project, and an 'education-for-production' countywide program

Is any type of cooperative organization on Rochdale principles now functioning on your campus as a Buying Club, Credit Union, Housing-Boarding Cooperative, Store, etc.? Replies: Yes, 23 now active (including 4 recently started); Recently operating but now considered a failure, 2; No, 26;

TABLE 9

COOPERATIVES ON SOUTHERN NEGRO COLLEGE CAMPUSES IN THE FALL OF 1943 SHOWING ACCREDITED STATUS, DATA ORGANIZED, TYPE OF COOPERATIVE, NUMBER OF MEMBERS, AND DEGREE OF SUCCESS

	COLLEGE ACCREDITED BY	DATE ORGANIZED	TYPE OF CO-OP.	NO. OF MEMBERS	DEGREE OF SUCCESS			
					High	Fair	?	Failure
1.	AAU-SACSS	several years ago	Eats Shop & Boarding	not given		yes		
2.	AAU-SACSS	Oct. 1943	Cred. Un. & Book	not given			?	
3.	SACSS	1935	Cred. Un.	75	yes			
4.	SACSS	1935	Cred. Un.	100		yes		
5.	SACSS	1936	Cred. Un.	236	yes			
6.	SACSS	1936	Store & Cred. Un.	not given		yes		
		1942						
7.	SACSS	1937	Cred. Un.	286	yes			
8.	SACSS	1939	Cred. Un.	60		yes		
9.	SACSS	1939	Buy'g. Cl.	not given				yes
10.	SACSS	1938	Cred. Un.	382	yes			
11.	SACSS	1941	Teaching Experiment	35*				yes
12.	SACSS	1942	Eats Shop	185	yes			
13.	SACSS	summer 1943 only	Teaching Experiment	31*		yes		
14.	SACSS	1941-1943**	Boarding	40	yes			
15.	SACSS(B)	1935	Store	100*	yes			
16.	SACSS(B)	1938	Eats Shop	85	yes			
17.	SACSS(B)	1939	Store & Hous.-Bd.	75		yes		
18.	SACSS(B)	Feb. 1943	Cred. Un.	40	yes			
19.	SACSS(B)	Sept. 1943	Store	112			?	
20.	Prof.	1936	Cred. Un.	100		yes		
21.	Unaccredited	1937	Hous.-Bd.	37		yes		
22.	Unaccredited	1941	Cred. Un. & Store	200		yes		
				125				
23.	Unaccredited	1941	Cred. Un. & Store	60	yes			
24.	Unaccredited	Sept. 1943	Store	10			?	
25.	Unaccredited	Oct. 1943	Store	70			?	

\* Membership at height of operation.

\*\* Lately inactive due to war conditions.

\* Cumulative membership amounts to 700 over a seven year period.

We are now forming study groups

In the near future we hope to start a cooperative book store

For the immediate future we are planning to have internship of students in communities where they may participate in cooperative activities

No answer, 6. Tables 9 and 11 group the colleges according to classification by accrediting associations, namely the Association of American Universities (AAU), the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools (SACSS), and others.

A secondary question called for a brief descrip-

tion of any interesting example of cooperative organization not connected with the college but in the immediate area. Sixteen colleges gave such examples. Four refer with considerable approval to the cooperative activities in nearby colleges and schools; two indicate stores in the Richmond

TABLE 10

BY GROUPS OF RELATED ITEMS, HINDRANCES WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE NEGRO GROUP TO CONSIDERATION OF C. P. AND THE C. M.	NUMBER OF TIMES INDICATED
<i>Educational-Economic</i> , mostly within the Negro race: Ignorance, apathy, lack of appreciation; poverty, extravagance, thriftlessness; past local and other failures in cooperatives. The main emphasis is upon ignorance, apathy, and poverty. Quotation: "Total lack of genuine knowledge of history, meaning, and methods . . ."	12
<i>Psycho-Social</i> , apparently from without and from within: Traditional profit business; unwillingness to be self-sacrificing and to start in small ways. Quotations: "Not at the college but public sentiment, vested interests, envy, and prejudice may hinder the successful operation of such organizations or even teaching the principles." "The well-known American individualism possesses Negro communities and leaders, devoted to a profit economy." "The cooperative principle of 'open membership' is not fully observed." "Segregation is an evil that dampens and stifles every otherwise worthwhile effort." "Provincialism."	12
<i>Institutional</i> , apparently from without and from within; Quotations: "Lack of sympathy from controlling forces in educational and religious circles and pseudofriends of interracial cooperation." "Our group has too little confidence in Negro business or too much dependence on white leadership." "Basic requirements of curriculum."	6

area, naming the Red Circle group; three point to local and County Credit Unions for teachers. In addition to these college, store, and Credit Union activities the other seven responses included by type of project: cafeteria, housing, milk buying, filling station (recently failed because "people would not go three blocks out of their way"),

experimental teaching, two cooperatives within 60 miles (presumably Tyrrell County, N. C.), and to a community-campus project about to go into business. Credit Unions and stores are the most common. Not without interest is a fact not revealed in the tables: Seven colleges that have indicated the teaching of the Cooperative Movement for a period ranging from 3 to 10 years have no campus cooperative at present, one of them having had a cooperative venture that failed.

Are you conscious of any hindrances within or without your group to full and free consideration of Consumer Problems and the Cooperative Movement? Yes, 14; No, 32; Yes-and-No, 1; no answer, 10. In interpreting the replies no clear differentiation can be made as between the two aspects of the inquiry or between hindrances from within and from without. Most of the colleges answering did so at some length. The groupings in Table 10 have unavoidable overlappings of meaning but they approximate the picture. One might condense alliteratively all the hindrances into poverty, apathy, prejudice, and profit-bound conditioning.

From what you know or have heard about the C. M., do you care to comment on the following statement by a Negro educator? "I hope the C. M. is going to start us on a line of activity in our schools and colleges that will write a new Emancipation Proclamation for us. That's not too much to hope, is it?" Replies: Concurrence, 30; Doubt or Qualification, 13; No Answer, 14. Most of the answers were the "I agree" type.

In a dozen concurrences that were expanded meaningfully the greatest values in the C. M. for the Negro are seen, in the order of their emphasis, as the following: advancing economic security; assuring greater independence, more employment and respect; more development of initiative, experience, leadership, and recreational activities. Significant quotations:

We are enslaved economically and this should be one way to break the shackles.

It can work within the present framework.

It is a self-developing program and one which does not necessarily depend on the "charity" of some powerful majority group for its success.

If it is to succeed the laboring group offers the best opportunity.

It is prophetic of a new day for all society.



Among those who doubt or qualify in their comments, 6 state that the Negro educator exaggerates, is too optimistic, or is wishfully thinking. The points of emphasis can be most clearly set forth by quoted selections. The first four of these may be termed "pessimistic," the next three as "can't-do-it-alone," and the last four as the "possibilities but—" type:

Vague—it will more probably develop, in spite of schools and colleges, as more Negroes form Unions of the C. I. O. type. Also vocationally trained farmers rather than 'liberal arts' intellectuals can best take advantage of cooperative methods.

I hardly expect the C. M. to amount to much in Negro schools as long as they exist under segregated conditions.

I once believed that, too, but after years of trying with students and laymen, and after belonging to many Co-ops . . . .

A good statement but over optimistic as to the Co-op activity that Negro schools are going to carry through.

He has just expressed a hope . . . . We are going to need more influential forces than the Negro alone can supply. How about Government interest?

The C. M. by itself can do nothing for Negroes . . . . Others will have to pitch in and show that they mean business . . . . The 100 or more Negro Co-ops in the U. S. today have merely scratched the surface; the same is true for Credit Unions.

His "new emancipation" will depend upon the interplay of many factors; we should not expect Co-ops to produce the entire result.

Facts don't support the hope; some of our basic ills are not touched by the C. M. . . . Within limits it can and will do a lot. I push Co-ops in classes and community . . . . There is hope in any change in a region that is as much of a drag on civilization as this one is.

There are limits beyond which the C. M. would not help very much. I am thinking of certain basic ills in our economic society.

It has possibilities but it will not lead to a major line of attack.

I am not so optimistic, but the C. M. does offer fine possibilities for Negro enterprise.

Apparently the foregoing are variations on the theme of "basic ills in society," not skepticism about the C. M. itself.

Thinking that the national and regional status of the colleges might be of some significance in an analysis of responses, we give in Table 11 the associational standing of the 57 institutions. In general there are few discernible differences in the course emphasis as between the 42 accredited and the 15 non-accredited institutions.

With reference to the portion of time during the year now given to teaching C. P. and the C. M. (calculated from inner details for Table 1), there are roughly twice as many of the accredited colleges as the non-accredited ones devoting the equivalent of half a course or more to each of these

TABLE 11

WHOLE COURSES ON C. P. AND ON THE C. M.  
ACCORDING TO ACCREDITED STATUS OF THE  
INSTITUTIONS FOR NEGROES AS OF  
1942-1943

ACCREDITING ASSOCIATIONS	NUMBER OF COL- LEGES	WHOLE COURSES IN	
		C. P.	[C. M.]
Association of American Universities.....	3	2	3
Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.....	19	10	2
Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools (Grade B).....	16	2	2
American Ass'n of Teachers Colleges.....	1	0	0
Professional Associations.....	2	0	0
North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools.....	1	0	0
Unaccredited.....	15	1	1
Total.....	57	15	8

subjects. For less than the equivalent of half a course the colleges are about even. There appear to be on a percentage basis approximately twice as many non-accredited colleges as accredited colleges giving no time to either subject.

With regard to the number of years or months already given to the teaching of C. P. (from inner details for Table 2), no significant differences appear as between the accredited and the non-accredited colleges, but for the C. M., where 24 percent of the accredited colleges have taught it for five years or more, only 6.6 percent of the non-accredited ones have done so. For less than five years there is little difference. Where no C. M. course is given and where there is no answer, 45

percent are found for the accredited schools and 66.6 per cent for those non-accredited.

The request for suggestions (see Table 8) on active steps that might be taken toward fuller understanding of C. P. and the formation of cooperatives, was answered by one-half (51 percent) of the accredited and by one-third (33.3 percent) of the non-accredited institutions.

#### SUMMARY

In southern Negro colleges there has been a recent heightening of curriculum emphasis on Consumer Problems and the Cooperative Movement. For the 46 institutions teaching C. P. and for the 37 teaching the C. M. most of the course emphasis has come since 1938; these colleges tend to give either a whole course or less than one-third of a course to the study of both aspects which are most commonly stressed in Economics, Home Economics, and Sociology. In some instances there is little distinction made between C. P. and the C. M. as revealed by the duplication in answers regarding texts and in the percentages of time given to study of the two aspects.

A wide variety of texts and teaching materials is used with little concentration on any particular books. One or more of the periodical consumer services are available through the campus library or by group or individual subscriptions in most of the institutions.

The greatest values from the study of C. P. center around the stimulation of better buying, quality grading and labelling, budgeting, criticism of advertising, all pointing to interest in improved levels of living.

More active leadership toward a fuller understanding of C. P. and the C. M. might come through forums, study-discussion groups, and education that goes over into activity especially in starting some sort of cooperative project.

Twenty-three of the 57 colleges now have some type of cooperative organization on the campus, 2 others report having made a venture that failed, and 32 have no such cooperative or did not answer. Eighteen of the "going" cooperatives are in the 42 accredited colleges; 5 others, with one exception recently started, are found among the 15 non-accredited colleges. Most of these cooperatives are reported as highly or fairly successful. One professional school is active in consumer and cooperative programs; neither theological school devotes any time to these subjects.

Sixteen colleges were able to refer to cooperatives (mostly Credit Unions and Stores) not on their campuses but in the immediate area. That 41 colleges did not respond to this query is indicative of the regional lack in cooperative enterprise.

College teachers are not emphatically aware of hindrances to their freedom in dealing with such subjects. Expressed opinions reveal the greatest obstacles as ignorance, apathy, poverty, and individualism within the Negro group, along with segregation, vested interests, and the conditioning effect of the profit economy in general.

The Cooperative Movement is looked upon as a way of further "emancipation" for the Negro but with weighty qualifications which range from pessimism stemming from a realization of the basic ills of society to optimistic agreement that the Movement does offer possibilities for the up-building of the Negro.

#### AMERICAN HOME ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION

The American Home Economics Association will hold its annual meeting June 20 to 23 in Chicago, with headquarters at the Stevens Hotel. Theme of the session will be "The Family in the World of Tomorrow." A Youth Conference for members of home economics student clubs affiliated with the AHEA will be held the same week with headquarters also at the Stevens.

HELEN HOSTETTER

Editor, *Journal of Home Economics*

## OBSERVATIONS ON REGIONAL DIFFERENTIALS IN COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION

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*University of North Carolina*

THE farming people of the Southeast have availed themselves little of the technicways of cooperation. Put in another way, the cooperative movement has made only negligible progress in this region. In the year 1939, only one out of twelve farmers in the Southeast did any business through cooperatives.<sup>1</sup> In the Nation as a whole, more than one out of five, and in several regions, more than one out of three, farmers did business through cooperatives.

A comparison of the regions is given in Table 1, and Table 2 gives a comparison of the States composing the Southeast. It is seen that the border States of Virginia and Kentucky, in this, as in so many other characteristics, vary from the pattern of the other Southeastern States, approaching more nearly the averages of contiguous areas. Florida also shows a marked variation. Eliminating statistics for these three States would reduce severely the average for the balance of the Southeast.

The census presents no data on the nature of the transactions reported except to classify them as buying, selling, or service. Therefore, to gain any knowledge of the importance of the several crops in cooperative enterprise, it is necessary to rely on the statistics for membership in cooperatives as compiled by the Cooperative Research and Service Division of the Farm Credit Administration. Table 3 analyzes the total cooperative

membership in the Southeast of 492,340<sup>2</sup> in 1941-1942 by purchasing and marketing cooperatives and by commodity types.

It is seen that 70 percent of the cooperative membership is in marketing cooperatives, and that of the total membership in marketing cooperatives, 58.5 percent is in either tobacco or cotton cooperatives. It can be said of both these types of cooperatives that they characteristically depart from the accepted principles of cooperative organization<sup>3</sup> and procedure in many important respects, most

TABLE 1  
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF FARM OPERATORS  
REPORTING BUSINESS WITH OR THROUGH  
COOPERATIVES IN 1939, UNITED STATES  
AND REGIONS

AREA	NUMBER	PERCENT
United States.....	1,364,402	22.4
Middle States.....	636,609	38.1
Far West.....	102,390	36.6
Northwest.....	198,829	33.1
Northeast.....	151,668	24.1
Southwest.....	81,519	12.5
Southeast.....	193,386	8.6

Source: Adapted from Census of 1940, III, Chap. VI, General Report on Agriculture.

significantly, perhaps, in that they permit of no real opportunity for member participation in the making of policy or the control of procedure. In fact, only a very broad definition of the cooperative would admit them under this heading. The same criticism could be made with varying degrees of aptness to other organizations whose membership is included in this tabulation, but the criticism loses some of its significance in a regional comparison since similar criticisms apply to organizations in other regions also classed as cooperatives. It is noteworthy, though, that in contrast to other regions, the South affords few examples of organ-

<sup>1</sup> Census enumerators were instructed in 1940 that "to be classed as a cooperative, an organization must: (1) be controlled by its members, and (2) be operated for the benefit of the members and not for profit on the basis of shares of stock held. They were cautioned not to include informal and occasional purchases or sales involving only a few farmers. They were also instructed that doing business through cooperative organizations and not membership in them, was the criterion for enumerating such activities. Thus, a person who held membership in a cooperative should not have been listed as a cooperative participant unless he operated a farm and also bought or sold goods or purchased services provided by cooperatives in the year specified. He should have been listed as a cooperative participant, however, if he did business with or through a cooperative even though he did not hold membership in the organization."

<sup>2</sup> This total has not been adjusted to eliminate the effect of overlapping. It is not therefore comparable with the census figure for the number of farmers doing business with or through cooperatives.

<sup>3</sup> See page 441.



izations, devoted either to purchasing or to marketing, which conform to a strict definition of a cooperative.

Membership in cooperatives by States of the Southeast and by commodity types is presented

TABLE 2

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF FARM OPERATORS REPORTING BUSINESS WITH OR THROUGH COOPERATIVES IN 1939, SOUTHEAST AND STATES

AREA	NUMBER	PERCENT
Southeast.....	193,386	8.6
Virginia.....	29,725	17.0
Kentucky.....	28,076	11.1
Florida.....	6,678	10.7
Louisiana.....	14,303	9.5
Tennessee.....	22,084	8.9
Georgia.....	18,201	8.4
Mississippi.....	23,384	8.0
Alabama.....	16,222	7.0
North Carolina.....	17,862	6.4
Arkansas.....	11,470	5.3
South Carolina.....	5,381	3.9

Source: Adapted from Census of 1940, III, Chap. VI, General Report on Agriculture.

ing membership. The record of Kentucky is somewhat marred by the fact that 75,000 of her 99,700 members are in tobacco cooperatives, known

TABLE 3

MEMBERSHIP IN COOPERATIVES BY COMMODITY TYPES, SOUTHEAST, 1941-1942

TYPE	NUMBER	PERCENT	PERCENT
All types.....	492,340	100.0	
Purchasing.....	147,350	29.9	
Marketing.....	344,990	70.1	100.0
Tobacco.....	104,300	21.2	30.2
Cotton.....	97,700	19.8	28.3
Livestock.....	30,120	6.1	8.7
Fruits and Vegetables..	27,400	5.6	8.0
Nuts.....	27,400	5.6	8.0
Dairy Products.....	10,020	2.0	2.9
Wool & Mohair.....	9,110	1.8	2.6
Poultry and Poultry Products.....	7,500	1.5	2.2
Grains, Dry Beans and Rice.....	2,470	0.5	0.7
Miscellaneous.....	28,930	5.9	8.4

Source: Adapted from Miscellaneous Report No. 64, Cooperative Research and Service Division, F.C.A.

TABLE 4

MEMBERSHIP IN COOPERATIVES BY COMMODITY TYPES, SOUTHEAST AND STATES, 1941-1942

AREA	ALL TYPES	PER-CENT	PURCHAS-ING	PER-CENT	MARKET-ING	PER-CENT	PRINCIPAL COMMODITY TYPES: NUMBER OF STATE MARKETING TOTAL AND PERCENT
Southeast.....	492,340	100.0	147,350	100.0	344,990	100.0	Tobacco 104,300 30.2
Kentucky.....	99,700	20.2	3,600	2.0	96,100	27.8	Tobacco 75,000 78.5
Virginia.....	98,980	20.1	80,000	54.4	18,980	5.5	Tobacco 8,100 42.7
Georgia.....	80,260	16.3	1,500	1.0	78,760	22.8	Cotton 46,000 58.4
Tennessee.....	64,920	13.2	10,000	6.8	54,920	16.0	Tobacco 21,200 37.2
Mississippi.....	39,460	8.1	18,000	12.3	21,460	6.2	Cotton 17,000 79.2
North Carolina.....	39,270	8.0	14,000	9.7	25,270	7.3	Cotton 10,000 39.6
Alabama.....	34,510	7.0	19,000	13.0	15,510	4.5	Cotton 5,200 33.5
Louisiana.....	16,490	3.3	170	0.1	16,320	4.8	Fruits and Vegetables 3,450 21.1
South Carolina	8,960	1.8	80	0.0	8,880	2.6	Livestock 5,450 61.4
Florida.....	5,300	1.1	400	0.3	4,900	1.4	Fruits and Vegetables 3,800 77.5
Arkansas.....	4,490	0.9	600	0.4	3,890	1.1	Fruits and Vegetables 1,880 48.3

Note: Membership is allocated to State in which the cooperative has its principal office rather than State in which member resides.

Source: Adapted from Miscellaneous Report No. 64, Cooperative Research and Service Division, F.C.A.

in Table 4. Here again it is seen that Virginia and Kentucky contribute a large part of the total. Kentucky has 27.8 percent of the marketing membership, and Virginia 54.4 percent of the purchas-

to adhere to few of the accepted principles of cooperation. Virginia's record, also, suffers from the fact that a very large portion of her cooperative purchasing business is transacted through

one wholesale organization in which membership participation is negligible, one which makes much more use of private dealers than of local cooperatives as outlets and counts as members those who buy through private as well as cooperative agencies.

Whatever standard is applied, cooperative organization in the Southeast as a whole and in each of the Southeastern States is weak to the point where it is ineffectual as a device for dealing with the complex, multiple problems of farmers in an agriculture in which technology is ascendant.

In the combined South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central States, census groupings which approximate the Southeast, farmers with gross farm incomes of less than \$1500 constituted, in 1939, 89 percent of all farm operators. Of this group, only 8 percent (a higher figure than would be shown for the Southeast proper) did any cooperative business, and only 25 percent of those with incomes of \$1500 or more. There exists not only the differential by income levels, but at any income level a differential by regions, with the Southeast always at the lower extreme. The




FIGURE 1. FARM OPERATORS DOING BUSINESS THROUGH COOPERATIVES, PERCENTAGES BY INCOME GROUPS, UNITED STATES, WEST NORTH CENTRAL, SOUTHEAST (SOUTH ATLANTIC, EAST SOUTH CENTRAL, WEST SOUTH CENTRAL)

Adapted from Cooperative Study, *op. cit.*

Why this should be so is a field for inquiry by social scientists. One possible contributing factor strikes attention at the outset. Throughout the Nation and in each of the regions, it is found that farmers participate in cooperative business roughly in proportion to their income. This is shown in Table 5. If the Southeast contains a preponderance of farmers having incomes below the level at which participation in cooperatives becomes significant, then one might be tempted to accept this as a sufficient explanation of the region's lack of cooperative enterprise. For the Nation as a whole, only 16 percent of farmers with gross farm incomes of less than \$1500 a year, did any business with or through cooperatives in 1939, as compared with 45 percent of those having greater incomes.

regional differential becomes the more striking when the comparison is between particular income groups, as shown in Figure 1. For example, in the West North Central States, 43 percent of farm operators in the \$1000-1499 income group did business through cooperatives; in the Southeast, only 16 percent. The differential is almost constant at other income levels: \$750-999, 39 percent and 12 percent; \$600-749, 34 percent and 10 percent.

The existence of this differential by income might be taken as a challenge by leaders of the cooperative movement. It seems to represent a tendency in the movement, as it has been promoted in the United States, which is at variance with the cooperative tradition of service to those in greatest

need. It should be considered in relation to the fiscal policies of the more influential cooperative organizations and to the educational policies of associations of cooperatives.

The last fifteen years have seen great expansion in all branches of the cooperative movement, and nowhere has there been a more vigorous growth than in the purchasing of both farm supplies and consumer goods by cooperatives in which farmers predominate. The area of most rapid growth has been in the Middle States and Northwestern region. Also, the last fifteen years have witnessed

limits, the Rochdale cooperative can and does succeed in this country.

The distinguishing features of the Rochdale cooperative, and, say those of this school, of any true cooperative, are adherence to the principles and rules of procedure first laid down by or implicit in the procedures of the first successful cooperative, established just one hundred years ago at Rochdale, England. They are: (1) Open membership; (2) One person, one vote; (3) Limited interest on capital; (4) Distribution of savings according to patronage; (5) Cash trading at

TABLE 5

CLASSIFICATION OF FARM OPERATORS AND OF FARM OPERATORS DOING BUSINESS THROUGH COOPERATIVES, 1939, BY INCOME, UNITED STATES, WEST NORTH CENTRAL STATES, SOUTHEASTERN STATES (SOUTH ATLANTIC, EAST SOUTH CENTRAL AND WEST SOUTH CENTRAL)

INCOME GROUPS	FARM OPERATORS		DOING BUSINESS THROUGH COOPERATIVES	
	Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of group
United States				
All incomes.....	5,968,755	100	1,357,187	23
\$1500 and above.....	1,369,019	23	619,565	45
Below \$1500.....	4,599,742	77	737,622	16
West North Central				
All incomes.....	1,066,716	100	426,295	40
\$1500 and above.....	393,068	37	215,619	55
Below \$1500.....	673,648	63	210,676	31
South Atlantic; East South Central; West South Central				
All incomes.....	2,957,294	100	287,097	10
\$1500 and above.....	308,261	11	77,943	25
Below \$1500.....	2,649,033	89	209,154	8

Source: Adapted from Analysis of Specified Farm Characteristics for Farms Classified by Total Value of Products. Cooperative Study, Bureau of the Census and Department of Agriculture.

the development of a strong educational and unifying program under the auspices of the Cooperative League, U. S. A., and National Cooperatives, closely allied to the League but more concerned with the coordination of purchasing activities. Until this recent advance of purchasing cooperatives, led by the farm groups, but with a growing number of urban consumer groups, it was generally held that the principles of cooperative action found successful in other countries could not be applied to conditions in the United States without radical modification. The organizations acknowledging the leadership of the Cooperative League have demonstrated that, within certain

market prices; (6) Neutrality in religious and political creeds; (7) Constant education; (8) Continuous expansion. These principles or rules had their origin among a group of textile mill workers in the trough of depression during the "Hungry Forties." Discussing the origins of cooperative enterprise, the Socialist economist Beatrice Webb says:

This bold venture in economic reconstruction [the industrial revolution] had now been proved to have been, so it seemed to me, at one and the same time, a stupendous success and a dismal failure.... Commodities of all sorts and kinds rolled out from the new factories at an always accelerating speed with ever-



falling costs of production, thereby promoting what Adam Smith had idealized as *The Wealth of Nations* . . . . On the other hand, that same revolution had deprived the manual workers—that is, four-fifths of the people of England—of their opportunity for spontaneity and freedom of initiative in production. It had transformed such of them as had been independent producers into hirelings and servants of another social class; and, as the East End of London in my time only too vividly demonstrated, it had thrust hundreds of thousands of families into the physical horrors and moral debasement of chronic destitution in crowded tenements in the midst of mean streets. There were, however, for the manual working classes as a whole, certain compensations. The new organization of industry had the merit of training the wage-earners in the art of team work in manufacture, transport, and trading. Even the oppressions and frauds of the capitalist profit-maker had their uses in that they drove the proletariat of hired men, which capitalism had made ubiquitous, to combine in trade unions and cooperative societies; and thus to develop their instinct of fellowship, and their capacity for representative institutions, alike in politics and industry.<sup>4</sup>

The cooperative movement came into being as a social invention for the survival of the class in society hit hardest by the impact of the new technology of the industrial revolution. Placed in their historical setting, the principles devised by the little group of workmen Owenites, Chartists, and Christian Socialists, are seen as an instrument for the extension of organization as rapidly as was consistent with sound progress at the level of greatest need. Continuous expansion was not to be primarily vertical expansion, building on a restricted membership base a capital structure rivalling that of profit enterprise, but rather a movement to extend to the greatest possible number of those in need, the primary benefits of organized cooperation, and on the broadest possible membership base to build as high as the capital resources of the members would permit.

There are strong indications that in the United States the cooperative movement has placed a different interpretation on the principle of continuous expansion. The movement here has drawn its leadership and the greater part of its membership from the higher income groups in agriculture, and with the capital contributions of its members and surpluses accumulated through relatively large transactions, has expanded rapidly

but vertically, driven by an oft-expressed intention to push cooperative enterprise through the various stages of retail purchasing, wholesaling, and processing, to the sources of raw materials, accumulating savings benefits for its members and gaining a mastery over all the processes upon which they depend for their economic welfare. This has required the investment and reinvestment of capital, and it has been observed that as the capital requirements made of members, by rule or social pressure, have increased, so, too, drives for contributed capital have been more vigorously prosecuted than drives for new members. Drives for extension of membership into the great majority of farmers who have the lesser incomes are virtually unknown. There is a curious contradiction in a people's movement where benefits are so largely restricted to the minority of the most fortunate of the people. One may question whether, unless it makes radical changes in its philosophy and its procedures, it could endure through a period of social change in which the people's needs find expression and satisfaction.

The absence from the program of the national cooperative leadership of any effective measures to extend the benefits of cooperative organization to the lower income groups may be regretted by those who would like to draw on that leadership for the advancement of cooperatives in the Southeast, but it does not explain why cooperatives have not arisen in the region in response to need as they have elsewhere. In partial explanation, a great many facts might be adduced. The lack of immigration from nations where cooperatives had earlier been established is one important consideration. The cooperative movement in the Middle States did certainly receive strong stimulus from the influx of Finns and Bohemians predisposed to cooperative action by their own prior experience. The Southeast lacked this stimulus, but received one of equal or greater force in the cooperative programs accompanying the agrarian movements which swept the Southern regions at the turn of the century, of which the Populist Party, the Farmers' Alliance, and later the Farmers' Union were products. There resulted an abortive cooperative movement which died with the passing of the mood in which it came to life. Several times under other stimuli, cooperatives have sprung into being in great numbers in the Southeast, but never have endured to become a significant element in the social organization of the

<sup>4</sup> Beatrice Potter Webb, *My Apprenticeship* (Penguin Books, Ltd., 1938), p. 394.

region. It might be argued that insecurity of tenure and the mobility of farm families in the Southeast have militated against the development of an enduring cooperative movement, and this, too, deserves consideration as an important factor, but it appears insufficient as an explanation when it is observed that similar conditions in Iowa and other western States did not have this effect. Indeed, there might be cited the example of Denmark, where, in the extremity of insecurity on the land, farmers adopted the cooperative method and, in large part through its instrumentality, gained a security of tenure difficult to match elsewhere in the world. It is sometimes said that the Southeast has lacked native leadership for the development of cooperatives. This is really just another way of saying that the Southeast has lacked cooperatives. The failure of a cooperative leadership to emerge is a part of the phenomenon we are investigating. It does not explain itself.

Some light is thrown on the question by considering cooperative organization as a product of the technicways. Cooperation is deeply rooted in the folkways of farming people everywhere, and to this the Southeast is no exception. As observed in the Southeast, however, cooperation among farmers is rudimentary in form, closely akin to the frontier folkways which compelled combination in forcing concessions from an environment which yielded little or nothing to the individual. The persistence of frontier conditions in the region has kept these folkways alive and relatively little changed. Rural life in the Southeast has been

largely self-contained through the last century. Even the impact of a civil war did little violence to the essential folk-place-work relationship of the region. Other regions, notably the three great Wests, felt the full impact of the agrarian revolution, which was in reality the adjustment of the folk to the new agricultural technology. Folkways of cooperation there provided the elements of the technicways of cooperation—the cooperative organization, with techniques commensurate with the survival needs of an agricultural society which saw the old relationship of folk-place-work shattered by the intruding forces of the new communications, transportation, refrigeration, machinery, terminal exchanges, and the whole complex of large-scale production, marketing, and distribution.

The fact that technology in the Southeast has not kept pace with that of other regions does not lessen the handicap of the region's deficiency in cooperation. Rather, the technological lag accentuates the lag in cooperation, and imposes on the folk of the region the imperative that it make full use of cooperative organization in order that it may the more quickly develop the technological proficiency necessary for competition under modern conditions. Here, again, invention is the mother of necessity, but whether one can expect necessity, in turn, to beget invention in these circumstances, is a question for which there is no certain answer. The emerging science of regionalism may provide the techniques by which such predictions can be made.

#### NOTE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Dr. Negley K. Teeters, assistant professor of Sociology at Temple University, believes that when Camden's (N. J.) Director of Public Safety, David S. Rhone, invoked an old law prohibiting children under 14 years of age from going to the movies unless accompanied by an adult he may have resorted to the wrong means of combating juvenile delinquency.

The enforcement of the law may have an opposite effect on the rate of delinquency cases, he thinks.

Dr. Teeters believes that this movie ban is not the proper approach to the juvenile delinquency problem, and that the step will be ineffectual. In general, thinks Dr. Teeters, children are not so deeply impressed by movies that they will become delinquents as a direct result.



## RACE, CULTURAL GROUPS, SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

### SOCIAL STATUS AND PHYSICAL APPEARANCE AMONG NEGRO ADOLESCENTS

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I  
THERE is a collective consciousness, a social mind, a group mental disposition concerning the whole question of intra-race relations among Negroes. Thus, there is virtually a consensus of opinion of the superior status of certain Negroes as over against the inferior social position of others. Moreover, bodily marks are important criteria in the intra-racial judgments of social status. For example, a certain mulatto Negro adolescent considers a particular dark skinned Negro girl as her best friend—shows her special favors, eats, drinks, and even sleeps with her—yet, this same person has persistently voted against the admittance of her darker friend in her sorority on the basis of "color," and does not include her in exclusive social gatherings. This group climate of opinion then stubbornly resists any impact of "liberal" sentiment on the race question, however "liberal" may be the behavior of individual group members.

Since the matter of race relations is now up for reexamination, and since race relations must now bear the scrutiny of every nation under the sun in connection with our democratic ideals, it seems appropriate to determine just what factors are most efficiently responsible for the body of intra-racial sentiments of Negroes. Besides, it appears significant to analyze how and why the factors discovered can influence the collective consciousness of a people to the extent that they do.

Accordingly, the writer will present some of the data obtained from a questionnaire distributed to 167 college students at Langston University and 250 high school seniors throughout the state of

Oklahoma. The aim of this study has a two-fold purpose: (1) to present a description of the relationship between physical appearance on the one hand, and the desire for intimacy and judgment of social status on the other hand, which persists among Negro adolescents in the state of Oklahoma. At the same time, the writer will elucidate the reactions of these youth within a social psychological framework, using as the variables: American political and economic institutions and the racial organizational mores of our democratic society; and (2) to nullify the assumption made by a number of professional educators that inadequacy of social science instruction, particularly in Negro schools, is responsible for the problems growing out of this discussion.

Meanwhile, the method of analysis presupposes that various factors—sociological, psychological, and biological—interdependently impinge upon the personality of the individual and condition it to react in a certain manner, thus setting the direction of the individual's value-judgments. The value-judgments can be understood only by analyzing the influencing factors. By describing the manner in which this sampling of Negro adolescents reacts ideologically to the racial organizational mores in the American society and by bringing into focus the dynamic motivation for intra-racial feeling in this segment of the population, the writer hopes to pose in bold relief problems which are strategically related to a better integration of Negro youth in the postwar democratic society.



## II

The questionnaire schedule<sup>1</sup> used in this investigation was designed to study the intra-racial attitudes in terms of physical appearances among Negro youth. In answering the questions, the respondents were requested not to include such admittedly significant factors as personality traits, intelligence, economic class position, etc. In addition each person was admonished against intellectualizing his reactions, thus giving "opinionated verbalisms" rather than intra-racial attitudes. In this regard, the writer has a firm conviction that a problem involving value judgments such as physical appearance and the desire for social intimacy is basically attitudinal; and that these emotional attitudes cannot be subjected to reasoned logic by the individual.

a social club or fraternity; (d) as a member of his social club or fraternity; (e) as a member of his business or profession; (f) as a casual acquaintance with whom he would exchange civilities.

In the second enumeration, the respondent was asked to indicate his own personal appearance in terms of skin color, hair type, and facial features according to the legend. The remaining questions dealt with the following, respectively: whether his physical type in relation to other members of his community was an asset or disadvantage; the amount of discrimination he had observed in his community on the basis of physical characteristics; his subjective interpretation as to how this discrimination came into existence; the color he would or would not like to be; and comments or observations on the subject of the study which he believed to be relevant or significant.

TABLE 1  
PERCENTAGE RESPONSES OF 417 ADOLESCENTS IN REGARDS TO THEIR OWN PERSONAL APPEARANCE

Color	White .5	Light Skinned 8.1	Brown Skinned 46.1	Dark Skinned 45.3
Hair Type	Naturally Straight, Wavy or Curly 17.9		Requiring to be processed or altered in appearance. 82.1	
Facial Features	Narrow Nose	Thin Lips	2.6	
	Narrow Nose	Full Lips	9.3	
	Broad Nose	Thin Lips	12.9	
	Broad Nose	Full Lips	75.2	

The schedule contained seven separate items. In the first enumeration, the respondent was asked to check a single trait of the preferred type in each of the major divisions: (1) *Complexion*: (a) white, (b) light skinned, (c) brown skinned, (d) dark skinned; (2) *Hair Type*: (a) Naturally straight, wavy or curly; (b) requiring to be processed or altered in appearance; (3) *Facial Features*: (a) narrow nose, thin lips, (b) narrow nose, full lips, (c) broad nose, thin lips, (d) broad nose, full lips.

The individual was then requested to make an associational relationship of the above legend to the following social situation: (a) as a prospective husband or wife; (b) as regular company of the opposite sex; (c) as a member of his clique within

Table 1 shows the percentage tabulations of the 417 questionnaires collected. Thus, it can be seen that 91.4 percent of the youth consider themselves as brown skinned or dark skinned, while only 0.5 percent and 8.1 percent reflect upon their skin color as being white and light skinned, respectively. With regard to hair type, 82.1 percent consider their hair texture to be of the type as to require processing or altering in appearance, whereas, 17.9 percent believe their hair to be naturally straight, wavy, or curly. As to facial features, only 2.6 percent make the attestation that their nose and lip form are of Caucasian characteristics (narrow nose, thin lips); but, at the same time 75.2 percent regard their features for the most part as typically Negroid (broad nose, full lips); and approximately 22 percent report a variation between these two extremes.

It was disturbing, yet illuminating to the writer to discover that, while a vast majority of these

<sup>1</sup>The schedule was originally constructed by Mrs. Henrietta Cox while a graduate student at the University of Kansas. However, the schedule was slightly modified to fulfill the purposes of this investigation.

adolescents adjudge themselves as having more of them prefer their associates to be unlike them in or less deep pigmentation (91.4 percent), with physical characteristics.

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE RESPONSES OF 417 ADOLESCENTS IN REGARD TO THEIR PREFERENCES IN PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

A. As a Prospective Husband or Wife					
Color	White 0	Light Skinned 36.8	Brown Skinned 44.7	Dark Skinned 12.2	Doesn't Matter 4.3
Facial Features	Narrow Nose Thin Lips 40.0	Narrow Nose Full Lips 28.6	Broad Nose Thin Lips 23.7	Broad Nose Full Lips 3.6	Doesn't Matter 4.1
Hair Type	Naturally Straight, Wavy or Curly 74.8		Requiring to be Processed 19.9		Doesn't Matter 5.3
B. As Regular Company of the Opposite Sex					
Color	White 0	Light Skinned 39.5	Brown Skinned 40.6	Dark Skinned 13.7	Doesn't Matter 6.2
Facial Features	Narrow Nose Thin Lips 35.6	Narrow Nose Full Lips 30.4	Broad Nose Thin Lips 21.3	Broad Nose Full Lips 8.8	Doesn't Matter 3.9
Hair Type	Naturally Straight, Wavy or Curly 69.2		Requiring to be Processed 25.4		Doesn't Matter 5.4
C. As a Member of Social Club or Fraternity					
Color	White 0	Light Skinned 35.6	Brown Skinned 27.8	Dark Skinned 10.0	Doesn't Matter 26.6
Facial Features	Narrow Nose Thin Lips 36.2	Narrow Nose Full Lips 24.2	Broad Nose Thin Lips 18.8	Broad Nose Full Lips 8.3	Doesn't Matter 12.5
Hair Type	Naturally Straight, Wavy or Curly 52.3		Required to be Processed 22.2		Doesn't Matter 25.5
D. As a Casual Acquaintance with whom Civilities are Exchanged					
Color	White 0	Light Skinned 30.0	Brown Skinned 33.8	Dark Skinned 25.8	Doesn't Matter 10.4
Facial Features	Narrow Nose Thin Lips 27.3	Narrow Nose Full Lips 26.5	Broad Nose Thin Lips 19.7	Broad Nose Full Lips 9.1	Doesn't Matter 17.4
Hair Type	Naturally Straight, Wavy or Curly 49.7		Requiring to be Processed 27.4		Doesn't Matter 22.9

frizzly hair (82.1 percent), and typical Negroid facial features (75.2 percent), such a large number

By way of illustration: "As prospective husband and wife," 36.8 percent of these adolescents prefer

light skinned spouses, and only 12.2 percent would marry a dark skinned person. There is, however, a greater discrepancy between their conception of their own hair type and their preferential judgments. Approximately 75 percent prefer to marry a person with naturally straight, curly or wavy hair, and to only 5.3 percent, hair type of their prospective mating partner doesn't matter. To 40 percent Caucasian facial features are preferred, and less than 5 percent would choose mates with typical Negroid features.

The same general picture could be described for the other social categories enumerated in the schedule. It is a fact, however, that these adolescents do not show such a wide discrepancy between their conception of themselves and their preferences in the categories involving associations less intimate than that anticipated in a wife or husband. They do, notwithstanding, show preferences "to regular company of the opposite sex" (which may end in marriage) similar to that of prospective mates.

To the item: "Have you ever had occasion to regard your own physical type in relation to others in your community as an asset—as a disadvantage"—22 percent responded to the former and 54.8 percent listed the latter.

The remainder did not reply or were so undecided or wavering in their responses that one could not be reasonably certain just how they regarded themselves physically in relation to others in the respective communities.

In their reaction to the enumeration: "Do you observe any discrimination within your community on the basis of physical characteristics"—57 percent of the respondents gave an unqualified "yes," while only 21.9 percent stated "no".

Finally, to the category—"Which color do you think it is best and worst to be,"—38.3 percent chose light brown skin as their favorite color and 42 percent, 11.4 percent, and 3 percent prefer brown skin, dark skin, and white skin, respectively. It is revealing that few of the respondents would like to be at either extreme—black or white. This fact is substantiated by the aversion of over 35 percent of the youth for white skin, whereas, over 40 percent have a repugnance against black skin.

These percentage scores, to whatever degree or extent their importance, are of secondary concern in the present study. In order to give some social meaning to these raw data, the writer will now turn this discussion to the concept and the variables previously enumerated.

### III

The data herein presented might appear astounding and perplexing to the casual observer; however, a cursory analysis of the "racial mythology" with its supporting mores and social institutions in our democratic society, and the effect of these societal sanctions upon Negro personality, might partially clear up this bewilderment.

Allison Davis<sup>2</sup> has recently pointed out that personality—"persistent and consistent patterns of behavior"—is learned; it is acquired from experiences in a social environment. Therefore, in order to understand the reactions of these Negro youth, one must inquire into the nature of the social experiences—the conditioning process, as it were, through which these youth have developed the state of mind which operates conversely to their cultural integration.

These Negro youth live at an extremely high level of emotional tension by reason of the inconsistency between the democratic ideology and the reality of their inferior and immobile status in the caste-like social pattern. The basic need for security within this group remains unsatisfied so long as the racial status quo is maintained in the democratic social order. A significant ramification of this unsatisfied need for security involves the circumscribed space in which Negro adolescents are permitted to move. To mention a few limitations: they are segregated on common carriers and in numerous establishments which cater to the "public;" sex contacts with whites are rigidly proscribed; the barrier between the races is at its height in regard to such intimate matters as dining and sleeping, extending to residential segregation; and finally the pattern of conduct of these adolescents toward whites is set by a definite racial etiquette.

As a result of the tension engendered by the lack of free space for movement, Negro youth become inhibited and frustrated. This frustration many times leads to overt aggression toward whites, but more safely, Negro youth develop overt aggression, defense mechanisms, states of apathy and inferior feelings within their own group. Moreover, and not infrequently so, adolescent Negroes attempt to "escape" the frustrating situation, physically, psychologically, and socially.

<sup>2</sup> See his "Racial Status and Personality Development," *The Scientific Monthly*, LVII (Oct., 1943), 354-362.



Still another factor of the tension felt by Negro adolescents may be found in the denial to the Negro social approval as a group. Even where a Negro is "lionized," he is, as it were, lifted out of his race and given a sort of quasi honorary white status because he, a Negro, has accomplished something assumed to be beyond the capability of the Negro. From that time forward he is never "just another Negro" as the implication of that expression is generally understood. Rather, he occupies a marginal position which deprives him of full acceptance in either racial group.

In forming a collective consciousness with regard to intra-racial relations, adolescent Negroes have obtained from their culture a common "psychological type" which is accepted by virtually every member of the total society. The new candidates are trained to conform with this type through a preparatory education. Moreover, this group mental disposition of Negro youth has its roots in the individual's attempt at social adjustment whereby the individual becomes identified with certain psychological types and rejects others. In addition, and of equal importance, is the ambivalent set of ideas, attitudes, and habits built up in regard to these types. The attitudes range from opposition and mild dislike, to strong disgust, and even hatred in reference to certain psychological symbols within the society.

More concretely, it is a psychological gain for Negro youth to become identified with the "superior" race. Although for the most part unconscious, but none the less real, these adolescents feel that the more they can approximate the standards of white society, the greater are their chances for economic and psychological security. Furthermore, to become identified with Negroes who approximate the physical characteristics of the dominant society, gives Negro youth a quasi high racial status not only within their group, but in addition, in the total society.

There are yet other conditions in the social experiences of Negro youth to motivate their aversion for extreme Negroid characteristics. In the American culture, there is to be found an elaborate set of social institutions that bombard individuals with visualizations which stigmatize the bodily marks of Negroes with such connotations as: laziness, socially irresponsible, criminal minded, child-like, politically incapable, hyper-sex urges, etc. To mention but a few of these social institutions that protect the racial myths of our social order: the American Press, particularly, news-

papers, popular magazines, and many of the comics; the cinema with its "Step-an'-Fetch-it" characterizations; and the radio with its "Amos and Andy" and "Rochester" personalities.

In a similar vein, Negro youth are frustrated as a result of the inhibiting effect of economic institutions upon their personalities. To be sure, achievements and security in many economic activities are limited to certain members of the Negro groups. Many of these respondents have seen, no doubt, advertisements in their local newspapers: "Wanted, a light skinned, intelligent colored girl to operate an elevator," in a certain exclusive downtown department store, or perhaps some may have had the experience of being refused a job because of "color."<sup>3</sup> Negro youth have come to feel deeply the penalties and economic restrictions which are exerted upon them as a result of their racial marks.

The existence of organic propensities cannot be omitted from this analysis. Sexual drives, a most suppressed motivating force in the American society, are a constant danger to the security of Negro adolescents. Many Negro youth with extreme Negroid features frequently find it difficult to satisfy biological urges within socially accepted channels because of the social aversions attached to their "looks." This is indeed a most vulnerable emotional spot for these young people and few of them are entirely insensitive to it.

To deny youth the basic need for love and gratification of their biological drives forces them to stage a sort of rebellion—"a sort of social sabotage against social cooperation." It is also a fact that no matter how well an individual may repress biological urges, they remain dynamic forces in the unconscious, and these impulses seek expression and assert themselves in a multiplicity of ways. Sooner or later, in one form or another, consciously or unconsciously, reasoned or emotional, the individual will discover or allow an outlet for his biological drives.

When it is remembered that only 12.2 percent of the respondents in this study would marry a dark skinned person with extreme Negroid features, and at the same time 45.3 percent of them are heavily pigmented with typical Negroid physical characteristics, a social problem of first rate importance exists for these youth. A well organized society must take the responsibility for

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gustavus Adolphus Stewart, "The Black Girl Passes," *Social Forces*, VI (September, 1927), 99-103.

the resolution of problems of this sort. Care must be taken to see that these young people have enough social participation to make life worth while. Moreover, a culture that forces some of its members to repress to the extreme their ego gratification and sense of importance is inevitably unstable, disintegrated, and pregnant with social conflicts.

There remains in this brief discussion to ask: "What implications does this study have for social science instruction?" The writer proceeds from the assumption that problems of the nature just described impose an obligation on social science teachers to aid in resolving this mental conflict among Negro youth. From the data, it is immediately obvious, and the writer advances the generalization that Negro youth are intra- racially prejudiced, and defensively so, primarily because of the operation of divergent social forces and contradictory racial mores.

Thereby, the writer invalidates the assumption made by a number of professional educators that inadequacy of social science instructional methods and materials for instruction are responsible for the racial prejudice and defensiveness of Negro students. That view, to be sure, oversimplifies the proposition and takes no account of the fact that inadequate materials for teaching and unsuitable teaching methods in the social studies merely

reflect the paradoxical features of the social structure. Moreover, it is extremely naive to expect that instruction in a discipline or field of knowledge, even if perfect in methodology and objectively exhaustive in content materials can counteract a "total universe" of interacting and inconsistent ideologies with their combination of resisting folkways and mores. In other words, social science instruction may aggravate or it may alleviate social problems, but the basic remedy is to be sought, not in whether the "problem approach" or the "systematic approach" is employed, nor in whether white or Negro characters are emphasized, say in a course in history, but by an analysis of the inconsistencies that exist in the societal structure so that value judgments may be made in the light of this knowledge.

If social science instruction is to aid in clearing up the frustration and emotional conflict of Negro youth, teachers must saturate them with a "problem solving consciousness." This is not to say, however, that these students should be imbued with this or that particular "ism," or indoctrinated with reform techniques. Rather, it means that social science instructors should make their youth aware of the nature of their societal structure and aid them in developing reasoned value judgments and action patterns to meet the problems of a dynamic society.

## THE ROLE OF SEMANTICS IN THE STUDY OF RACE DISTANCE IN PUERTO RICO

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THIS is an attempt to answer two related questions: How feasible is it to use semantics as a means of scientifically explaining race distance in Puerto Rico? Do the race and color terms used in Puerto Rican Spanish accurately subsume the race distance that can be empirically observed and measured in interracial situations?

Semantically, the problem is to discover evidence that racial or quasi-racial symbols possess prejudicial inflections, the knowledge of which is to be derived from the total language pattern, the vocal inflections and intonations and their supporting gestures, and finally, the situational fact of race behavior as it is expressly or implicitly indicated.

At the outset, it may be stated that the problem of objectively understanding race distance in Puerto Rico is a very complicated and difficult one, regardless of the method or combination of methods used. Hence, if semantics has even limited utility as a method for race-distance analysis, it must reflect the situational complexities, the double meanings and ambiguities that are the general characteristics of interracial situations.

Puerto Rican Spanish is rich in racial terms, each of which, depending on the situation, contains various degrees of reference to zoological and nonzoological usage. In one situation, a term may be dominated by the zoological connotation of race; in another situation, the same term's meaning may be predominantly class in character; and in



another, the same term may indicate all of the characteristics of race prejudice or race indifference; and, lastly, several meanings may be blended into the same term.

A semantic examination of the race terms most commonly used in Puerto Rico will first be attempted; after which an effort will be made to appraise the use to which these terms may be put in the study of race distance.

#### RACE TERMS

*Negro.* Zoologically, the Spanish term *negro*, as used in Puerto Rico, has the same connotation as it does in English. It refers to an individual with anatomic traits that are distinctly negroid. If and when this usage is indicated—which is more frequent than in the States—the term has a neutral value.

Who is a Negro in Puerto Rico? "He is a person who is so black that he cannot possibly be white," was one answer given. He is seen as a Negro, regardless of whatever ancillary meanings may be suggested. "*Un negro es una persona que es bien prieta.*" ("A negro is a person who is very black.") The shading of meaning here goes either for or against the negro or is neutral, depending on who would say it. The term *prieta* (black) is either derogatory, or affectional, or neutral.

"That person is a Negro;" reference being made to a medium mulatto. In this situation, the term *negro* suggests triple usage—race, color, and class distance. The first two are a confusion of race with color. The last connotation, namely class distance, was derived from the conversation which followed wherein it was discovered that the responder knew that the person he pointed out was not a full-blooded Negro; but he did want to put him in a Negro's place, which is in the lower class.

"A Negro is a person with 'bad' [kinky] hair." An upper-class white woman gave this definition. She had a rather strong prejudice against the Negro. (A discussion of the usage here given will appear under the term *grifo*.)

"A Negro is a person who works with his hands" was the meaning several mulatto unskilled workers gave the term *negro*. This definition was quite frequently given. But further probing always showed that persons who gave this definition knew that many lower-class white persons also work with their hands. It is apparent that the usage here is largely, if not entirely, devoid of real racial meaning. The meaning has been shifted from race to class and status. *Negro*, so used, is a circumlocution.

"I don't want to pay my taxes to those damned Negroes," was a statement heard several times during a certain political era. Following the insular elections of 1932, which resulted in the political defeat of the old Coalition Party, political patronage went to a relatively larger number of Negroes and mulattoes who assumed many responsible administrative posts in the government. Among these posts were the revenue collectors. This "circulation of the elite" provoked the resentful remark indicated above. Resentment against the Negro in this case was provoked primarily by political conflict, secondarily by class, and only incidentally by race and color. But, owing to the increase in the number of Negroes and mulattoes in public office, the "outs," many of whom were Negroes and mulattoes, too, discovered the Negro to be a good cue and excuse for their depreciation of the party in power.

The meaning of the term *negro* is to be indicated not only in terms of race, class, and political partisanship but also whether the person responding to the question, "Who is a Negro?" is himself a Negro, mulatto, or a white person.

In general, white persons will classify persons as Negroes who would not be so classified by Negroes or mulattoes. Of all groups, the mulattoes are likely to be the most chary about calling one of their number a Negro. Their own self-appraisal is reflected in their attitudes and reactions towards questions of race and color in others. Their own self-appraisal and wishes are based on the knowledge that achievement is known to be a controlling factor in the determination of status.

Given two mulattoes equally pigmented and equally featured is no assurance that the two will receive the same classification. One may be a man of wealth or political prominence; the other may be a cobbler or an unskilled laborer. The first person is socially defined as "white"; the second person is probably not "white," possibly a Negro, but probably he belongs by definition to some non-racial group. Towards what is the prejudice primarily directed in this situation? It is not towards race or color, but towards the differential in achievement, which is a non-racial value.

"I won't dance with that Negro." The person referred to was a medium-dark mulatto. But, more significantly, he was the son of a plumber. The white girl who said this was observed later to dance with a boy who was just as dark, but he was socially defined as a white person because he was the son of a wealthy local merchant. This



"white wish," based on the recognition of achievement that is known to be a primary attribute of social position, is responsible for these social definitions of race that have very slight correspondence with the zoological definition.

Furthermore, the meaning of the term *negro* and the degree of prejudicial inflection that the definition of a Negro contains must be examined in the light of the attitude that the definer assumes toward the questioner. If, for example, the questioner be a white American from the United States, the Negro or mulatto Puerto Rican is very likely to give lip service to more prejudice than he actually possesses. The contacts here are unfamiliar; and, at the same time, these Puerto Ricans are aware of strong race prejudice in the United States which they impute to all white Americans coming from there. Anticipating this prejudice and wishing to please the dominant group, they vocally simulate the point of view of the American. These same Puerto Ricans will often be virtually oblivious of race in their own familiar situations. In this case if the language used and the definitions given were to be taken at their face value, the questioner would readily reach the conclusion that race prejudice is very strong in Puerto Rico, when, in fact, words belie deeds.

Dissimulation of this type is accentuated in those cases where there are double stimuli for it. I refer to those cases where the questioner is a white American from the United States and the responders are light or medium-light mulatto Puerto Ricans. In this situation what answer to the question, "Who is a Negro?" is obtained?

As in the previous example, the responder is presumably aware of the questioner's race prejudice; but, added to this, is the fact that this group is socially "near" the upper class; and, having some felt chance of moving to that class by achievement, they are more than likely to launch into vehement tirades against the Negro. As before, this lip service that is so markedly derogatory belies the workaday and playaday behavior of this group wherein indifference to race is the general rule.

Interesting examples of the Puerto Rican meaning given to the Spanish term *negro* are to be found where the term possesses a purely conventional usage.

"*¡Qué hay negro!*" is literally translated "Hello, Negro!" But, more correctly, the translation is "Hello, pal!" or "Hello, friend!" This conventional salutation, that is quite often heard, connotes intimacy and endearment. It may be

directed indiscriminately to a person who is "white," a mulatto, or a Negro. I am well acquainted with several Puerto Ricans who are as white as most Northern Europeans. Their nicknames are "*Negro*."

In the absence of other evidence to counteract it, circumlocutionary usage of this type would suggest that it is flattering to be called a Negro. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to find such usage where race prejudice is very strong, especially when it is supported by the fact that the term *negro* was never observed to be a real fighting word.

*Mulatto Terms. Trigueño.* *Trigueño* literally means the color of wheat. In pigmentation, its root meaning is brunette. But a brunette shading is considerably darker in Spanish usage than in English usage because the Spanish type is generally darker. But in Puerto Rican usage there is no strict conformity to this pigmented type. In fact, the color reference is quite ambiguous. Darker types, even those with conspicuously negroid markings, are often called *trigueños*. This was especially noticeable in cases where lower-class whites and mulattoes who possess a "white wish" used the term.

If strict conformity to the root meaning of the term *trigueño* were indicated, then it would apply solely to the more darkly complexioned white persons. But I have never observed this usage. Usually, the color reference is to the light mulatto, but, as suggested above, *trigueño* as used may cover virtually the whole range of color shades found in mulattoes.

Death notices that appear in the insular newspapers often use the term *trigueño* when referring to a deceased person who is known to have been conspicuously negroid in appearance. These death notices are usually written by upper-class white persons who know very well the criteria of respectability in their communities.

Achievement is a much more important criterion for the social definition of a *trigueño* than it is for a *negro*. If a *trigueño* has wealth, "pull," marries well, has good family traditions, or gains political or professional recognition, he is, in general, socially defined as a white person. (This presumes, of course, that no interpersonal or local friction has fomented redefinition.) If he does not possess these socially prized attributes, he is either a *trigueño* or a white person—if light enough—but not a *negro*. This light mulatto type has practically disappeared into the white race.

So far, the usage conforms to social practice. But, as in the case of *negro*, *trigueño* may be used as a term of endearment, a conventionalized salutation of affection. "My dear *trigueñito*." *Trigueñito* is the affectional diminutive of *trigueña*, meaning, "My little darling."

*Grifo*. Semantically, this is a most interesting word. It appears, generally, to be both the most derogatory and the most anatomic of all mulatto terms used. In some situations, *grifo* portrays a stronger derogatory inflection than the term *negro*.

Some Spanish-language lexicographers have attempted to define a *grifo* as a person who is three-fourths Negro, or the reverse of the blood ratio found in a quadroon. But Puerto Ricans have not paid any attention to this definition.

Since the race pedigrees of persons in a community are rarely known or pried into, unless some personal conflict has provoked it, the term *grifo* is currently used to designate those mulatto persons who have *pelo malo* ("bad" or kinky hair). Striking anatomic combinations are often to be observed in Puerto Rican mulatto types, because race mixing has been prevalent for several centuries. One combination is a person with dark or black kinky hair and white features, and pigment. This is the *grifo* type.

Just why this single anatomic trait elicits uncomplimentary remarks is not known. There is a little evidence to show that the combination of anatomic traits formed in the *grifo* clash with the traditional aesthetic sense of the Puerto Rican. More plausibly, the Puerto Rican, since he can see little difference between the brunette Spanish type and the light mulatto type, hits on kinky hair that texturally distinguishes the *grifo* from the straight, dark-haired Spanish type. It should be emphasized, however, that the term *grifo* is only mildly derogatory unless some white person does not like some *grifo* because of some personal friction.

*Moreno*. *Moreno* may mean brunette, too. But in Puerto Rican usage the term usually, though not invariably, refers to the darker mulatto types. Occasionally, it is a synonym for "darkey." *Moreno claro*, or "clear *moreno*," usually indicates the silky, close-pored skin of a darker mulatto type which is a mark of beauty; and, hence, somewhat complimentary. Although the term invariably carries a race or color reference, it is rarely derogatory. If a white person were angry at a *moreno* he would probably call him a *grifo* or *negro*.

*White-Race Terminology*. Contrary to what

might be expected, the most clear-cut terminological indices of race distance in Puerto Rico are to be found in those terms that refer to the white race. In many instances, white-race terminology shows clear indications of a "white wish" on the part of the mulatto types, which is, in itself, valuable evidence of race distance. White people count for more as a race-class type. White-race terms are rarely, if ever, derogatory, rarely neutral, usually complimentary, and occasionally flattering.

*Blanco*. The *blancos* are the "whites." The term *blanco* rarely, if ever, conveys social stigma whether used by any race, color group, or class. Unlike the term *negro*, which not infrequently possesses a neutral connotation, the term *blanco* is almost always complimentary. But like the term *negro*, *blanco* often alludes to class, not race, as for example: "Whites are upper-class folk." "The whites are the ones who count." "The whites do not work with their hands."

*Colorado* and *rubio*. These two white-race terms may be discussed jointly because their meaning is practically synonymous, although *colorado* is heard more frequently. The terms mean blonde. But a Puerto Rican blonde may correspond to a brunette in the United States owing to the generally darker pigmentation there.

Happy are those Puerto Rican parents who give birth to a "*rubio*" infant, as if it were an achievement of first rank. "*¡Qué colorado!*" ("How white; how pretty!") Some disappointment may come as the child ages and becomes darker. However, as the child becomes older and more self-conscious, he himself may be ashamed of his own too-conspicuously white appearance, especially if he be a boy.

#### RESEARCH VALUE OF RACE TERMS

An attempt will now be made to critically appraise the research value of the race terms that have been explained.

Viewing these terms as a whole the impression obtained would probably be that race distance is considerably less in Puerto Rico than in the United States, which is true. But this general inference would not satisfy the critical student. It is only by dividing these terms into their respective race and color categories, by carefully examining their racial and non-racial connotations, and, more importantly, by appraising them as used in their appropriate situational settings, that it is possible to obtain real insight into their meaning and utility as race-distance criteria.



Measuring race distance necessitates the choosing of social situations and observing carefully the nature and extent of racial interaction—whether, for example, interracial participation in those situations is complete, partial, or entirely absent.

*Frequency of Use of Race and Color Terms.* It seems that one of the chief weaknesses of the race-semantic approach to the study of race distance in Puerto Rico lies in the fact that none of the terms explained above is used often enough in everyday conversational situations to give it real research significance. A Puerto Rican may go for days and participate in innumerable situations wherein there is no linguistic reference to race. The result is that the investigator, when in search of semantic evidence of race distance, is virtually forced to induce the person with whom he is in contact to articulate about a subject which he is not used to discussing. On one hand, infrequency of the "natural" appearance of semantic data is a quantitative handicap; on the other, quantitative deficiency impairs the reliability of the information that is reported under artificial inducement.

Interaction in Puerto Rico on the racial level is highly personalized. In conversation with a friend, and allusion to a third person who is a mulatto or a Negro is made, the third person is designated almost always by name, not by race or color. John Doe committed a crime; not John Doe, a Negro, committed a crime. The same also holds true in published accounts of persons. If one of the conversants is envious of John Doe, or if tension exists, or if they have had a quarrel, then there is likelihood that reference to race will be made. But the distance created between them is interpersonal or at least localized. It does not get defined in social experience. The net effect is that there is either an absence of allusion to race; or else the race prejudice, induced by tension and conflict, misleads the investigator into believing that it is indicative of the broader field of race relations when it is, in fact, only the consequence of interpersonal defection.

The Puerto Rican casinos are good examples of the quantitative deficiency of the semantic approach in the study of race distance. The casino is an exclusive upper-class institution whose members devote themselves primarily to dancing and other convivial activities. Negroes and dark mulattoes are excluded. Light and medium mulattoes may be members providing their achievements so rate them.

Although the casino is probably the most important single barometer of race and class distance to be found in Puerto Rico, the semantic evidence of the fact is made conspicuous by its virtual absence. The casino group is an in-group whose relationships are those of intimacy and conviviality. The interests are determined by the defined function of the institution. There is little or no occasion to refer to race unless perhaps that problem should arise when the membership committee reviews a petition for admission by some racially questionable person. Even here, an outsider would not be likely to discover what went on.

Where the Negro blends socially with lower-class whites and where lighter mulattoes merge quite readily into upper-class white social circles, there is no strong inducement to invent terms conveying race or color stigma, nor to give old race or color terms strongly derogatory inflection; nor, in many cases, even to give these terms milder inflections that are indicative of condescension or patronization.

Social situations that have racial facts expressly or implicitly indicated are so numerous and so differentiated in the nature of interests involved that there are no adequate symbolic counterparts for them. Take, for example, the absence of clear-cut evidence of conventional race stereotyping or caricaturing. Stereotyping is that form of symbolism that serves as a substitute for intimacy. If there is essential intimacy, there is little excuse for race stereotypes; hence, no use for race terminology that subsumes situations out of which stereotypes develop. If race stereotypes are hunted for and cannot be found, even with reference to those situations where race distance is known to exist, then semantics serve no purpose. Or, stated sociologically, if race competition, tension, and conflict are not conspicuous processes in most Puerto Rican situations, there is no basic causal force for the development of stereotypes, or, for that matter, any other strong manifestation of race distance.

In order that race prejudice continue indefinitely on a relatively high level of intensity so that it will be thoroughly defined in the social traditions, it must be periodically stimulated by tension and conflict. When group factionalism becomes strong, such as in the political situation mentioned above, wherein one divisive factor seemed to be excused on the basis of race or color, there will be, for the time being at least, fairly adequate semantic evidence of social distance, some of which will be



race distance. But when tension and conflict wane, the original prejudice-bearing race symbols are correspondingly redefined. This cyclical process makes it difficult to secure representative symbolic evidence of race distance that would have long-run scientific value. Today, the symbolic evidence seems good; tomorrow, it seems bad which means that the student will have to deal with the problem over a longer cyclical period of time.

*Race Semantics and Dissimulation.* Where would race semantics lead to in those situations where lip service is given either to race prejudice or to race democracy by persons who are later observed to be, respectively, indifferent to race or to show by segregative practice to have race prejudice? These situations are not uncommon and the answer is that semantics, if relied on as a method of investigation, would guide the student into entirely false leads and misplaced judgments.

*Semantics as a Clue to Race Distance.* It would seem that the most useful purpose that semantics serve in the study of race distance in Puerto Rico is as a clue—a lead, a hunch, a suggestion to probe further. It may give the student reliable hints and, if used with proper caution, warn the student to be wary about jumping to conclusions. As a clue, semantics is a beginning, not a conclusion.

*The Data Value of Race Symbols.* Race symbols

have data value for the student of race distance in Puerto Rico providing he can prove that these symbols contain usages that are reliable subsumptions of racial situations. But a so-indicated meaningful race symbol is only a datum for one race situation; hence it is only a small fraction of the data coverage needed to explain race distance in that situation. If the usage indicated in the symbol is found to be dissimulative of the actual race conditions, then the semantic evidence must be ignored lest it prejudice the value of more substantial data.

It can be stated positively that semantics, per se, is not conclusive evidence of the amount and type of race distance extant in the infinite number of race situations found in Puerto Rico. The semantic evidence must be checked and cross-checked by other and far more reliable data.

At best, semantics is a good tool that can be used effectively to further insight into interracial situations. But unless the investigator be a thoroughgoing linguist who knows how to get at the meaning of terms as reflected in their linguistic and non-linguistic context he had better let semantics alone as a method of investigation. The good investigator, who is seeking to understand race distance in Puerto Rico, would not have his contribution too seriously impaired were he to ignore semantics entirely.

#### NOTES FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

Dr. Guy B. Johnson has been elected by the Board of Directors as Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council with headquarters in Atlanta and with Dr. Ira B. Reid of Atlanta University as Associate Director. "The objects and purposes of said Corporation are to exist and function as an eleemosynary organization, and more particularly to organize and maintain a Regional Council for the improvement of economic, civic and racial conditions in the South, in the endeavor to promote a greater unity in the South in all efforts towards regional and racial development; to attain through research and action programs the ideals and practices of equal opportunity for all peoples in the region; to reduce race tension, the basis of racial tension, racial misunderstanding, and racial distrust; to develop and integrate leadership in the South on new levels of regional development and fellowship; and to cooperate with local, State, and regional agencies on all levels in the attainment of the desired objectives."

The University of North Carolina in losing Dr. Johnson feels that it is making the greatest possible contribution to regional development by releasing him from important work at the University to undertake what seems to be the most important single project in the South at this time. Dr. Johnson, in addition to his distinguished work as a scholar, is a member of the Board of Trustees of Howard University, at Washington, and carries with him the esteem of Negro and white leaders, North and South.

Howard W. Odum is President of the Board and Charles S. Johnson is chairman of the Executive Committee. The Council is in all respects co-racial with equal numbers of each race in the several respective units of work.

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## GERMANY'S PEACE AND POPULATION POLICY

LOUIS O. KATTSOFF

*University of North Carolina*

The situation in which Europe will find itself at the end of this war will be vastly different from what it was in 1918. This difference is one that holds the threat of future wars within itself. It is a condition that may easily result in a unification of Central Europe either into Great Germany or under the dominance of Greater Germany. If this hap-

pens, Germany will again rearm and set out upon another war in which she will be invincible. And why not? Who would then say, "War does not pay?" Defeated in 1918, Germany almost conquered Europe in 1939-1940-1941. Defeated again in 1944 or 1945 or 1946, by 1970 all Central Europe could easily be German—if Hitler's re-

population plans and population movements are successful and not undone.

We must remember that National-Socialist policy has always involved not merely strengthening German arms but defense and repatriation of German people throughout Europe. Repatriation can be effected either by returning Germans to Germany or by extending national boundaries to include those outside. Extension of boundaries may be brought about, (1) by threat, (2) by war, (3) by plebiscite. Before Germany marched into Poland in 1939, the penetration was to a large degree peaceful. German people and German tourists began infiltrating wherever possible. The existence of "fifth columns" throughout Europe, the accessibility of Quislings, the way in which Germany was willing to permit plebiscites, all give evidence of the success with which infiltration works. When infiltration methods became impossible, German armies became the agents for the distribution of German people throughout Europe. According to figures issued by the International Labor Office, about thirty million people in Europe have been displaced as a result of the war. But the thing that must be remembered is that many of these thirty million people were either uprooted and moved or destroyed as a matter of German policy. We must keep in mind what this policy involves. It is true that during every war many people are rendered homeless and forced to wander, in order to keep out of the way of the opposing armies. After the war, these people in general frequently tend to return to their original homes. In the present war the difference consists in the fact that the resettling, distribution, or destruction of the peoples of Europe was, and is being, done according to plan. This plan has as its goal replacing these vast millions with people of German origin. The purpose of this redistribution of the people of Europe and replacement by Germans is so clear that we are unable to believe it. German leaders are making certain that strategic sections of Central Europe will be occupied by Germans who are politically reliable. Greatest Germany—the Fourth Reich—is in process of formation! With Central Europe occupied by Germans and under German control, who could defeat Germany? And why should the Germans now in possession not keep what they have? Have not the owners disappeared? Why leave so much land and territory unoccupied? Germany may be defeated on the field of battle but if she can achieve this, she has won the war! Thus do German leaders plan to

establish nuclei from which later the "Greatest Reich" could be established. Subsequent generations of German rulers could even demand from democratic nations a plebiscite, the outcome of which plebiscite would be apparent. Within 50 to 100 years Central Europe would be part of Germany. From that point on Germany would be invincible.

These considerations are supported by the data given by the International Labor Office in its pamphlet, *The Displacement of Populations in Europe*, written by E. M. Kulischer.<sup>1</sup> The figures given in this booklet are alarming and astounding. Where only some nine hundred thousand Germans migrated to Germany after the war of 1914—a migration which was to a large extent voluntary—and about sixty thousand a year migrated from Germany between 1924 and 1928, we find that some two million two hundred and eighty thousand Germans migrated from Germany since the advent of Hitler. Hitler has proclaimed "repatriation" as a national policy. Yet he was sending more Germans out of Germany than he was bringing back to Germany! Repatriation obviously was to be accomplished by extending boundaries—"lebensraum" was to be taken by force or by plebiscite. If not enough Germans inhabited a region to assure the outcome of a plebiscite, send some in. If the enemy shall later control the region, remove the population, destroy them and replace them by Germans. Later, the "decadent democratic powers" can pay for the plebiscite. It is interesting to note (in support of what we have said) the places to which these Germans from the Reich went and similarly where the German minorities removed by Germany from various European countries from 1939 to 1941 were sent by the German government. Hitler's enunciation of the repatriation of German minorities as a policy resulted in the repatriation of a mere six hundred thousand, most of whom were sent from the area of origin to the Incorporated Polish Provinces. All but approximately ninety thousand were sent to this part of Poland after German occupation. If this does not look toward a future consolidation of the Incorporated Polish Provinces into the Greater Reich, then it is difficult to see any meaning to Hitler's policies at all.

<sup>1</sup> Eugene M. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe*. Montreal: International Labour Office, 1943, 171 pp. For review of this book by Werner J. Cahman, see pp. 457-458, this issue.



But of the greatest significance is the movement of Germans from the Reich to other parts of Central Europe. It is a known fact that the German army expelled hundreds of thousands of local inhabitants and replaced them by German citizens or colonists. We are not talking about German political refugees or Jewish exiles; we are discussing the movement of acceptable German citizens in a definite attempt to repopulate strategic areas of Europe with Germans. *The Germanization of Central Europe looking toward the future erection of an invincible German nation is in full swing.* In the spring of 1942 the German population in Prague rose to an estimated two hundred thousand. As the bombardment of Germany got under way, this migration of Germans from the Reich was accelerated. Again in 1940 German authorities had declared that some two hundred thousand Germans were to move into Lorraine. We find that in Cracow the German population rose from five hundred in 1933 to twenty-four thousand in August, 1942.

The significance of these movements into Poland, Lorraine, the Sudetenland, and other parts of Central Europe must not be lost upon a world seeking to prevent future wars and endeavoring to demonstrate that war does not pay. A great deal of this repopulation was enforced. German soldiers and police deported from one part of Poland to another some million five hundred thousand persons, only three hundred thousand of whom were Jews. This is not an attempt clearly to make Central Europe "judenfrei"—it is an attempt to give the German people that living space which Hitler had promised them, a living space that was to include practically all Central Europe with as much loot as could be obtained.

Obviously, in order to avoid hostile opinion in neighboring countries as well as to bring into being a strong body of Germans, we find some two hundred thousand Germans were sent to the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway. Let us repeat some of these figures: from Germany to Czecho-Slovakia were sent some four hundred and eighty thousand Germans; from Germany to the Incorporated Provinces, some eight hundred thousand Germans as well as about three hundred and seventy thousand Germans from other countries. We have already cited two hundred thousand Germans sent to Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. To Alsace-Lorraine, three hundred thousand Germans; to other parts of France, two hundred thousand Germans; to Yugo-

Slavia, thousands of German officials; to Greece, thousands of German officials; and finally, to the occupied territory of Soviet Russia, some three hundred thousand Germans.

Look at the map, note the concentration of these Germans and Hitler's plan becomes evident. In the light of these figures the opinion of people that Germany should be given any parts of Europe she has occupied subsequent to 1932—the opinion of people that we should hold plebiscites to determine the government of various parts of Europe, such opinions can end only in strengthening the future military power of Germany. It is no idle remark that under these conditions the next war would see Germany victorious.

The greatest Reich would be formed of Germany proper, Austria, the Sudetenland, western Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, and satellites nominally independent but strongly Germanized, for the resources and industries of these smaller countries would be owned and controlled by Germans—part of the loot acquired during this war.

But what is to be done? No single nation can alone remedy the situation. To restore conditions to the status ante-bellum seems almost an impossibility. On the one hand, we are confronted with the necessity of rendering justice to those despoiled by the Nazis and to make war really unprofitable for the Germans and, on the other hand, with a difficult task of resettling these millions of people.

Decisions concerning the construction of the post-war world, decisions concerning territory, decisions concerning the resettlement of European refugees and of deciding the future of Europe and the world should be made in the light of these facts. If Germany is permitted to retain what she has looted from the treasuries, the art galleries and warehouses of Europe, and if German civilians are permitted to stay in possession of the land from which these millions of people have been displaced, then we have lost the peace even before it has been achieved. The job of resettling Europe is a difficult one; but in any case something must be done if we really mean to show that war does not pay, for if we permit conditions to result which will enable the German militarists to point with pride at the wealth and extent of the German Empire *after defeat*, it will be very easy to convince the Germans of the wealth and land that could be theirs if they won the next time. That there is a strong sentiment in this country to bring about such a state of affairs is evidenced by the growing

feeling that much of what Hitler accomplished by force of arms should be left to Germany anyway. A summary of replies on the problem of the treatment of defeated enemy countries has been published by the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems. These are replies to questions concerning German boundaries, German reparations, punishment of Germans, changes in German economy, etc. As to boundaries, a minority group feels that even though initially German territories acquired by force be relinquished, subsequently there should be an Anschluss between Austria and Germany, that the Sudetenland should be restored to Germany, that Alsace should be restored to Germany, or at least given the opportunity of a plebiscite (without benefit of relocating population), that the Saar Valley should remain within Germany, that Germany should not be compelled to pay reparations, and that Germany should not be partitioned nor should we enforce any control of its government (except that it be not Nazi), etc. All of these factors mean inevitably a German victory, for that is what Hitler wanted when he marched into Poland.

What is to be done? The United Nations (including Russia) must set up a commission whose purpose will be solely the relocation of people and the return of their property to them. All property taken by force should be returned to the owners whenever possible. If the owners are dead or cannot be located, the land they tilled should be distributed as homesteads to the nearest of kin of the original owners. Failing that, the land should be given as homesteads to those who need it. Where property was purchased, unless it can be proved otherwise, the purchase should be void because it was under duress. If he who sold the land or property had done so freely and had received money which he had used, his property or land should be considered public and distributed as homesteads to soldiers not already possessing land. The Commission should uproot German colonies planted since 1932 and return the Germans to Germany. If these people do not wish to return to Germany, provision should be made for them to go where they desire if conditions permit. But they cannot do so if they were actual members of the Nazi Party. Those permitted to remain where they are must give evidence of good faith and cannot achieve political rights for twenty years.

Only in some such way will the Germans learn that war does not pay.

THE DISPLACEMENT OF POPULATION IN EUROPE. By Eugene M. Kulischer. Montreal: International Labour Office, 1943. 171 pp. \$1.50; paper edition, \$1.00.

In publishing this book, the International Labour Office has done a great service to the discussion of postwar problems. Among so many statements which, under a thin veil of scholarly language, reveal nothing but bias, resentment, and wishful thinking, this is a statement of facts. It is an impartial, if preliminary, inventory of the statistical knowledge which can be assembled from various sources at this time. Official as well as semiofficial sources have been used whenever obtainable while gaps have been filled in by estimates from carefully selected materials. The author has been aided in his work by Mr. Pierre Waelbroeck, Chief of the Labor Conditions, Employment, and Migration Section of the International Labour Office, and by numerous organizations and special experts.

The author discusses the topic in three big chapters: Chapter I dealing with the migration movements of the German people; Chapter II with the movements of non-German populations; and Chapter III with the mobilization of foreign labor by Germany. Chapter I discusses the transfer and resettlement of Germans from abroad into the confines of the Greater German Reich as well as the movements of Germans from the Reich into the non-German areas of Hitler-occupied Europe. Chapter II discusses pre-war refugee movements, movements of peoples other than Jews during the war, and the expulsion and deportation of Jews. The discussion includes both voluntary and enforced population movements, and the U.S.S.R. is included among the areas under review. Finally, Chapter III discusses the immigration of foreign labor into various countries before the war and the mobilization of foreign labor, mainly for aiding the German war machine, during the war. There is a chart of population displacements in Europe since the beginning of the war, and three maps: one on the transfer of German minorities, one on the movements of non-German populations, and one on foreign workers and prisoners of war employed in Germany at the beginning of 1943.

The result of these painstaking efforts is stupendous. Professor Kulischer estimates that more than 30,000,000 people have been displaced in Europe, if all the aforementioned categories are put together. He presents a careful accounting in



support of this estimate. From September 1939 until May 1940, it is said, nearly 3,800,000 persons were uprooted. From May 1940 until June 22, 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, nearly 4,000,000 persons were added to the total. Between June 1941 and January 1943, 23,000,000 additional persons were transplanted; deported, or dispersed. Meanwhile, many more millions have been added, among them an entirely new category, namely the fleeing or transferred inhabitants of bombed-out regions. According to conservative estimates, the total number of displaced people in Europe would by now exceed 40,000,000.

Among the total of 30,000,000 people who are accounted for in the present study, by far the largest number is constituted by the more than 12,000,000 persons that fled before the advancing German armies in Russia and have been evacuated beyond the Urals by the Soviet authorities. Over 10,000,000 of these are from the old territories of Soviet Russia, over 1,500,000 from the annexed territories (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Eastern Poland, Eastern Bukovina, Bessarabia); many, but not all of them, have been settled definitely in Soviet Asia. The enormous total would still be greater if internal displacements in Soviet Russia were known. So, over 400,000 inhabitants of the former Volga-German Republic have been forcibly removed (with unknown fate), and also many inhabitants of Moscow.

If we disregard Soviet Russia, 18,000,000 displaced persons still remain and none of those can be said to be permanently settled in their new habitat. More than 4,000,000 Poles (disregarding Jews) have been removed from their homes, either to make room for Germans, to work in the armament industries of the Reich, or by evacuation to Asia. The number of Balkan inhabitants uprooted by population exchanges and deportations is put at more than 1,500,000. More than 500,000 persons have been expelled or transferred from Alsace and Lorraine, while more than 3,000,000 Germans have been moved to places outside the former German Reich. Finally, more than 4,000,000 Jews, from all countries of Europe, have been expelled or deported. The fate of the Jews differs from the fate of most of the other European populations in that no attempt has been made to incorporate them into the Nazi "new order" of Europe. The aim with regard to them is not resettlement, but extermination. The majority of the 4,000,000 Jewish deportees accounted for in Professor Kulischer's book must be regarded slain.

The study is cautious in forecasting future trends, both with regard to the immediate future as with regard to postwar reconstruction, but it is none the less outspoken in its recommendations. As to the immediate future, it is held that with the forward move of the German armies checked and even reversed, evacuation outside the ring of German occupation has come to a stop so that many of the former inhabitants will now be able to return to their homes, while within the ring population movements may be expected to be more violent than ever. As to postwar reconstruction, the study emphasizes the magnitude of the task of resettlement. In some cases, repatriation is believed to be the obvious solution, but in many instances a redistribution of labor will be required. Moreover, it is held that European measures will not suffice to solve the problem of resettlement and that many Europeans will stand in need of emigration. The author is right in saying that "the political, economic, and moral reconstruction of Europe depends partly on whether these centrifugal forces can find an outlet." He is even more right in asserting that repatriation, redistribution, and migration will lead to still more tumultuous and chaotic conditions than those prevailing now if they are not tackled by effective international cooperation. This applies especially to the field of migration where the interests of the countries of emigration and immigration must be coordinated and capital be made available which would enable the labor of the former countries to be used to develop the material resources of the latter. This reviewer suggests that the discussion on postwar reconstruction should be centered about the problems raised in Professor Kulischer's study instead of indulging in the dreamland illusion of democratic "re-education" as a substitute for the democratic solution of pressing needs. A planned democracy must include the planning of population movements.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

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SOCIOLOGY PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS. By Charles Ellwood. New York: American Book Company, 1943. 408 pp. \$1.80.

This book has had a remarkable record. It has enjoyed a continuous popularity ever since its first appearance in 1910 and its present issue is the eighth time that it has required a fresh copyright. The explanation of this history is chiefly found in



its distinguishing feature. It draws its contents from the concrete situations and problems of contemporary life close to the reader's interests and is therefore quite unlike the presentation that seems to the average student a mass of authoritative concepts brought into being through the thinking of professional specialists but alien so far as his normal social experience is concerned.

No book has more faithfully kept to its thesis that the laboratory from which the student should draw his sociological understanding is social life itself. If students were free to choose their own texts not only would this book have a still greater sale but also the more advanced texts would be driven to a similar methodology in developing their presentation. The book guides the student to an evolutionary, functional conception of society but it does more than this by being itself evolutionary in its construction. Naturally, therefore, it starts with an emphasis upon primary contacts using the chief source of these, the family, the closest of all the personal experience of the student, as the basis for the exposition of sociological principles. Psychological material has been skillfully woven into the discussion so as to present to the student the idea of society as something that has resulted from past experience and that now exists in the thinking and practices of individuals in their social relationships rather than to bore him with the impression of an analysis of unrelated, contemporary social problems. The book throughout is written with the clarity of style and definiteness of meaning that is characteristic of all of the writing of the author.

ERNEST R. GROVES

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SOCIETY AND NATURE: A SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY. By Hans Kelsen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. 391 pp. \$4.00.

Dr. Kelsen's *Society and Nature* is a rather curiously proportioned essay. Following one hundred eighty-five pages of matter on primitive conceptions of nature and causation, and sixty-four pages on the analogous conceptions found in ancient Greek religion and philosophy,—two hundred forty-eight pages in all of survey and analysis of certain important aspects of the intellectual history of mankind during periods the latest of which ended some seventeen or eighteen centuries ago—there are two short chapters, eighteen pages in all, on the trend of the conceptions of nature and causality in modern science. Pre-

sumably, these two concluding chapters present the argument or reasoning for the sake of which the whole book is written.

With some hesitation, the reviewer undertakes to summarize the author's main argument as follows: In primitive societies generally, and in the thought of the ancient Greeks, concepts of nature and causation were derived from the concept of society, particularly the conception individuals formed from their experience and interpretation of the behavior of others. The result was a notion of causation approximately identical with, and derived from, the concept of retribution. The effects of natural causes were regarded as the retributive or compensatory actions of gods, and "laws of nature" were thus assimilated, in conception, to the "natural laws" which were felt to be proper to the realm of human society. Eventually, however, from about the time of Hume, there arose the modern scientific conception of nature as a realm of impersonal, non-normative causation—eventually redefined as functional interdependence. "Thus a certain dualism of nature and society arises within the theological view of the world. Man's free will signifies not only a limit of divine omnipotence . . . but also a restriction of the principle of causality. . . . The exceptional position conceded to man within nature constitutes an open contradiction in the theological system. In this contradiction the theological dualism of nature and society originates. . . . The dualism of nature and society is by no means the last step in the evolution of science. In the course of a critical analysis into the nature of the norm, this dualism, too, becomes problematical. . . . For modern sociology a social event appears as part of reality, determined by the same laws as a natural event. No essential difference between natural and social laws . . . exists as soon as the natural law itself relinquishes its claim to absolute necessity and satisfies itself with being an assertion of statistical probability. There is no fundamental hindrance to prevent sociology's arriving at this kind of laws in its own domain. In religious speculation nature was a part of society ruled according to the law of retribution. After the complete emancipation of causality from retribution in the modern notion of law, society is—from the point of view of science—a part of nature." (pp. 265-266, concluding paragraphs of main text, abridged as indicated.)

Whether the excellent summary and interpreta-

tion of primitive and classical Greek thought contained in the first two long parts of this volume constitute an adequate foundation for the reasoning of the two short concluding chapters, briefly summarized in the foregoing quotation, is perhaps a matter of opinion. The reviewer's opinion is that the tracing of a trend in conceptions of nature and causation from primitive and ancient to recent times does not prove anything in particular as to the conceptions of these matters that will eventually be found acceptable by modern man.

Dr. Kelsen's scholarship appears to be quite adequate and painstaking; there are over a hundred pages of notes collected at the close of the text. References to British research in the matters studied appear to be somewhat scanty and perhaps ill-chosen by comparison with references to German research, but this is natural under the circumstances; doubtless to a German reader American scholarship appears to lack similarly the evidences of an adequate acquaintance with the researches of German scholars.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

*University of Virginia*

**LIBERAL EDUCATION.** By Mark Van Doren. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1943. 186 pp. \$2.50.

Mark van Doren has given us a pithy and brilliantly written account of what he conceives liberal education to be. Most educators will agree with his diagnosis of the ills of liberal education as we have known it in American colleges before the present war. Few will disagree that we must rebuild a more effective liberal education as soon as military exigencies permit. There is room for debate, however, in the author's conception of liberal education and how it can most adequately be attained. An early reviewer's claim that this volume makes unnecessary further books on the subject is not borne out. Rather one can predict that the debate will become more intense. That is as it should be.

Mr. Van Doren's technique is to build up a strong case for his conception of liberal education through the effective use of apt quotations taken for the most part from writers whose ideas coincide with his. This is not to say that his synthesis is superficial. It definitely is not. Each paragraph is meaty and thought provoking as well as beautifully written. The book is challenging and should be read and re-read by all who are interested in the future of education.

Referring to the liberal arts as "the specifically intellectual arts" (p. 74) and "the maturing rituals of our civilized tribe" (p. 75), the author finds them falling under two types, language and mathematics. The former type has traditionally included grammar, rhetoric, and logic, with the latter comprehending arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. Later in the discussion natural science, philosophy, and religion are given a play.

At no point is there consideration of the place of social science in liberal education. Nor, what is more significant, are there any reasons given for this omission. One is forced to conclude that Mr. Van Doren purposely chooses not to recognize the existence of the social sciences. At one point he implies that "imagination" is more valuable than "statistics and surveys" in enabling the West to understand Eastern culture (p. 127). And again: "Man's study of man is always threatened with frustration because it is the case of a species being measured by itself, which of course is not scientific" (p. 18). Perhaps these are clues to the author's attitude toward the social sciences. It would seem, however, that the study of social science, as well as the classics and natural science, can aid in "liberating" the intellect.

It will be something of a mental jolt for many to find the author concluding that *the way* to a liberal education is through a few score "great books" such as the list which serves as the curriculum for St. John's College in Maryland. It is one thing to stress the importance to liberal education of the great works of literature, philosophy, religion, science, and history; it is something else to claim these books as an all-sufficient curriculum which can serve the needs of all students alike. And this criticism should not be construed as a defense of the college program as we have known it in the immediate past. We can agree with Mr. Van Doren that the myriad specialized courses and the extreme departmentalization of our colleges has made liberal education difficult if not impossible to achieve. But his answer is perhaps at the other extreme: "The great books are the source from which wit and humor come, and all that is rangy in the mind. They are the headwaters of sense, and the reference when we are wise" (p. 156). To separate liberal education from the problems of contemporary civilization indicates the failure to recognize that education is a functional part of the organic culture of our society.

GORDON W. BLACKWELL

*University of North Carolina*



GEORGE FITZHUGH: PROPAGANDIST OF THE OLD SOUTH. By Harvey Wish. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943. 360 pp. \$3.00.

Rather rapidly now the lives of the early leaders of social thought in this country are being produced. Also on my desk lies Theodore Maynard's *Orestes Brownson*, the life of whose hero had much in common with the spirit, if not the aims, of George Fitzhugh. There was a time, in my youth, when George Fitzhugh and Henry Hughes had all but been forgotten. Henry Hughes had been forgotten, only to be recalled by some investigations I made while at Tulane University and in Mississippi. Now the slightly better known George Fitzhugh has found a sponsor who has brought him vividly to life again in a biography of unusual merit and completeness, especially in the political and publicist aspects of his career. George Fitzhugh, unlike Henry Hughes, was not really a sociologist, although he wrote a *Sociology for the South*. Like Swift, whose career his in some respects resembles, he was not even a very good politician, but rather the literary hack for the outstanding public men who ruled the South in the decade preceding the War between the States. Like Swift, he did most of their politico-social thinking and forced them into his own mould of thought, and, like Swift, he was a political and social reactionary, tory, and royalist—and even more than Swift he was a fascist at heart. But he lacked Swift's stinging satire, for which he substituted not altogether convincing invective and abuse against his northern political opponents. He was always poor and ill paid for his propaganda work and only twice was he rewarded with political office for brief periods, once in Buchanan's and again in Johnson's administration. Yet he was the unofficial mouthpiece and chief literary apologist for the slave power before The War. All this (omitting references to Swift) Harvey Wish makes clear to the discerning reader, although he does not exactly say it in so many words.

Dr. Wish has done an excellent piece of research in unearthing the details of Fitzhugh's political and propagandist career, pursuing his investigations in various parts of the country, several of which I can verify from my own travels over the same road in unearthing the buried history of sociology and the lost discipline of social science. Wish's work is accurate in a high degree and so illuminating that future historians of pro-slavery thought in America will have to add it to the

writings of Phillips, Eaton, Jenkins, and others. It has a certain advantage over these in that it delves intensively into a specific phase of the history of that field as represented by a single individual. It must seem rather surprising, one might think, that the other researchers did not go deeper into the propaganda work of Fitzhugh, who did so much to crystallize the pro-slavery thinking in the eighteen-fifties. The answer, of course, is that their broader tasks left them with less time for such an intimate pursuit.

But with this much said, it should be clearly stated that this work is a political rather than a sociological analysis. Even the sociological analysis which Fitzhugh did make is given quite incidental and scattered notice. Only a few stray and inadequate hints are offered as to the sources of Fitzhugh's questionable sociological orientation and even his use of the term sociology is not adequately explained. He is not properly connected up with his European background (which he knew only vaguely and indirectly). And the liberal and radical movements in Europe and the North, which he fought so rabidly and understandingly with his pen, are not even minimally explained so that the general intelligent reader may understand the significance of this phase of his propagandist activity. There may have been several reasons for such omissions and I shall not guess at them, but merely record their absence and point out the fact that it leaves the story of Fitzhugh's labors incomplete from the standpoint of the full significance of what he was doing and especially why his rabid pro-slavery propagandism was doomed to ultimate failure because it was so unrealistic and uninformed regarding the movements and social conditions which he was fighting. Neither does the author always make clear why Fitzhugh so constantly engaged in misrepresentations and misunderstandings of the other side, why for example, he classed Horace Greeley and several other adversaries among infidels, free-lovers, communists, and disreputables generally, or why he identified the "Black Republicans" of the later 1850's with Communism and Fourierism. It was largely ignorance on Fitzhugh's part, and even more perhaps a spirit of time-serving partisanship. But the author does not make these things sufficiently clear. He assumes too much knowledge of the detailed history and thought of this period on the part of his readers. In some respects he has written for the historian and social scientist rather than for the general reader, and



most of the time he has kept his eye too closely on the writing hand and body movements of Fitzhugh to the partial exclusion of his surroundings, near and far. He has looked for the repercussions of Fitzhugh's voluminous propaganda rather than for the forces that made and controlled Fitzhugh's behavior. This is, of course, only natural in a way, since he was telling a story of one man's life activities. But, after all, a larger part of the story should have been of the way in which Fitzhugh came to be that way and why he became the chief literary pro-slavery apologist for the South.

But I do not wish to overemphasize these criticisms. The book is a splendid piece of work and makes a most valuable contribution to the history of political action, especially its propaganda aspect. It is weaker on the formal sociological side than it might have been, in ways already mentioned, perhaps because the author was only incidentally concerned with this phase. It contains data for the historian of sociology but little analysis or exposition of Fitzhugh's sociological system or method, while it has much more of his political system and method. The whole framework of the author's exposition would have had to be altered radically to bring out these aspects and he is not to be blamed for not writing a different book from the one he produced, especially when that book is so fine as this one is.

If there were more space I should like to point up more fully some of the new things the author has brought out,—Fitzhugh's surprisingly modern fascistic philosophy, for example. I found the same in Henry Hughes and other pro-slavery enemies of free society.

Finally, I think the publishers are to be highly commended for their splendid work in publishing their generally excellent Southern Biography Series.

L. L. BERNARD

Washington University

THE SEVEN MYTHS OF HOUSING. By Nathan Straus. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944. 322 pp. \$2.75.

The Administrator of the United States Housing Authority from 1937 to 1942 dispels the following myths:

There are no slums in my town  
Public Housing does not clear slums  
The Government should buy up the slums  
Public Housing is costly and extravagant

Public Housing does not rehouse families from the slums

The slum dweller creates the slums

Public Housing injures private business and threatens to bankrupt the country

These myths are similar to the sixteen fallacies dealt with by Edith Elmer Wood in an earlier publication, *Introduction to Housing*.

From Burlington to Baton Rouge, from Charleston to Seattle, informed readers will have heard all seven myths, particularly the first one, voiced with jowl-shaking fervor by "realistic" realtors and by the profiteers of slum conditions. "I don't believe there is a slum in D——. Why, many of the presidents were born in so-called slums; they keep moving Andrew Johnson's native slum home to find a suitable place for it." This the reviewer caught from a public hearing in 1940 in a southern city that finally did permit a real property inventory revealing one-fifth of the houses in need of major repairs or "unfit for use." Be it said, however, that no region in the country has been more responsive on housing than has the South. Informed or not, the average reader will be stirred by this book written for a time that tries men's souls.

Mr. Straus had to produce this well documented volume as an answer to the pattern of misconception he found throughout the country. However, the best answer is the observable accomplishments of the U. S. H. A. between 1937 and 1941. Six hundred local authorities saw and did something about their slums in a cooperative business arrangement with the Federal Government which did not "buy up the slums" and thus bail out slum owners as some of them so desired. As to costs, a matter involving complexities, the pioneering P. W. A. did go expensively astray but the U. S. H. A. literally "went to town," reaching the lowest income third with building costs, all factors considered, averaging 25 percent less than for similar housing attempted by private enterprise. Moreover, as Mr. Straus makes very clear, acceptable new housing provided by private enterprise is beyond the means of half the families in the United States. On that sixth myth, every sociologist knows that ecological factors, not the slum dweller, create the slums. Facts so completely demolish the seventh myth from every standpoint—costs, rentals, taxation, insurance, etc., to say nothing of comparative costs as between other long-standing subsidized services and housing—that some other sacred wailing wall is indicated for

those who are scared but yet unscarred. However, reactionary complaints are vigorously current about government housing.

Some people will not agree with Mr. Straus on certain details. Those who see postwar possibilities in assembly-lined prefabricated housing and related decentralization of industry will take issue with him though they will agree that here is no cure-all. Some will smile at certain of his illustrations on the point that land has no scarcity value in this country, but on this he is not unmindful of the need for planning that takes full account of all factors. He has the broad view gained from experience here and abroad, notably England.

Incidentally, and something not mentioned by Mr. Straus, how queer sounds the press release of October 4, 1936, when Stewart Macdonald stated that instead of lagging behind the British, America was actually ten years ahead of England,—that, at a time when we had scarcely begun while England was well on the way toward its total of 1,112,544 state-aided houses built by local authorities under a subsidized slum clearance program.

U. S. H. A.'s experience with Labor has been happy. Students of housing know that U. S. H. A. had its own highly detailed specifications, its own ideas as to what were necessary job operations, and as to standards and styling from door-locks to gutters, no enslavement to manufacturers' dictates. Mr. Straus tactfully does not bring in comparisons between C. I. O. and A. F. of L. procedures in building. He does emphasize that in the order of their importance the cost of capital comes first, then materials, and lastly labor as a comparatively small item. He certainly has written nothing to alarm either manufacturers or labor groups.

The Lanham Act, unless amended, is seen as a threat for the postwar years. Its provision for housing for war workers was so worded as to prevent the use of war housing as a means of improving housing conditions for low income families. Although the thousands of Lanham Act defense housing units were substandard from the beginning, they should be turned over immediately, says Mr. Straus, to local housing authorities wherever such exist, for administration during the war and for disposition after the war, with provision that this housing be used, so far as it is suitable, for rehousing slum families. Some of it would be demounted or demolished or otherwise disposed of.

In terms of freedom from want, Public Housing is clearly a postwar program offering more possibilities than does any other form of public works.

Mr. Straus gives nine characteristics of an ideal public works program all emphatic of large-scale employment, stimulation of private enterprise, widespread participation, and elevated morale. He urges the creation of a Department of Works and Planning whose head would be a cabinet member and whose functions would merge numerous alphabetical agencies including the National Resources Planning Board. He recommends the building of 1,500,000 new homes immediately when peace comes. His central theme is that we have done well in Public Housing but that the golden opportunity lies ahead.

It would seem that with the abundance of excellent housing literature now available, more academic courses on the sociological aspects of housing would be in order. In such courses this book deserves a primary place.

LEE M. BROOKS

*University of North Carolina*

THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: A CASE STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF MULTIPLE PURPOSE. By Joseph Sirera Ransmeier. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1942. 486 pp. \$3.00.

No doubt many persons wholly sympathetic to the objectives of the TVA have had sincere doubts as to the validity of any yardstick of power costs, since natural factors are always different. They have been even more skeptical of the TVA yardstick because here the generation of power is only one element in a multiple purpose development. Such persons should therefore welcome what appears to be an unbiased attempt to dissect and explain the economics of this fascinating experiment.

Part I, which consists of the first five chapters of the book, reviews the evolution of national policy in respect to stream control, the struggle for power rights at Muscle Shoals, and the final establishment of the comprehensive basin development program. This is followed by a discussion of the nature and impact of the TVA resale power program, this being the major point of controversy between the Authority and the privately-owned power utilities. These resale rates constitute the TVA "yardstick" and they represent far greater absolute reductions from the previously existing level of retail rates than can be explained by any concession in TVA wholesale rates. The theory which led to these reductions has two major premises: first, that the elasticity of demand for electric power is high; and second, that fixed costs play an important role



in the power distribution business. Both of these premises appear to have been validated. By being in position to demonstrate the elasticity of power demand, the TVA, instead of driving private utilities from the field, may have provided them with the key to their continued prosperity.

Part II deals with cost apportionment among the several water control objectives. Only those costs which can be traced to particular units of production or to particular benefits can be considered direct costs. All others are joint costs. Even these are not homogeneous, for in some cases the product is a threefold combination of power, navigation, and flood control and in other instances a dual purpose combination. Again, joint cost must be divided between (1) fixed charges upon joint investment and (2) joint operation and maintenance costs. In its allocation formulas the TVA has adopted the admittedly arbitrary principle of equal apportionment for the latter and has concentrated its efforts upon the problem of properly apportioning total joint investment. In a series of six chapters the author analyzes the various theories of allocation, examines the experience of the TVA with each, and comes to the rather pessimistic conclusion that joint costs can not be allocated, thus confirming what the naive layman rather suspected.

Having found allocation impossible, he then raises the question whether there is any real need for it anyway. He concludes that it is not needed to establish rate bases since competitive prices or alternate costs are sufficient guides for that purpose. The argument that allocation is needed to guide investment in multiple purpose enterprise is dismissed on the ground that government is not interested in water control from a strictly commercial standpoint and that social and intangible economic benefits are not susceptible to pecuniary evaluation. He maintains that public policy rather than prospective economic returns must be the final guide to public investment.

The final chapter is an appeal for a coordinated federal water policy and a discussion of some of the ways in which present policy might be clarified and unified. Dr. Ransmeier recommends a master plan for each major drainage basin of the country all woven into a national plan by a coordinating committee for water resource planning. This does not imply, he says, that there is any single "correct" national water plan. In such a development he does not suggest that private hydroelectric enterprise be barred from the field, though he con-

cedes that emphasis on multiple purpose may foreshadow the end of new private construction in the nation's streams.

The book is an excellent analysis of a highly technical problem. It is approached with candor and pursued with thoroughness. If the reader expects a satisfactory formula for allocating joint costs he will be disappointed. If he expects a conclusive validation of any "yardstick" of power cost, he will be disappointed. What he will discover is that the TVA yardstick, like the ordinary household variety, is a rather crude measuring instrument but that it may serve a very useful disciplinary purpose. Indeed, President Roosevelt, in advocating public water power developments, characterized such competition as "a birch rod in the cupboard".

There is no doubt that the TVA competition has forced down the price of current throughout the Southeast, but it has also demonstrated that consumption is so elastic that profits are not necessarily reduced thereby. Distribution costs per kilowatt-hour go down as the use goes up. Hence the paradox expressed by Director Lilienthal, "The rate charged for electricity, within wide limits, determines the cost." This is one great lesson which the TVA has taught. The other is that multiple purpose enterprise is the most economical socially, even if the elements of cost can not be isolated and measured. Mr. Ransmeier's case study has lifted from the welter of conflicting charges these two important truths.

PAUL W. WAGER

*University of North Carolina*

DICTIONARY OF COOPERATION. By Emory S. Bogardus. New York: The Cooperative League, U. S. A., 1943. 60 pp. \$75.

This little volume will be of considerable assistance to a movement which bases its integrity and its possibilities for growth on intensive education. As the author states, "The movement has grown to the point where many terms are used in different senses and where the use of initials and other abbreviations is confusing to the uninitiated," as well as to many "cooperators." The dictionary, which is more an encyclopaedia in miniature, is timely and important.

In one sense this publication indicates the maturing of the cooperative movement in the United States. Also, it reflects to some extent the present immaturity of the movement. Perhaps most significant, it represents a striving towards



maturity, and in that striving, some wishful thinking. Note, for example, the following from the definition of "Strike, labor": "...since the prevailing spirit is not competitive but cooperative, the need to resort to strikes in a cooperative society usually does not exist." This generalization would have been more nearly valid had it been restricted to consumer cooperative societies. There are other evidences of a lack of critical approach. cursory treatment or complete omission will be noted, of the more "progressive" elements of the cooperative movement, organizations which are trying to extend the movement to those people who most need its benefits, for example: The National Farmers Union, the Southeastern Cooperative League, the Farm Security Administration, and such outstanding local undertakings as the Red Circle Association (Richmond, Va.) and the Carroll County Cooperative Project (Georgia)—all these omissions the more noteworthy as contrasted with the inclusion of *Paddy the Cope* (Northwest Ireland), singled out presumably for its rural region significance. Further, is not inclusion of such coined words as "coopogram" and "coopportunity" at least premature? These faults might be remedied in the revisions to come.

The publishers expected disagreement with definitions. This reviewer would quarrel with a few (those of accounting terms especially, where much of accuracy has been lost in an attempt to simplify) but would commend the great majority. The book is skillfully organized, though more extensive cross-referencing would improve its usefulness.

CHARLES M. SMITH

University of North Carolina

CRIMINAL CAREERS IN RETROSPECT. By Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1943. 380 pp. \$3.50.

THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIME. By John Barker Waite. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (Chicago: Callaghan & Co.), 1943. 221 pp.

TROUBLEMAKING IN PRISON. By Jerome Gerald Sacks. Washington: The Catholic University of America, 1942. 168 pp.

Not since Healy's earlier contributions has there been a more convincing presentation of fact and argument than these books provide. The Gluecks follow the criminal in-and-outers with highly detailed investigation over a long period of time, Professor Waite combines the basic findings of research with the progressive lawyer's convictions

on effective preventive measures, and Dr. Sacks gives an inside view of the resistive prisoner as an administrative problem.

*Criminal Careers in Retrospect* is a follow-up study *par excellence*, something exemplary in modern sociology. In 1930 the Gluecks published their first 5-year study, *500 Criminal Careers* out of the Massachusetts Reformatory. Then in 1937 came another 5-year study of the *Later Criminal Careers* of the same men. The present volume covers the third 5-year period. Its main purpose is to "determine their behavior during the various forms of peno-correctional treatment to which they have been subjected from the onset of their criminal careers, and to determine the trend of their behavior over the 15-year span following expiration of their Reformatory sentences."

Of the original 500 offenders, 439 are still living and of these all but 20 percent were interviewed either personally (53.5 percent) or checked upon through close relatives or others. Of the 418 men whose behavior over the entire 15-year span can be adequately described, one-third persisted in serious criminality throughout the three periods; one-third reformed entirely; 29 percent became minor offenders; and 5 percent reformed during the first ten years, relapsed briefly in the last five years, then again became noncriminals. This is the first time in the history of penology that a large number of criminals are followed in detail from childhood to well beyond maturity. The family and personal backgrounds of the men, detailed in the earlier volumes, are retraced. After-prison failure is precipitated frequently by economic depression but no causal or conditioning aspect is more influential for success or failure, before or after prison experience, than is the offender's family background of poverty, ignorance, mobility, and its pattern of delinquency.

Like Waite, the Gluecks are concerned with predictive and preventive factors especially with regard to the recidivist. At the time of sentencing can behavior be predicted not only in the penal institution but after release? This basic question emphatically involves realistic consideration of adequate psychiatric techniques, of indeterminate sentencing, and of efficient probation and parole work. "Prevention of recidivism as the chief aim of punishment has, under existing methods and regimes, miserably failed.... The wholly indeterminate sentence or broad-zone sentence provision called for by an effective correctional system should prove just as deterrent as the fixed-sentence

or narrow-zone sentence now prevailing, if not more so." (pp. 289-290) They are proposing, as many others have done, a fundamental change in sentencing and releasing procedures, a change that has as its theoretical basis an emphasis upon the corrective aim of the criminal law. All these are precisely the points made by Waite.

The descriptions and comparisons in Parts I and II introduce the major contribution of the work in Part III where the authors set forth a series of illustrative prediction tables "of a kind which judges and others concerned in the treatment of offenders can in the future—when these and similar tables have been properly validated by checking them on other series of cases—utilize in determining the treatment needs of a *particular class of offenders at a particular age level*." Their method of constructing prediction tables is based upon 27 factors of comparison with several sub-categories for each one. Then they select 5 factors which bear considerable relationship to the particular treatment or post-treatment behavior under study. They stress repeatedly the tentativeness of the present tables but it is evident they are very near to a usable prediction technique. "The experience we have ourselves already had with our prediction tables has convinced us that at least some of them will more than justify their eventual employment by judges, parole officials, and others." (p. 220)

For the Gluecks the biologic factors loom as more significant than the environmental, but what is meant by the words "same" and "equally" in the following passage? "Our conclusion [is strengthened] that the difference between the reformed and the unreformed are more biologic than they are environmental. For example, both groups of youths had the same amount of schooling and were equally retarded in school. They had used their time equally harmfully, had been irregular church attendants to the same extent, had been subjected to the hazards of street trades at an early age, and to equally varied neighborhood influences as reflected by their frequent changes of residence." (p. 133) Obviously, and without quibbling over words, there is no such thing as equality or sameness of experience. Twins walking along the street with their father between them do not necessarily have the same experience, qualitatively or quantitatively. One may be captivated by something beautiful to his left, the other may see a ghastly act down a side street to his right, and the father, facing straight ahead in deep meditation, may be

unaware of either conditioning situation. However, this is not to deny that the rough similarity of aggregate experience in the lives of offenders is something that can be utilized along with other criteria for the production of prediction scales.

Such a wealth of data is included that it defies discussion for any short review. Fairly often the authors, with due modesty, footnote a comment such as: "This has to our knowledge never before been done in the history of criminology." And to indicate that they have even more convincing results yet to be published: "We are now engaged in a research in which well over 200 factors . . . are being considered. From among these we will undoubtedly discover more significant predictive factors than those already established."

It seems that while others have gained ground in the field of analysis and prediction, the persistent scientific work of the Gluecks is nearer to scoring against the traditional ineffectiveness of our courts and prisons, nearer if our institutions and the responsible public will quit fumbling and act by fact.

In *The Prevention of Repeated Crime* law professor Waite, whose progressive views and writings have already become familiar to students of criminology, discusses the futility of punishment as a preventive of repeated crime. He gathers no new data because ample material has already been collected to show that "punishment is not an effective preventive either of first crimes or of repeated crime." His thoroughly reasoned and fact-filled chapters leave little room for dispute.

Punishment commonly continues to be justified on a theory that it has disciplinary and prospective value, that somehow it will prevent crime. Copious statistics on multiple recidivism—some interesting examples are given in the book—make it clear that "punishment fails for the simple reason that while it may possibly beget a desire to refrain . . . it cannot be designed to foster an *ability* to refrain." This is the heart of the author's emphasis, the point the traditional "so-what-ers" seem never to consider in the stream of our "barbarous inconsistency," as Lieber referred to our penology even a century ago. Waite sees our current practices as deteriorating character, neglecting rehabilitation, and lacking constructive follow-up. "Punished" but unreconstructed repeaters, crime carriers, are discharged daily from our penal institutions. "Typhoid Mary" was institutionalized year after year because she was a continuing danger to public health. Insane per-



sons are confined for life to protect public safety. But 'punishment' is limited not by what the public needs but by what the crime will justify." Rehabilitation and indeterminate sentencing, stressed for the last seventy years, have been slowly moving toward changed practices. It is held that none of the assumed effectiveness of punishment as a socially desirable influence upon the conduct of others would be lost by the change from retaliation to rehabilitation.

The book gives at considerable length the present legislative authorization of nonpunitive methods but any generalizing as to their actual use can not safely be made because of such wide variation in State practices. The author speaks for new legislation embodying rehabilitative features that would limit the possibility of character deterioration, that would keep dangerous persons under supervision or segregation until they are fit to be free. A new program must be such as to increase the offender's capacity as well as his will to abstain from crime. When this is done and he is released there must be adequate provision for actively assisting him in law-abiding conduct.

Because rehabilitative procedures depend upon a complex of factors the last half of the book is given to appendices presenting statutory provision State by State on such matters as probation and parole; prison-made goods, industrial, educational, and medical-surgical correctives. Finally a directory of prison and relief associations is listed for the United States and Canada. There is no index.

To object is ever more current than to be objective. People who believe that indeterminate control of offenders is arbitrary and discriminatory, that much of Professor Waite's thesis is based on a false analogy to clinical medicine, will disagree, as they already have done with his beliefs, but the criminological realist will subscribe to his empiricism. While his book has little that is new for the informed student of crime, it does admirably drive forward on one salient of a many-sided front toward more effective social control, toward more wisdom and less foolishness. Some day, perhaps, the public will realize that punishment is a futile deterrent, that it does not pay back society even proportionately as well as crime pays the criminal.

*Troublemaking in Prison* is the product of the author's graduate study and three years of voluntary residence as parole interne in the District of Columbia Reformatory. Dr. Sacks worked on the records of 256 prisoners (in a total of 1,800 inmates) who had violated rules over a 6-months

period. Twenty-five (21 Negro and 4 white) men with an established pattern of resistant behavior, *repeated* troublemakers, were closely studied along with an equal number of "good" prisoners (also 21 Negro and 4 white). The method included participant observation; analysis of records; specialized tests; individual interviews; investigation of prisoners' families; and study of prison guards, some of whom assisted as cooperating observers.

The summarized findings show that the habitually resistant prisoners, as compared with the non-resisters, are short-termers; have more of a history of juvenile delinquency; have a slightly higher I.Q.; had unfavorable pre-prison employment records; are malingerers with little interest in vocational and constructive leisure time activities; tend to condone acts of cruelty as well as their own acts that brought them to prison; are critical of prison personnel and administration; belong to "problem" families particularly lacking in interest in the son's prison welfare, and so on.

Administratively it was found that "the guards' reactions to the resistant inmates' problems offered no relief and intensified the problems presented; ... classification procedure did not take into account all aspects of the prisoner's situation; punishment by prison officials was administered without previous analysis of the prisoner's total situation." If they are to reduce the number of administrative problems of maladjustment among prisoners, institution executives will have to consider more fully than they do now those psychosocial factors that cover the offender's total life pattern.

Dr. Sacks stays conservatively close to his specific subject. An example: Case HP, a sexual pervert and repetitious troublemaker in various ways, "imbecile that he was," is referred to as a man that *may* not have belonged in a prison but *should possibly* have been considered for an institution for defective delinquents. (Reviewer's italics). Some of us would say less cautiously that this individual and many others definitely need specialized, indeterminate custody. As to book and technique, very interesting. The omission of an index in such a small volume can perhaps be forgiven because the table of contents is well detailed. There are a few technical flaws that should have been edited out, and some of the informal interview questions would seem to invite more objectification for ease and precision of scoring.



This very commendable dissertation does not deal with the indeterminate sentence and parole, since its emphasis is on prison administration and inmate control, but it does imply what the Gluecks and Waite propose. It cannot be doubted that today's repeated troublemakers in prisons, some of whom are already recidivists, are most likely to be the very individuals in need of more promising correctives than are now employed.

LEE M. BROOKS

*University of North Carolina*

RACE AND CRIME. By Willem Adriaan Bonger. Translated from the Dutch by Margaret Mathews Hordyk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. 130 pp. \$1.50.

This little book, a translation of the late Professor Bonger's *Ras en Misdaad* (Haarlem, 1936), is a sort of primer on the subject of race and crime. After a brief discussion of race in general, the author reviews the history and theory of the relation of race and crime. Then comes the main body of his work, a sixty-page chapter of "case studies," that is, brief excursions into the criminality of Negroes, Jews, Alpines, Nordics, Ugo-Finns, and other "races." Finally there is a brief résumé and conclusion.

It seems to the reviewer that this book adds little to our knowledge or theory about race and crime. The author apparently takes crime statistics much more seriously than they deserve to be taken, and much of his data seems to be outmoded. Of some 250 items listed in the bibliography, a bare dozen are dated 1936 or later. Furthermore, the author has assumptions concerning race, temperament, psychic traits, etc., which will seem somewhat naive to the average American criminologist. However, his conclusions do not differ markedly from the conclusions of the leading American authorities on this subject. Certainly no one would object to the statement that "to speak of criminal races is pure nonsense."

GUY B. JOHNSON

*Southern Regional Council,  
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NEGROES IN BRAZIL. By Donald Pierson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942. 392 pp. \$4.50.

The title of this volume, *Negroes in Brazil*, is a misnomer. It should be *Negroes in Bahia*. For this thesis study is concerned with a specialized

racial pattern found in the single Brazilian state of Bahia, not of Brazil as a whole. The author is more accurate in his text than in his title. For he not only describes the pattern of culture in Bahia, but occasionally points out differences between conditions in Bahia and those of other Brazilian states. However, even in the text there is still a tendency to generalize by substituting the word "Brazil" for the word "Bahia."

The study presents the picture of a society of blacks, mixed-bloods, and whites living in racial harmony in "a friendly land where class not race determines social prestige." In the United States a drop of Negro blood makes a "colored" man, while in Bahia a drop of European blood tends to make a "white" man.

In Bahia there are class lines based on occupation and economic criteria, according to Pierson's interpretation, but none based on "color". According to his belief there is no racial consciousness. His evidence, however, does not bear this out in detail. There is for instance a loose kind of "endogamy" practiced within the classes. And the classes differ in color composition. The upper classes, the "intelligentsia" to use Pierson's terminology, is preponderantly white, with a good percentage of mixed-bloods, and only an infinitesimal proportion of blacks. The marginal class (middle class) is preponderantly mixed-blood, with a smaller proportion of whites, and a still smaller proportion of blacks. The lower class, on the other hand, is preponderantly black, with a fairly large proportion of mixed bloods, and a small percentage of whites. Now it is obvious that there is an inevitable selection by color even though the "basis" of selection were actually that of class.

The two factors in this material, class and color, have the same social direction. Pierson's study has not isolated them sufficiently to validate his monocausal interpretation.

The picture on closer examination, as a matter of fact, is quite close to that of the colored and Negro groups in the United States taken as a racial unit. There the general trend is for the mulatto to identify himself with the Negro and toward a lessening of caste line between black and mulatto. There is a tendency however, for the successful black to marry a mate of lighter skin color than himself.

In Bahia some such trend is accomplishing what Pierson calls the Aryanization of the blacks. The blacks seems to be losing ground as more mulattos "pass" to the whites, and as more blacks "pass"

to the mixed-bloods. Pierson looks upon this process with much more equanimity and racial aloofness than the Bahia blacks apparently do themselves. For they have associated in groups to study and preserve Negro history and African contributions to Brazilian culture. Reading between the lines it would appear that the blacks do not like to be "lost" despite their lack of racial consciousness. Certainly in other Brazilian states various movements, groups, and journals have arisen with an obvious racial consciousness and intent.

Dr. Robert E. Park, in his introduction to this study, says: "I have come to the conclusion that the difference between Brazil and the United States in respect to race is due to the fact that the people of Brazil have, somehow, regained that paradisaic innocence, with respect to differences of race, which the people of the United States have somehow lost."

A more probable, though less poetic, interpretation of the Bahian situation lies in certain historical determinants. The Portuguese who founded the colony were the *degradados*, exploiters, and adventurers, not farm-colonists bringing wives and children with them as was the case of the English colonists of the United States.

The Portuguese, owing perhaps to their prolonged contact with the Mohammedan Moors who were "color blind," intermarried with Indians and Negroes, took them as concubines, and enslaved them. The Portuguese were followed by Italian and Spanish immigrations, also Mediterranean peoples with imperceptible racial consciousness. The Catholic Church, which has dominated the religious life of the Brazilian community since its founding, has encouraged these racial intermarriages.

The "Bahianese" are not an isolated phenomenon. For the Portuguese have followed the same pattern in India in the establishment of the mixed-blood Goanese, and in China in producing the Christian, mixed-blood Macanese.

The pattern in the United States has followed that common to the racial contacts of North European stocks,—English, Dutch, and German. This is to be seen not only in the United States, but in South Africa, India, and the East Indies. Miscegenation has taken place, but the *mores* have fixed a caste endogamy implemented by the legal code.

The pattern found in Bahia is certainly one way racial contact can eventuate under a specific set of

conditions. However, there is just as certainly another resolution possible. Something in the nature of a biracial system of vertical rather than horizontal caste lines, as has been suggested by Dr. Guy B. Johnson, seems a more probable eventuality in the United States—given its historical and cultural background—than does the Bahian pattern.

This volume is published in The University of Chicago *Sociological Series*. Its timeliness is that it deals with Brazil. Its importance for readers in the United States lies in its presentation of a solution of a Negro-White racial problem at variance with that which is familiar to the citizen of the United States.

Systematically, this study is a description of a colored society presented as a document attached to the racial ideologies of Drs. Robert E. Park and Louis Wirth. Grateful acknowledgment is made to the Rosenwald Fund for financial support of the enterprise.

FLETCHER McCORD

*University of Kansas*

THE WPA AND FEDERAL RELIEF POLICY. By Donald S. Howard. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1943. 879 pp. \$4.00.

This volume, we are reminded in the foreward by Joanna C. Colcord, Director of the Charity Organization Department of the Russell Sage Foundation, is the third in a series dealing with emergency relief programs in the United States. *Unemployment Relief in Periods of Depression*, by Leah Feder, published in 1936, covers the period from 1857 to 1922. *The Burden of Unemployment* by Philip Klein is a study of unemployment relief measures in fifteen American cities in the winter of 1921-1922. The present volume, Miss Colcord writes, carries the story forward through the depression of the 1930's into the 1940's. But there is a gap. In the present volume there is but slight reference to the years of the depression prior to 1935,—to the attempts of local governmental units and States to deal with relief problems from 1929 to 1932; the program of federal loans to states and local units of government, 1932-1933; the Emergency Relief Administration, with its subdivisions and special programs within the general program—the Civil Works Administration, the rural rehabilitation division, the rural rehabilitation corporations, the program of aid to youth which developed into the separate National Youth Administration which was to survive its parent



organization by only a few months. Miss Colcord points out the "enormous difficulties" involved in the appraisal of "a program so subject to sudden change as has been that of the WPA." Within the seven years that its program had been in operation, there had been no point "where one can draw a line and say: 'Here is the end of a definite phase; from this point we can project the future course of events.'" The primary purpose of the study, we are told, is with lessons to be drawn from WPA and their application to future relief programs. For this purpose a study also of ERA as detailed as Mr. Howard's analysis of WPA is needed.

The program which Mr. Howard attempts to interpret as a guide for future action began its existence by radically changing the nature of its program before it got started. When in 1935 the President decided that the federal government must get out of "this business of relief," he created by executive order an agency which he called the Works Progress Administration. The relief of all those who were "unemployable" was to be returned to the States or their subdivisions. Employment for other needy and unemployed would be furnished by about fifty federal agencies, among which the Public Works Administration and the Bureau of Public Roads were to play leading roles. The Works Progress Administration was to coordinate the employment programs of these various agencies. As a minor function WPA might "employ on small useful projects the residue of the needy unemployed not given jobs by the other agencies." This work program was to become the agency's primary function.

The federal government did not get out of the business of relief. WPA insisted always that it was a work program. It proclaimed this aim in box-car letters on placards conspicuously displayed at every project. But the program in the mind of the public remained a relief program. The story as told in this volume makes it clear that whether it might have been something else under the administration unhampered by Congress, that branch of the government by repeated legislation defining eligibility labeled the program *relief*.

To those familiar with the program it will be no surprise to read that Congress was largely responsible for whatever political coloring WPA took on. Not only was it required by law that the appointees to the upper positions be confirmed by the senate, but a much larger group of administrative personnel in actual practice came under the political

patronage of senators and representatives in Congress.

From his analysis of the organization and program of WPA, the eligibility rules under which men and women were employed, the numbers employed, and other issues involved, Mr. Howard reaches certain conclusions among which the following are perhaps the most important:

"That the federal government should participate in establishing a broad nation-wide program of direct relief to protect families in all parts of the country from falling below a socially defensible standard of living."

That "the right of relief . . . must be superseded by a prior right—the right to live without having to rely on relief."

That the federal government has rightly assumed a particular responsibility for the employable. That the WPA program of work has been of "inestimable value to millions of workers who otherwise would have been idle and in many instances, without means of subsistence."

That normal work is preferable to the WPA type of employment.

This study should prove a valuable reference book not only to leaders and students of public assistance, but to legislators and others planning future programs of relief.

ROY M. BROWN

*University of North Carolina*

PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK, 1943. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. 491 pp. \$5.00.

Due to the difficulties of war-time transportation the National Conference of Social Work this year celebrated its seventieth anniversary by holding regional conferences instead of the usual annual meeting. Two of the three regional conferences originally planned were held, the first in New York City in March, and the second in St. Louis in April. The Cleveland meeting scheduled for May was cancelled almost at the last minute.

The forty-five selected papers included in this volume of the *Proceedings*, however, are drawn from the papers prepared for all three of the regional conferences, which had programs "in large measure identical as to topics and, in some instances, as to authors." Again the contents of the *Proceedings* are arranged under topics of reader interest, rather than by following the divisions into five Conference Sections. Almost the entire volume is concerned with problems of war and



reconstruction. In fact, the President of the Conference himself, Mr. Fred K. Hoehler, was so engaged in foreign relief and rehabilitation in North Africa, that he was unable to attend the Conference and deliver the usual Presidential address.

The main impression one receives in reading these selected papers is that social workers no longer think so much in terms of serving a particular group of clients, or a special agency, community, region or nation. Their main job now is to build up an international system of social security. For this reason the *Proceedings* should prove of interest not only to social workers, who wish to keep up with the maddening pace of social change, but to other professional groups—ministers, teachers, physicians, psychiatrists—to politicians and statesmen—and to the average citizen who also has a stake in the future.

WILEY B. SANDERS

*University of North Carolina*

THE FAMILY AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. By Joseph Kirk Folsom. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1943. 755 pp. \$4.00.

The fundamental purpose of this book is to present as complete as possible a picture of the contemporary American family in relation to the historical development of the family as a social institution to recent and present social change, and with special emphasis on the relationship between the family and the democratic political and social organization. The author takes the position that sociologists need to participate more actively in the actual development of social changes and that they should not be wary of championing specific values. The application of this point of view to the family is stated as follows: "I believe that reforms in the family system, in the relations between men and women, and between adults and children, are not to be postponed and awaited as by-products of other democratic changes; but that they are important keys for the release of other forces and constitute in themselves a part of the very essence of Democracy" (p. viii).

In contrasting the purpose of this volume with its predecessor (*The Family: Its Sociology and Social Psychiatry*, 1934), Folsom says, "My specific recommendations for action were mainly in terms of 'social psychiatry' or 'individual adjustments,' which I placed in the intellectually dramatic climax near the end of the book. The 'climax' of the present volume is the study of the needed

changes on the societal, cultural level. Individual personality adjustments are studied not as 'the only thing we can do about it,' but as a source of guidance as to *what social action* is needed" (p. viii).

Certain sections of the book call for special comment. The first of these is the chapter on The Family and the Evolution of Democracy. Folsom looks upon the concept of a person-centered society as the most essential meaning of democracy. Such a person-centered society "divorces the person from his social place or role. It allows him to choose his place. It allows him to change his place, for all time or for periods of time" (p. 221). The family's function is to be itself "person-centered," and to train its members to assume their places in a democratic society.

The author favors what he designates as a "democratic family-and-population policy." "Democracy has faith that the right people really want to have the right number of children if the conditions are made right; that is, if the penalties now suffered by those who maintain the race are removed, and if home life with three or four children is made compatible with the leisure and personal development of the parents" (p. 240).

In the section on Men and Women in a Democracy the author expresses the belief that we are far from attaining, either ideologically or in reality, a true equality for women, but that such an attainment is necessary for any future democratic development.

The book presents two unsolved fundamental problems: "First, how can people find the mates who will assure monogamous, creative, enduring love in time to bear children in early adult years? Second, how can we harmonize the need for adult achievement and self-realization, especially of women, with the needs of young children for that almost continuous attention which their development apparently requires?" (p. 662).

Dr. Folsom's treatment of the subject of the family is scholarly, factual, and thought-stimulating. I personally feel that he has related it too closely to the events of the war as they were developing at the time of writing; but perhaps such direct application gives the work a reality that would be lacking in a more theoretical treatment. It is a good book, well worth reading and studying.

DONALD S. KLAISS

*University of North Carolina*

BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY. By G. E. Hubbard. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. 93 pp. \$1.25.

**BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST.** By E. M. Gull. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations in association with the Oxford University Press, 1943. 272 pp. \$3.00.

To the social scientist as just a typical citizen who wants to know whether, in the Far Eastern theater of war and peace, we Americans can count on the cooperation of the British on the basis of ideals for a postwar world to which we ourselves have already subscribed, these books have a constructive significance. Brought up on the idea that the Open Door is our own peculiar policy instituted by Secretary Hay at the end of the nineteenth century, we are reminded that we ourselves adopted its kernel principle in the first half of that century, but that it had already been Britain's own prior policy, in turn associated with her dependence on free commercial opportunity throughout the world. As in some sense a corollary of this policy and as a guarantee against policies of exclusive rights and monopolies by other Powers in China, Britain had also maintained the doctrine of a strong and "independent" (or, may I say, responsible) China. Thus, one after another of the much disputed and variously distorted issues of British foreign policy—from the opium trade to her hesitancy as to joining the United States in sanctions against Japan's Manchurian venture of 1931 and the closing of the Burma Road from July to October 1940—are treated from the standpoint of history, realism, and British long-run policies. Whether regarding her Yangtze valley sphere of interest or the lease of the port of Weihaiwei, Hubbard, with plausible evidence on his side, will not permit the classifying of Britain's policy with the imperialisms of France, Germany, or Czarist Russia. Nor will either he or E. M. Gull allow United States citizens to keep our illusions that we did not back up the entire treaty-port system and attempt to squeeze all the profit we could out of it in practice and by Congressional enactment. Although his historico-scientific rigor and restraint slip in a place or two and he would appear satisfied (more so than Gull, in fact) not to give much weight to some very concrete pressures upon British policy (such as the Communist-Nationalist sweep down the Yangtze in the summer of 1926), his treatment is broadly sound, successfully condensed, and interesting.

E. M. Gull has a more difficult task than the Far Eastern Research Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Hubbard). If he

were only as up-to-date in his method of handling economic facts and statistics as he is progressive in his basic ideas of world economics, the reader would have relatively little complaint to make. And should the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, really wish the rank and file of intelligent Americans to be informed about the background facts, the kinds of politico-economic thinking and interest, the sets of prejudice, antagonism, and goodwill, which should be considered in postwar economic relations between Occidentals and Far Easterners, it would take books of this sort, put two-thirds or more of their content into a statistical appendix, and *transform* the rest into graphically illustrated popular documents, thoroughly edited and indexed. I am not naive when I say Gull will astonish the Americans nurtured on suspicion of British imperialism in the Far East, particularly, when, near the end of the volume, they learn his own experience in the Far East.

All Southeast Asia is his field, and the interests of the entire British Empire his major theme. Yet very suitably, his keynote is the treaty-port system which has provided the rights, the protection, the homebase so to speak, through which foreign economic interests have built up and stimulated the Chinese in building up, both a sizeable export and import momentum and an enormous new economic life in China—with all the consequences that entails. Though most of his material is objective, obviously some of his most interesting discussions are those where he comes to grips with "unities," complexes, and problems, involving intangible elements as well. For instance, his discussion of the "incompatibilities" within the system, which were evoked centrifugally by certain later events; his examination of the relation between Imperial Preference applied in shutting Japan's piece goods out of British Malaya, on the one hand, and Japan's plans to carve out her own East Asiatic ("preferential"?—M.T.P.) Co-Prosperity Sphere, on the other hand; China's postwar problem of proving her "credit worthiness" under the new system; or the implications of the Atlantic Charter for a new type of economic cooperation among all parties concerned.

These two books can be practical because of the huge amount of previous documentation upon which the larger and more specialized works underlying them, were based, and because of the clear and realistic thinking of their authors. From the more strictly cultural, ideological, and still



more narrowly sociological viewpoints, of the professional social scientist, moreover, certain over-all conceptions, institutionalized complexes, and trends, are suggested. Here, however, far more comprehensive documentation, and far more elaborate socio-historical research, are necessary

before these conceptions, complexes, and trends can be satisfactorily defined, systematically treated, and related to multitudinous exterior factors which condition them.

MAURICE T. PRICE

*Champaign-Urbana, Illinois*

### BRIEFER COMMENT

**BROWN AMERICANS: THE STORY OF A TENTH OF THE NATION.** By Edwin R. Embree. New York: The Viking Press, 1943. 248 pp. \$2.75.

This volume is a rewriting of Embree's *Brown America*, which was published in 1931. "As I wrote this new version," says the author, "I was struck by the changes that have come even in the twelve years since I first tried to tell the story of the Brown Americans. There is still far to go before this tenth of our people shares fully either in opportunities or achievements. But in the struggle toward equality the tone has changed. Negroes are no longer so humble as they used to be. Today they are not so much asking for fair treatment as demanding their rights as citizens in a democracy. And their claims are bolstered by the rising power of the hundreds of millions of colored peoples—yellow, brown, and black—all over the world."

Like its predecessor, this book will provide stimulating reading for those who want a sympathetic and inspirational overview of the rise and progress of Negro Americans.

G. B. J.

**RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITICS.** By Ruth Benedict. New York: The Viking Press, 1943. 273 pp. \$2.50.

This is a new edition, with slight revision, of this excellent book which was first published in 1940. It is well written and is useful to the layman as well as the scholar.

G. B. J.

**THE PUEBLO OF SANTA ANA, NEW MEXICO.** By Leslie A. White. *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 44, No. 4, Part 2, October-December, 1942. Published by the American Anthropological Association.

This very competent ethnological treatise is based on the author's field work over a period of several years. It covers the following main topics: history of Santa Ana, setting and background, cosmology and pueblo life, social organiza-

tion, government and social life, corn and the cosmos, hunting, war, science and witchcraft, paraphernalia and ritual. The introduction contains some excellent comments on the methodology and strategy of conducting field work among the pueblos.

G. B. J.

**SOCIAL FACTORS IN CRIME, AS EXPLAINED BY AMERICAN WRITERS OF THE CIVIL WAR AND POST CIVIL WAR PERIOD.** By Ellen Elizabeth Guillot. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. 1943.

"According to American observers and students of the period, 1860-1885, . . . when . . . institutions were not soundly constructed, or when their functions were not realized competently and responsibly, and when the patterns of behavior characteristic of groups of people differed from predominating standards, crime was a natural consequence."

The above statement immediately demonstrates that there has been a continuity in the approach to crime. Students of the period noted the basic factors which are still accepted as being "causes" of crime.

The limitations of the study are noted by the author. Practically all of the sources are from the Eastern section of the United States because it was there that interest in the subject was predominant. The absence of extensive statistical data is justified by the paucity of such data.

J. E. F.

**WORLD WARS AND REVOLUTIONS: THE COURSE OF EUROPE SINCE 1900.** By Walter Phelps Hall. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1943. 406 pp. \$3.50.

This volume was printed to meet the suddenly increased demands for a short text in contemporary European history. It is composed of the relevant chapters of *The Course of Europe Since Waterloo*, by Hall and Davis, an excellent and widely used text in survey courses in European history, combined with an introductory chapter on the ante-



cedents of the first World War and a final chapter bringing the narrative from the Balkan campaign of 1941 through the German defeat at Stalingrad. The result is a dependable and pleasing text partaking, within shorter compass, of the many virtues of its larger progenitor. The book is well illustrated, has adequate maps and reading lists, and an unusually full index. It deserves and will undoubtedly receive wide usage, especially in the service courses for which it is obviously intended.

J. L. G.

**THE MISSING VALUE IN MEDICAL SOCIAL CASE WORK.**

By Claire A. Peugnet. St. Louis: Hilton Printing Company, Inc., 1943. 115 pp. \$1.50.

This book will undoubtedly be a helpful guide to all Catholic case workers in expressing the Catholic doctrine as related to case work. Because the reviewer is not familiar with the Catholic dogma, it must be taken for granted that the writer is accurate in her presentation of the religious concepts.

The non-Catholic case worker cannot fail to be impressed with the influence and authority of the Church and its effect upon our Catholic clients and patients. It is true, as the writer brings out, that all case workers need to take into consideration the cultural backgrounds of their patients. This is a 'must' not only in relation to the Catholic traditions but all religious faith and creeds.

Many of the statements and some of her conclusions and recommendations will probably be questioned and not accepted by the non-Catholic readers. Surely though we will agree that many of us do need to develop a more adequate understanding of the spiritual needs of man in practicing social case work.

R. E. B.

**MACHINES FOR AMERICA.** By Marshall Dunn and Lloyd N. Morrisett. New York: World Book Company (America at Work), 1943. 164 pp.

**POWER FOR AMERICA.** By Marshall Dunn and Lloyd N. Morrisett. New York: World Book Company (America at Work), 1943. 164 pp.

**WINGS FOR AMERICA.** By Marshall Dunn and Lloyd N. Morrisett. New York: World Book Company (America at Work), 1943. 244 pp.

The importance of the machine in the everyday life of America is the theme of *Machines for America*. Farm machinery, factory machinery, the wedge, the screw, the wheel, and various other types of machines are discussed. Glassmaking

and the story of steel fascinate the boys and girls on tour through the plants. Graphs, pictures and diagrams add much to the readableness of the material.

Teachers of physics in high school will find *Power for America* excellent supplementary material on the fundamentals of motors, the use of oil in motors, and the relation of electricity to power. Social studies groups will find this presentation of value in observations concerning the American scene and way of life. The average boy will be interested in this not too technical treatment of the subject.

To the hundreds of boys in their teens who stand ready literally to devour each new book on aviation, *Wings for America*, with its condensed treatment of the many phases of the subject, will be a welcome title. The would-be pilots and bombardiers will find here clear-cut statements regarding their fitness for the job. The portrayal of the marvels of aircraft production will appeal to girls and boys alike. The clarity of language, excellence of illustrations, scope of material included and the good bibliographies make it a splendid book on the most popular subject among high school youth.

In the opinion of this reviewer the books in this series will prove widely useful when the other titles projected are published; but their value will lie chiefly in their use as supplementary reading for courses in social science and pure science, and for recreational reading for the boys, rather than in their use as textbooks, as planned by the authors.

H. M. P.

**JOURNEY INTO AMERICA.** By Donald Culross Peattie. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943. 276 pp. \$3.00.

To the student of folk sociology, there is much of value here both in folk wisdom and folk beauty, while the general reader will delight in the descriptive poetic prose and historic incident, made glamorous as well as factual. Although there appears little continuity in the series of sketches of personalities and places—there being only a mere thread weaving and holding together the incidents as they pass in revue—nevertheless, we do have a story of how "we became what we are." The book's essential value is descriptive in the sense that it portrays, not only the folk, but their regional variations and the problems which arise because of readjustments.

K. J.

**ABBREVS. (A DICTIONARY OF ABBREVIATIONS).** Compiled by H. J. S. (Herbert John Stephenson). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. 126 pp. \$1.75.

*Abbrevs.* is a valuable adjunct to any office. The section on Federal Agencies alone makes the book worth having. However, a brief Foreword on "how and when to use" would have been helpful

lest the uninitiated get the impression that an abbreviation is not only permissible but perhaps even preferable "at all times and in all places," whereas they should always be employed sparingly and discriminatingly. But where one is confronted with an unfamiliar contraction or grouping of letters, *Abbrevs.* will, in most cases, come to the rescue.

K. J.

### NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

**PRIMER FOR PARENTS, 12 TO 18—THE CRITICAL SCHOOL YEARS.** By Frank Ashburn. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1943. 196 pp. \$2.50.

**AN ANALYSIS OF STATE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN THE THIRTEEN SOUTHERN STATES.** Study No. 13 of the Bureau of Research School of Business Administration. By Paul Barnett. Knoxville: Division of University Extension, the University of Tennessee, January, 1944. 60 pp. Paper.

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